Beijing’s Dual Game: China’s Signals to the World and Ukraine from the SCO Summit and Military Parade
The recent 25th anniversary summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin and the grand military parade in Beijing that followed were not isolated events but rather a carefully orchestrated strategic communication. They embody the two pillars of Xi Jinping’s grand strategy: the diplomatic construction of a “multipolar” world order that challenges Western dominance and the demonstration of overwhelming military power to bolster these ambitions. For Ukraine, which is engaged in an existential struggle for its sovereignty, these signals from Beijing are not peripheral; they indicate an intensifying geopolitical landscape in which a major global power actively supports the aggressor and promotes a world order fundamentally hostile to the principles of international law on which Ukraine’s survival depends.
The SCO as a Tool of Multipolarity Represents the Architecture of a New Order
The SCO summit in Tianjin served as a platform for formalizing and advancing China’s vision of global governance, which Beijing actively positions as an alternative to the Western model. This architecture of a new order is built on ideological foundations, institutional mechanisms, and skillful exploitation of global dissatisfaction with U.S. policy.
At the core of China’s diplomatic activity lies the concept of the “Shanghai Spirit,” which officially proclaims principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations, and the pursuit of common development. Beijing and Moscow position this ideology as an alternative to the Western “rules-based international order,” which they portray as a tool for unilateral actions, “intimidation,” and a “Cold War mentality.”
The Tianjin Declaration, adopted at the summit, explicitly calls for building a “more representative, democratic, and just multipolar world,” a euphemism for reducing the influence of the United States. In his speeches, Xi Jinping consistently called for resisting “hegemonism” and “bloc confrontation,” emphasizing the need to strengthen a system of international relations centered on the UN, a subtle hint at bypassing Western-dominated institutions. The organization also reaffirmed its commitment to combating the “three evil forces” – terrorism, separatism, and extremism – a convenient pretext for tightening domestic control and conducting cross-border security operations under the guise of collective threat response.
The summit’s culmination was Xi Jinping’s official unveiling of the new Global Governance Initiative (GGI). Although framed in abstract, UN-friendly terms – sovereign equality, international law, multilateralism – the fact that it was announced at the SCO platform rather than within the UN framework is a powerful symbolic act. The GGI is the capstone of Xi’s other global initiatives (on development, security, and civilization) and represents China’s clearest statement to date of its intent to lead the reform – or, in essence, revision – of the global order.
The GGI’s conceptual document identifies the “shortcomings” of the existing system, particularly the underrepresentation of the Global South in international institutions. Xi Jinping explicitly called on the SCO to “take a leading role” in implementing this initiative, underscoring Beijing’s intent to use structures under its control as a vanguard for advancing its vision. Thus, the GGI becomes not just a set of principles but a roadmap for building a world where norms and rules are shaped not in Washington or Brussels but within non-Western alliances under Beijing’s patronage.
China backs its ideological proposals with concrete institutional steps. A breakthrough at the summit was the final approval of the establishment of the SCO Development Bank – an idea Beijing had pushed for over a decade, overcoming resistance from Russia, which feared losing its influence in Central Asia. This bank, alongside the BRICS New Development Bank, is designed to create an alternative financial architecture capable of funding large-scale infrastructure projects, bypassing the U.S. dollar, and reducing member states’ dependence on Western institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.
The decision to establish the bank was complemented by Xi Jinping’s pledges to provide billions of yuan in grants and loans to SCO members, further deepening the region’s financial dependence on China. Leaders of some countries, such as Alexander Lukashenko, explicitly called for the creation of an “independent financial mechanism” to mitigate the pressure of sanctions, which fully aligns with Beijing’s strategic goals.
