Alexei Dyumin: Russia's Old-New Center of Power
If the Kremlin is preparing a successor, the face of that change has long been on the horizon, wearing a uniform and looking down at Putin from behind. Alexei Dyumin is not just another governor, not just another general. He is a product of the evolution of Putin's state: a bodyguard who became a strategist, a governor who became a figurehead.
It is Dyumin, not another Kovalchuk descendant or a sluggish Patrushev Jr. who is increasingly appearing on the internal list of “What's next for Putin?”
Competition for Succession
The Kremlin is not a Soviet Politburo with cemented rules, but a hybrid oligarchic system where power is transferred not by law but by trust. And Putin's trust is a scarce currency. Of all the candidates for the role of “successor,” only a few have this currency in sufficient quantities. Dumin is one of them. His name is getting louder and louder on the list of “Kremlin princes.” Kovalchuk is too old. Patrushev Jr. is too bookish. Dyumin, on the other hand, is “combatant,” “proven,” and “knows the system from the inside.” And most importantly, he is from the “body”. Someone who knows where and how many elevators there are in the presidential residence.
The fact that Dyumin has never been involved in public intrigues does not mean he is weak. On the contrary, in the Kremlin's logic, silence often means strength. All of his main rivals have either burned out or turned into a boring clip. Even Shoigu, who seemed untouchable a few years ago, now looks like a museum piece.
What Will Happen After Putin
The question of post-Putin Russia is being raised more and more often, and the answers are becoming more and more realistic. If there is no “Tank on Red Square” or “elite grizzly” scenario, then the Kremlin will rely on a technocratic strongman. This is exactly how Putin wants to see the future. A strongman who knows how to talk to the regions, modernize the defense industry, keep the vertical and not ask unnecessary questions. Here, Dyumin looks like a prototype of a new Putinism without Putin. Not a caricatured copy, but a functional substitute.
Putin himself, if he does hand over power, will do so only to someone who does not need to explain anything. Dumin knows the schedule, rhetoric, style, and even the pace of speech. He is not just a performer. He is a fragment of Putin's mentality, cast in the bronze of the security forces.
Why Dyumin
Since 1994, he has been in the Federal Security Service, since 1999 in Putin's personal security, and since 2008 he has been an aide to the prime minister. It's not just a career, it's access to the body. For an autocracy, it is important not only who executes the order, but who tacitly understands it. Dyumin is one of the few people who was in the narrowest circle of trust.
After 2012, he was the deputy head of the Presidential Security Service. In 2014, he joined the GRU, the leadership of the Special Operations Forces. In 2015, he was appointed Vice Chief of the General Staff of the Army. In 2016, he became Deputy Minister of Defense. This is a power puzzle that has been assembled into a figure convenient for transit.
In 2016, Dyumin was thrown into the governor's chair in Tula. It was a political experiment: could a security official become a “soft power” for domestic consumption? It turned out that he could. Industrial parks were created for him, new educational programs were introduced, and import substitution was launched at the regional level. But most importantly, he stayed in the game in Moscow, maintaining close ties with the administration, business, and the army. No other governor had such direct and regular communication with Putin.
The Path of a “Kremlin Prince”
The Russian system does not openly train heirs. They are pulled up, tested, and tested. First, a bodyguard. Then special operations. Then the region. Then the National Council. Now – the defense. With each step, Dyumin becomes part of a new model of managed transit of power. His position as an aide to the President on defense issues is not only a signal, it is an attempt to give him “bail” on one of the most painful areas where failure is fatal and success is strategic.
In 2014, Dumin was at the headquarters. He was the one who coordinated the Special Operations Forces, participated in the removal of Yanukovych, and led the initial phase of the annexation of Crimea. There is every reason to believe that he was one of the designers of the hybrid format of the war in Donbas. All these “militias,” “Ikhtamnets,” and “volunteer corps” are not chaos, they are engineering. And this engineer was Dyumin. It was then that Russia mastered the “war without war” formula, and it was Dyumin who developed its first applied cases. For this, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation and a shadow career.
Drone Direction
In 2024, Dyumin took on a new role as Assistant to the President for the Defense Industry. And the first topic he deals with is drones. FPV, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, ground drones. This is a strategic topic. And it is this topic that Dyumin is entrusted with. He is in charge of a new block, collaborates with Manturov, Belousov, Yevtyukhov, and supports the Kulibin Club. This is no longer just helping the army; it is building a new defense industry.
It is significant that it was at the time of the Prigozhin crisis that Dyumin was back in the center. According to rumors, he was the channel for negotiations with Prigozhin. A common past with Wagner, special operations in Syria, and personal loyalty all came together. Dumin is a “contact” that both militants and generals understand.
Does Dyumin Justify the Regime's Trust in Him
Dyumin is not a public politician. He does not create factions or build a media image. He is a figure of trust. And this is his strength. The State Council, which he oversees, is becoming a platform for modernized governance. His role is to coordinate governors, to sew the vertical together, to prepare new decisions. This is a new type of shadow politburo. He is not the head of the State Council, but he is its architect. And he is also the curator of the new defense industry. A new type of coordinator is emerging in the military-industrial complex, which used to be dominated by “thieving directors.”
Now Dyumin is a liaison between the front, the regions, and the Kremlin. He travels to the frontline regions, presents awards, opens BRICS games, and negotiates with governors. His influence is growing. And with it, the weight of the position he holds is growing. His involvement in the military-industrial complex, direct contact with Belousov, ties with Manturov, and settling issues with governors all form a parallel vertical of influence.
Bohdan Popov, Head of Digital at the United Ukraine Think Tank, communications specialist and public figure