Why the West Needs Ukraine in Its Defense Industry

From strike drones to joint production with Rheinmetall, Ukraine has already begun reshaping Western defense industries. What started as emergency wartime improvisation is turning into a strategic necessity: integrating Ukraine’s defense sector into Western supply chains is no longer charity, but the only way to ensure resilience against modern threats.

The full-scale war has shown that the global security system can no longer be built on the illusion of “eternal peace” or faith in diplomacy as the sole tool for deterring aggressors. Europe and the United States have realized that their defense production capacities are unprepared for high-intensity warfare. Ammunition shortages, delays in air defense deliveries, or a lack of munitions have become challenges no less serious than the Russian army itself.

This is where Ukraine can and must become part of Western defense production chains. This is not only about supporting Kyiv in the war but also a strategic task – building a shared infrastructure for collective defense capable of withstanding any shocks.

Ukraine’s Defense Industry Has Proven Its Innovativeness on the Battlefield

Over more than three years of war, Ukraine’s defense-industrial complex has demonstrated its ability to create weapons that are changing the very logic of modern warfare. From strike drones and electronic warfare systems to modifications of Soviet-era equipment, Ukraine has become a laboratory for real innovations that work not in theory but on the battlefield. Ukrainian developments in the fields of UAVs and artillery systems are now being studied by leading military experts in the U.S. and NATO.

This experience cannot be ignored. Integrating Ukrainian solutions into Western production chains means accelerating the adaptation of Western armies to new types of threats – from massive drone attacks to missile campaigns.

Are There Already Major Examples of Ukraine’s Defense Industry Integrating with the West?

Concrete examples already exist of how Ukraine’s defense industry is being integrated into Western chains. One key case is joint projects with the German conglomerate Rheinmetall, which opened several joint service centers for armored vehicle repairs in Ukraine in 2023–2024. In 2025, the company announced its readiness to localize the production of Fuchs armored vehicles and potentially assemble Lynx infantry fighting vehicles.

Another case is the collaboration with the British company BAE Systems, which opened an office in Kyiv and is working on transferring technologies for artillery systems and ammunition. The French-Belgian company Thales is negotiating joint production of medium-range air defense systems, while the Italian company Leonardo is exploring the transfer of technologies for electronic warfare.

Equally notable is the development of the “Danish model,” where partner funds are directly allocated to the production of Ukrainian “Bohdana” howitzers and other military technologies. Within a year, this scheme has enabled a fourfold increase in gun production and created hundreds of new jobs.

A separate dimension of integration is the Brave1 cluster, which connects Ukrainian startups in the fields of drones and air defense with American and European investors. Thus, this is not about theoretical prospects but about real production lines already operating in partnership with the West.

Collective Defense Requires Expanded Production Bases

The defense budgets of the U.S. and the EU are growing, but weapons production remains concentrated in a few centers – Germany, France, the U.S., and the UK. Such concentration makes the system vulnerable to disruptions in logistics or political decisions. If the supply chains for shells or air defense systems break down, it immediately impacts the combat readiness of all allies.

Ukraine can offer not only additional production sites but also its own network of enterprises already adapted to operating in wartime conditions. The West gains an opportunity to diversify risks by placing part of its production in a country with the most extensive combat experience in armed confrontation in recent decades.

Joint Production Reduces Dependence on Third Countries

The war has proven that dependence on raw materials and components from third countries, particularly in Asia, is critically dangerous. China, which controls the lion’s share of rare earth metals and electronics production, could become a pressure point on the West. If the U.S. and the EU aim for strategic autonomy, they must minimize this dependence.

Integrating Ukraine into Western defense chains is a chance to establish a full production cycle within the democratic world: from the extraction of titanium, lithium, uranium, or graphite to the production of drones, ammunition, and armored vehicles. Ukraine can become the critical element that enables the creation of a closed supply system without weak links.

Numbers and Scale – Why Integration Is Critically Necessary

The war in Ukraine has become a test for global defense production. As of 2024, the EU and the U.S. together could produce about 1.2 million 155-mm shells per year. In contrast, Russia, according to NATO estimates, produced 3.5–4 million shells annually in 2023–2024, relying on both its own factories and supplies from North Korea and Iran. Ukraine, in 2025, reached a production level of about 1 million munitions of various calibers per year – compared to less than 100,000 in 2021.

The drone sector is even more telling. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, production was around 50,000 drones in 2023, over 1 million in 2024, and has risen to several million in 2025. For comparison, Russia, with Iranian supplies, can produce 1.5–2 million drones annually.

Importantly, the U.S. and EU industries also need the Ukrainian factor. The European Defence Agency estimates that by 2030, the EU must at least triple its shell production. Without Ukrainian production sites, this plan will remain on paper. Joint production with Ukraine simultaneously addresses two issues: meeting the front’s needs now and creating reserves for future crises.

Europe Needs an Advantage in Time and Endurance

The Kremlin is betting on exhaustion, believing the West cannot sustain the pace of supplies to Ukraine. The response must be the creation of joint production centers to eliminate ammunition shortages. If Europe integrates Ukraine’s defense industry into its structure, it will mean a shift from short-term aid packages to a long-term strategy of endurance.

Ukraine can produce not only for itself but also for its allies, providing an operational reserve in case of a large-scale war in Eastern Europe or the Balkans. This is an investment not in “someone else’s war” but in one’s own defense capability.

Integration of Ukraine Is Not a Gesture of Solidarity but a Strategic Necessity

Incorporating Ukraine into Western defense production chains is not just about supporting a country at war. It is about strengthening the entire architecture of collective security. For the EU and the U.S., this is an opportunity to close critical gaps in arms supplies, reduce dependence on vulnerable markets, and gain an ally that has already proven its effectiveness in a war against an army considered the second strongest in the world.

Ukraine’s experience, resources, and production capacities can become the missing element the West needs to transform its defense chains from tentative and slow to flexible, resilient, and capable of rapid response. Integrating Ukraine is not a future bonus but an urgent requirement of today’s geopolitical reality.

Bohdan Popov, Head of Digital at the United Ukraine Think Tank, communications specialist and public figure