Post-Putin Russia: What Awaits Ukraine and the World
Is Russia capable, after Putin, of choosing the path of genuine democratization, or will imperial ambitions remain dominant?
Sooner or later, the era of Vladimir Putin will come to an end, and the question of Russia’s future will arise with exceptional urgency for both Ukraine and the entire world. However, the most critical question remains: what will happen next, and what possible scenarios for further developments can be envisioned? It is clear to everyone that even after the death of a dictator, Russia will not change automatically, and changes in state policy under such conditions are by no means indisputable. So, what scenarios are possible?
Transfer of Authoritarian Power: Preservation of the Regime under the “Venezuelan Scenario”
The first scenario envisions the preservation of an authoritarian regime after Putin. Essentially, this would be “Putinism without Putin.” Most likely, power would be inherited by a representative of the current security elite, who would position themselves as a continuator of Putin’s course. In such a case, the new leadership, relying on security structures, would continue all the key priorities of Putin’s policy: maintaining dictatorship within the country, imperial ambitions, and confrontation with the West.
On the international stage, such a “post-Putin” authority is unlikely to immediately alter its aggressive course. The war against Ukraine would likely continue, although the regime would fail to achieve success in it. However, the likelihood of freezing the war under this scenario is somewhat higher, as for any post-Putin government, the war against Ukraine would no longer carry the intensely personal connotation of a “personal vendetta.”
Russia’s economy, under the influence of sanctions and military expenditures, would increasingly degrade. The country risks repeating the fate of isolated oil dictatorships like Venezuela. From a security perspective, the threat to Ukraine and the West would persist: even without Putin, the regime would continue to view the West as its main adversary and the source of all troubles, thus maintaining a confrontational policy.
In essence, the realization of the “Venezuelan” scenario (i.e., when the successor of an authoritarian ruler continues the same policy, as happened in Venezuela after the death of Hugo Chávez) implies long-term instability: a Russia weakened by sanctions and military defeats but still aggressive, retaining significant military potential. Such a development appears quite likely in the short term, as a change in the face at the top of power does not necessarily mean a change in its essence. At the same time, this scenario could, over time, evolve into an even deeper crisis for Russia and its disintegration, as the state’s problems will not disappear.
Should We Give a Chance to Liberal Changes – the Scenario of a New “Perestroika” and Gradual Reforms in the Russian Federation
The second possible path for post-Putin Russia is internal changes and partial liberalization, a kind of“new perestroika.” Historically, after the departure of authoritarian leaders, Russia has often experienced periods of regime softening and reforms from Khrushchev’s “thaw” after Stalin’s terror to Gorbachev’s perestroika after the stagnation of Brezhnev’s era. A similar scenario could unfold now: the rise to power of a more pragmatic successor (for example, a technocrat or a moderate representative of the elite) could mark an attempt to turn the country from isolation toward dialogue with the outside world.
Analysts from the Atlantic Council have modeled a scenario in which a new government, formed by a group of technocrats with “Western education,” seeks to normalize relations with the United States, Europe, and even Ukraine. Such a government would likely reverse the most odious decisions of its predecessor. For example, it might end indefinite rule, release some political prisoners, and ease censorship.
In foreign policy, a course toward de-escalation is possible: the new leadership might publicly renounce ultra-nationalist rhetoric and acknowledge the mistakes of past years. It is not ruled out that Moscow could withdraw its troops from a significant portion of Ukraine’s occupied territories, retaining control only over Crimea and abandoning claims to the annexation of other regions.
The world would perceive such changes with cautious optimism. Many in the West might even call for giving Russia a “second chance” in the event of its transformation. For Ukraine, the cessation of active warfare would mean a respite and an opportunity to restore territories (although the issue of Crimea would remain a frozen conflict). However, experts warn against excessive illusions: even a technocratic or conditionally reformist regime in Moscow does not guarantee genuine democratization, the abandonment of imperial ambitions, or the return of all seized territories.
By and large, this scenario is similar to the previous one but is characterized by a more pragmatic and rational government willing to make significant “tactical retreats” without changing strategic approaches to Russia’s place in the world. While this would provide Ukraine with a chance for a “breather,” this scenario could be even more dangerous, as the illusion of a “normal Russia” has already cost the world dearly.
Will the World Benefit from a Deep Crisis and the Disintegration of the Empire?
The most radical scenario is the destabilization and disintegration of the Russian Federation. It assumes that accumulated internal problems and defeats (military failures, economic decline, ethnic contradictions) would lead to an uncontrollable crisis of central authority. Such a crisis could erupt after Putin’s departure if the struggle for power escalates into open conflict among elite factions or regions.
Currently, this scenario seems fantastical to many, but it could materialize under a confluence of several factors. For example, the destabilization of national republics could serve as a detonator for disintegration: the death of Ramzan Kadyrov and the power struggle in Chechnya could spark a new war in the North Caucasus, or mass protests in Tatarstan against the suppression of the Tatar language could grow into a broad anti-colonial movement. Such events could trigger a “parade of sovereignties,” with republics and regions one after another declaring independence, challenging a weakened center. The result would be a chaotic collapse of central authority, territorial fragmentation, and violence.
The consequences of Russia’s disintegration would be extremely serious for the entire world. Western experts directly call this scenario “the most dangerous” due to the risks of uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
For Ukraine, the disintegration of imperial Russia could theoretically be a historic victory, as the aggressor would literally cease to exist as a unified state. Oppressed peoples (Chechens, Tatars, Yakuts, etc.) could break free from Russian oppression, and Russia itself would lose its capacity to wage aggressive wars for a long time. However, such an outcome in the near term appears unlikely.
Why Post-Putin Russia Will Remain a Threat to the West
It is worth soberly understanding: even after Putin’s departure, Russia is unlikely to immediately cease being a source of challenges and threats. In the scenario of regime preservation, this is obvious. If the course remains largely unchanged, the confrontation with the West and the Kremlin’s expansionist ambitions will continue. The West will need to steadfastly maintain its sanctions policy, as such a successor “will generally share the same geopolitical views as Putin, primarily regarding confrontation with the West.”
Moreover, even a partially reformed or conditionally democratic Russia may retain dangerous traits. First, imperial sentiments among a significant portion of society and elites will persist. Even a new democratic government in Moscow may face pressure from public opinion unwilling to relinquish Crimea or the status of a “great power.” Second, the enormous military arsenal, including nuclear weapons, and the inertia of the military-industrial complex will not disappear. In the unstable conditions of a transitional period, the risks of unauthorized actions or the leakage of dangerous technologies only increase.
Finally, neighboring states and NATO will long continue to view Russia with apprehension, remembering its history of aggression. Even in the best-case scenario (Russia’s democratization), the West must remain vigilant regarding possible revanchist rhetoric and neo-imperial tendencies in Russia.
Petro Oleshchuk, political scientist, Ph.D, expert at the United Ukraine Think Tank