Russian Threats to NATO and Europe in 2025
At the NATO summit in The Hague in late June of 2025, allies unanimously recognized Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security.
This assessment is enshrined in the final declaration, which names Russia as the only state posing a common threat to the entire Alliance, on a par with international terrorism. Accordingly, European countries are now focused on countering a wide range of hostile actions by the Russian Federation.
The Kremlin is waging a so-called “gray war” against the West—a set of aggressive measures below the threshold of direct military attack. These include interference in democratic processes, cyberattacks, hybrid operations against neighbors, coercive pressure in strategic regions, attempts to undermine NATO unity, ultimatums regarding the Alliance's military presence, and the use of “energy weapons.”
Interference in Elections and Disinformation Continue
Moscow systematically attempts to influence electoral processes and public opinion in European countries by promoting forces favorable to the Kremlin and undermining trust in democracy. Russian special services and related structures use a wide range of tools, from financing radical parties and candidates to massive disinformation campaigns in the media and social networks, as well as cyberattacks aimed at stealing and leaking confidential information.
It is noteworthy that before the 2024 European Parliament elections, the Netherlands recorded attempts by the Russian Federation to disrupt voting through cyberattacks on political party websites and even transport companies in order to hinder voters' access to polling stations. Dutch military intelligence (MIVD) has stated that the Russian threat to Europe is not diminishing but, on the contrary, is growing, and even after the possible end of the war against Ukraine, Moscow will continue its hybrid influence on Western societies.
Similar incidents have been recorded in other countries. For example, at the end of 2024, before the presidential elections in Romania, Russian hackers carried out more than 85,000 cyberattacks on the country's electoral infrastructure and leaked the data obtained on closed forums. Such operations are part of the Kremlin's established tactics, which date back to the Cold War. Even the Soviet KGB practiced so-called “active measures” — covert interference that is difficult to trace but which, at minimal cost, has the maximum effect in terms of sowing doubt and discord.
Modern Russia has inherited these methods
In particular, disinformation operations using fake news and propaganda are aimed at shaping a worldview favorable to Moscow among Europeans – for example, undermining trust in NATO and the EU, dividing society on sensitive issues (migration, the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, etc.) and thereby indirectly influencing election results.
Russian networks of influence almost certainly exploit international summits themselves to reinforce the perception of the Alliance's “ineptitude” and division. To this end, they use controlled media, “troll factories,” and, more recently, even artificial intelligence to create fake content aimed at discrediting NATO leaders and sowing discord among allies. Taken together, such covert information influences pose a serious long-term threat. They undermine the very foundations of democracy on which European security rests. Recognizing this, European countries are developing countermeasures.
The EU has a special working group, the East StratCom Task Force, which refutes pro-Russian fakes, and NATO is stepping up the exchange of intelligence on interference. However, the scale and persistence of Russian influence operations remain unprecedented. “We live in a gray zone between war and peace,” said the Dutch defense minister, pointing out that Russia is conducting aggressive actions against Europe without ceasing its kinetic war in Ukraine. The facts show that the Kremlin will not abandon its attempts to destabilize the political situation in European countries, using the open societies of the West as an arena for its covert operations.
Russia is Carrying out Cyber Aggression Against Critical Infrastructure
One of Russia's most dangerous tools is cyberattacks, both for espionage and sabotage. Over the past two years, Europe has experienced a real wave of Russian cyber activity. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the number of confirmed Russian attacks in Europe rose from three incidents in 2022 to 12 in 2023, and in 2024, it skyrocketed to 34 cases. These attacks had a wide range of targets: government agencies, critical infrastructure, transportation, energy companies, and military-industrial enterprises. Various tactics were used, from covert installation of spyware to equipment sabotage.
It is noteworthy that the first attempts at cyber sabotage were recorded in 2024: Dutch intelligence reported an attack by a Russian hacker group on the digital systems of one of the facilities in the Netherlands, which had signs of sabotage (fortunately, without significant consequences). In addition, Russian cyber activity against the energy sector and transport networks has been detected, presumably in preparation for future physical sabotage.
European allies directly accuse Russian intelligence services of the most high-profile cyberattacks
For example, France officially attributed a series of breaches of its government networks in 2023–2024 to the GRU (Russian military intelligence), publicly condemning the aggressor. The UK and the US have stated that Russian hackers were behind the cyberattack on the Viasat satellite network in February 2022 — an attack that was initially aimed at Ukraine but caused internet outages across Europe.