Notably, the appeal of the SCO and its initiatives is largely driven not by the merits of the Chinese model but by the vacuum created by U.S. policies, which many Global South countries perceive as unpredictable and punitive. Trade wars initiated by the Trump administration have pushed countries like India toward closer coordination with China and Russia. The first visit in seven years by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China and his demonstratively warm meetings with Xi and Putin were a direct reaction to U.S. tariffs. This suggests that the SCO is less a coalition of like-minded states and more a “coalition of the aggrieved,” united by a shared desire to hedge against American dominance. China skillfully exploits this discontent, positioning itself as a “fixer of global disorder,” offering stable economic partnerships under the slogan “we don’t lecture, we build.” However, this unity is reactive and fragile, and a more flexible and predictable Western foreign policy could easily expose deep contradictions within the bloc, such as the border conflict between India and China.
The Iron Will of the Dragon: Beijing Demonstrates Military Might
If the SCO summit was a demonstration of China’s diplomatic and ideological “soft power,” the military parade in Beijing, dedicated to the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II, was an uncompromising display of its “hard power.” It signaled that Beijing not only has a vision for a new world order but also the military muscle to defend and promote it.
The most significant signal of the parade was the first-ever concentrated display of China’s full nuclear triad – land, sea, and air components. This was a deliberate move to assert to Washington and Moscow that Beijing considers itself an equal nuclear power.
Particular attention was drawn to new systems, such as the mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) DF-61 and a new modification of the silo-based ICBM DF-5C, which significantly enhance the survivability and range of China’s nuclear arsenal, strengthening its second-strike capability. The Chinese state agency Xinhua called the triad a “strategic trump card for safeguarding national sovereignty and dignity.”
Against the backdrop of rapid warhead expansion, which, according to Pentagon estimates, could reach 1,500 units by 2035, this display signals China’s shift from a strategy of “minimum deterrence” to an aspiration for nuclear parity with leading powers.
The parade showcased a range of new anti-ship missiles, many of which are hypersonic, including the YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20. These systems form the core of China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy. Their primary purpose is to threaten high-value U.S. naval targets, particularly carrier strike groups, thereby making the cost of potential U.S. intervention, such as in a Taiwan conflict, prohibitively high. The hypersonic gliding warhead of the YJ-17 and the aeroballistic YJ-20 missile, capable of maneuvering at hypersonic speeds, make their interception an extremely challenging task for existing missile defense systems.
Beijing also demonstrated its vision of future warfare by showcasing futuristic unmanned systems. These included extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles (XLUUVs) like the AJX002, quadruped robots dubbed “robotic wolves,” and advanced combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the stealth drone GJ-11. While some of these systems may still be in the prototype stage, their display serves a dual purpose: projecting an image of technological superiority to intimidate regional rivals and functioning as a large-scale “arms fair” for potential buyers from Global South countries seeking access to modern technologies as alternatives to Western or Russian systems. Additionally, the LY-1 air defense laser systems were showcased, indicating China’s significant investment in directed-energy weapons as a cost-effective means to counter mass drone attacks.
Notably, the parade’s emphasis on high-tech, unmanned, and precision systems is a deliberate strategic communication aimed at creating a contrast between the perceived modernism of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the protracted, exhausting, and often technologically clumsy war Russia is waging in Ukraine. The Russian army has demonstrated significant weaknesses in logistics, communications, and the application of modern technologies. Beijing, as Moscow’s primary strategic partner, is aware of the risk of “guilt by association,” where the West might underestimate Chinese capabilities based on Russian failures. Thus, the parade was a deliberate narrative correction.
The display of advanced drones, hypersonic missiles, and sophisticated command systems required for their integration carries a clear message: “We are not Russia. Our army is a 21st-century force built for high-tech conflict. Do not draw false conclusions based on our partner’s actions.” This aims to restore confidence in Chinese military deterrence, which may have been inadvertently undermined by Russia’s challenges.
“Boundless Friendship” in Action: The Beijing-Moscow Axis and Its Global Consequences
The deepening partnership with Russia is a central element of China’s strategy. This axis is the driving force behind the multipolar world they seek to build, and the war in Ukraine has become a catalyst that has accelerated and strengthened this alliance while revealing its growing asymmetry.
The carefully choreographed unity between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin at the SCO summit and military parade aimed to showcase a powerful alliance challenging the U.S.-led order. Their joint appearances, with Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Xi, were a visual embodiment of an “axis of the discontented.”