In 2024, several European countries were hit by a series of cyberattacks: in March, Germany was attacked — the attackers stole an audio recording of a meeting between senior military officials discussing aid to Ukraine and leaked it publicly, which the defense minister called a “hybrid operation aimed at sowing discord.” In May 2025, NATO allies, including Germany, France, Britain, and the US, even issued a joint warning about an active Russian cyber espionage campaign targeting channels for supplying defense aid to Ukraine and NATO's military-technical sector.
Russian cyberattacks are increasingly crossing the line from mere espionage to becoming a tool of direct influence and blackmail. At the end of 2024, Russian hackers briefly paralyzed the web resources of key Italian government agencies after Rome confirmed its support for Ukraine. A pro-Russian group claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that it was “punishment” for the Italian government's pro-Ukrainian stance. Such actions demonstrate that Moscow seeks to demonstrate the vulnerability of the West and test its readiness to defend itself.
Hybrid Operations in the Baltic: “Protection of Russian Speakers” and Local Provocations
The countries most vulnerable to the Russian threat are those in the east of NATO – the Baltic states. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been experiencing Moscow's targeted hybrid actions for several years now, which have become more frequent since 2014 and especially since mid-2023. These include a range of measures, from disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks to covert sabotage, aimed at undermining NATO's presence and influence in the region.
Russian special services have stepped up their attempts to recruit local residents to gather secret information and carry out provocative actions, using linguistic and ethnic ties. According to estimates by the Latvian State Security Service, Russian activity will become even more diverse in 2025, with even sabotage against infrastructure possible in order to destabilize the situation within the Baltic states. The most alarming scenario for the Baltic states is Moscow staging a local conflict under the pretext of “protecting the Russian-speaking population.”
Security agencies point out that the Kremlin may resort to provocation in a border town populated mainly by Russians, such as Narva (Estonia) or Daugavpils (Latvia). Such a precedent of undermining collective defense from within has long been Moscow's dream. The Baltic states are aware of this threat and are preparing to counter it. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have significantly strengthened their rapid response forces, police, and border guards in the eastern regions and are working closely with NATO units deployed on their territory.
The Struggle for the Baltic Sea and the Danish Straits Continues
The strategic rivalry between Russia and the West also extends to Northern Europe – the Baltic Sea, which, after Finland and Sweden joined NATO, is almost completely surrounded by allies. The Kremlin, however, has not abandoned its ambitions to strengthen its naval presence and influence in the region. Of particular importance are the Danish straits, narrow passages connecting the Baltic Sea with the North Sea. Critically important shipping routes and Russian oil exports pass through them, so control over the straits – both economic and military – is an extremely sensitive issue.
Recently, there have been signs that Moscow is ready to take risky steps in this direction. In particular, Denmark has reported a sharp increase in threats from Russia in its waters. According to a report by Danish military intelligence (DDIS) published in December 2024, Russia has significantly expanded its capabilities to challenge the Alliance in the Baltic Sea. As a result, the allies are tightening control over shipping in the straits: Denmark and Sweden have introduced additional inspections of Russian tankers passing through the straits, fearing both an environmental disaster (in the event of sabotage on a tanker) and provocations by Russian military vessels.
In Russia itself, according to Western intelligence, attention to the Baltic Fleet is growing: large-scale exercises are being conducted, and in 2024, for the first time in many years, large-scale maneuvers “Ocean-2024” were held with the participation of more than 400 ships, a significant part of which were in the Baltic Sea. This demonstrates the Kremlin's desire to maintain an image of strength in the region despite NATO's dominance. Thus, the Baltic region has become an arena of covert confrontation, where Russia is testing the West's resolve through both direct military presence and covert operations.
Russia is Trying to Destroy NATO Unity
Russia realizes that it is inferior to NATO's combined capabilities on the open battlefield, so it is betting on internal divisions and weakening the unity of the allies. For many years, the Kremlin has been working purposefully to sow discord among Western countries through propaganda, corrupt ties, or support for loyal politicians. These efforts have gained particular momentum since the start of full-scale aggression against Ukraine: Moscow seeks to undermine the West's determination to support Kyiv and to make individual countries question the value of NATO.
One of the goals of Russia's active measures is to create conflicts between governments, especially within the North Atlantic Alliance. The Kremlin has consistently fueled Eurosceptic and anti-American narratives in Europe. In several EU countries, far-right parties that have historically been skeptical of NATO and often sympathetic to Moscow have gained significant influence—for example, Marine Le Pen's National Rally in France or Alternative for Germany, which have openly questioned the usefulness of the Alliance. Russian propaganda supports such forces with information and financial resources (remember that Le Pen's party received a loan from a Russian-linked bank in 2014).
In addition to influencing public opinion, Moscow also uses direct diplomatic and military leverage to divide allies. For example, at the end of 2021, on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, Putin issued an ultimatum to the US and NATO demanding that the Alliance be returned to its 1997 configuration — withdrawing troops and weapons from Eastern European countries and providing legal guarantees that NATO would not expand eastward. These demands were unanimously rejected by the allies, which, according to some estimates, became the formal pretext for the war. Since then, the Russian Federation has continued to test the unity of the Alliance in various ways.
In February 2025, during US-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia, the Russians again tried to “exchange”normalization of relations for concessions – according to the Financial Times, the Russian delegation demanded that Washington withdraw NATO forces from Eastern Europe. Although the Americans rejected this proposal, the fact itself worries Eastern European allies. There are warnings about the risk of a “new Yalta,” where powerful players could decide the fate of the region without its participation. European leaders (French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and others) made a special trip to Washington to convince the US not to make deals behind its allies' backs. This episode shows Moscow's desire to divide transatlantic unity by playing on possible differences in positions on the war and relations with Russia.
“Energy Blackmail” and Bribery: Influence Through Resources
A separate front in Russia's hybrid war against Europe is in the energy sector. For decades, Moscow has used oil, gas, and nuclear technology as a tool of political influence, encouraging the loyalty of individual governments with favorable terms of cooperation. The essence of this strategy is to form a so-called “fifth column” among key European countries, consisting of politicians dependent on Russian energy resources who will promote the Kremlin's interests in the EU and NATO. To this end, both direct financial benefits (discounts, loans, corruption) and the creation of long-term economic commitments that are difficult to break are used.
The most striking example is Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Under the rule of the Fidesz party, Budapest has pursued a policy of rapprochement with Moscow, accompanied by generous energy bonuses. In particular, Russia supplied Hungary with gas at a price five times lower than the market price. Orbán openly boasted about “cheap Russian gas” as his achievement before voters, which significantly increased his popularity. Hungary was almost 85% dependent on Russian gas and 65% on Russian oil, and in 2021 signed a new 15-year contract with Gazprom for supplies bypassing Ukraine.
This energy dependence directly influenced politics: Budapest blocked or delayed the implementation of some EU sanctions against Russia, refused to provide military assistance to Ukraine, and even did not allow the transit of weapons through its territory. The “friendship” between Orbán and Putin was cemented by corrupt contacts—there is evidence that the Hungarian leader's entourage benefits greatly from joint business projects with Russia.
In addition to gas and oil, the nuclear sector became a powerful lever. The Russian state corporation Rosatom actively promoted the construction of nuclear power plants in Europe, offering attractive financing. In the case of Hungary in 2014, Rosatom was awarded a contract without competition to complete two power units at the Paks nuclear power plant, a key energy facility for the country. Moscow agreed to finance up to 80% of the project's cost through a loan of up to €10 billion. Moreover, the contractors for the project were companies close to Orbán's allies, which also created corruption benefits for the Hungarian elite. Such agreements firmly bind the country to Russia for decades to come: the loan must be repaid, and the plant requires Russian fuel and maintenance.
Rosatom has promoted similar projects in other countries, including the Czech Republic, Finland, and Bulgaria. In some cases, they were stopped (as in the Czech Republic, where Russia's participation in the tender for the Temelin nuclear power plant was canceled after a scandal), and in others, they were not (in Bulgaria, the long-delayed Belene nuclear power plant project could theoretically be revived with Russia's support). Through energy resources, Moscow is effectively buying the loyalty of governments.
Security Threats from Russia in 2025 Are Multifaceted and Interrelated
All these threats serve as means for Moscow to achieve its main goal: to regain control over neighboring states and weaken the unity that allows Europe to effectively resist Russian expansion. According to Western intelligence estimates, even if the active phase of the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will not abandon its aggressive course and will likely focus on confronting NATO as a whole. The response to these risks is unity, societal resilience, and constant adaptation of defense capabilities.
Europe is already drawing conclusions from the lessons of recent years, and despite all the Kremlin's efforts to sow chaos, European countries are jointly strengthening their shield against new challenges. Ultimately, as practice has shown, the Russian Federation's aggressive tactics often only result in increased unity and readiness among allies to fight back — precisely what Moscow feared most.
Igor Popov, head of United Ukraine Think Tank, expert on political and security issues