The SCO serves as a platform for promoting a shared narrative that the West, through NATO expansion and a policy of “intimidation,” is the true source of global instability. At the summit, Putin directly accused the West of unleashing the war in Ukraine, and Xi Jinping did not contradict this claim, signaling tacit support for Kremlin propaganda.
Despite the rhetoric of equality, the relationship between Beijing and Moscow is becoming increasingly asymmetrical. The economic and diplomatic isolation caused by the war and sanctions has made Russia critically dependent on China as a market for its energy resources, a source of technology, and diplomatic cover at the UN. Analysts note that Russia is increasingly playing the role of a “junior partner” in this tandem. Russia’s economic dependence on China is solidifying, giving Beijing significant, though cautiously exercised, leverage over Moscow. China’s success in advancing the SCO Development Bank, despite earlier Russian resistance, is a vivid testament to this shifting balance of power.
The war in Ukraine has been a true test of strength for the “no-limits” Chinese-Russian partnership. From the perspective of Beijing and Moscow, this alliance has passed the test. China has provided Russia with critical and indispensable economic support, enabling the Kremlin to withstand sanctions pressure and continue military operations. This, in turn, diverts significant Western military, financial, and diplomatic resources to the European theater, objectively benefiting China in its primary confrontation with the U.S. For this reason, despite its peacemaking rhetoric, Beijing is not genuinely interested in a swift resolution to the conflict.
Strategically, China uses Russia as a “battering ram” against the Western order. While Beijing maintains a facade of plausible deniability and calls for “peace,” it directly benefits from Russia’s disruptive and aggressive actions. Moscow bears the direct costs of sanctions and military conflict, while Beijing reaps strategic dividends in the form of distracted Western attention and depleted resources. This allows China to pursue its revisionist goals through subtler economic and diplomatic means, positioning itself as a “responsible” global power. Thus, China is not a passive beneficiary but an active accomplice, delegating to Russia the dirtiest work of dismantling the existing world order.
Signals for Kyiv: The Ukrainian Dimension of China’s Game
For Ukraine, the growing geopolitical weight of China and the strengthening of its alliance with Russia are not an abstract threat but a direct and urgent problem. Beijing’s actions, cloaked in the rhetoric of neutrality, directly impact Ukraine’s ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Beijing’s official stance of “neutrality” in the Russian-Ukrainian war is a fiction. China’s actions indicate de facto support for the aggressor. This is evident in its refusal to call the invasion a “war,” preferring euphemisms like the “Ukrainian crisis,” and in its dissemination of Kremlin narratives about NATO’s responsibility. More critically, China has become a vital economic lifeline for Russia and a supplier of dual-use components for its military-industrial complex.
According to Western intelligence, China supplies up to 70% of the machine tools and 90% of the microchips needed for Russia’s weapons production. Ukraine has already imposed sanctions on Chinese companies, accusing them of supporting Russia’s defense industry. Beijing’s so-called “peace plans” have also been criticized for echoing Russian demands and omitting the key condition of immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from all Ukrainian territory.
China’s position reveals deep hypocrisy. While proclaiming the principle of “sovereign equality” as a cornerstone of its vision for global order within the SCO and GGI, Beijing directly facilitates Russia’s brutal violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. This contradiction exposes the true attitude of Chinese leadership toward international law: sovereignty is a valuable tool to shield against Western interference in its own affairs (e.g., regarding Taiwan, Xinjiang, or Hong Kong) but not a universal principle to be upheld for other states, especially when their interests conflict with those of a strategic partner. Analytical centers highlight this double standard, noting that China’s concept of a multipolar world effectively legitimizes “spheres of influence and territorial revisionism.”
Ukraine’s stance toward China has undergone a dramatic evolution. While Kyiv initially harbored hopes that Beijing could act as a constructive mediator, these illusions have since dissipated. Ukraine has shifted from “caution to open strategic skepticism,” viewing China as a “strategic adversary cloaked in neutral rhetoric.”
Direct accusations by President Zelenskyy against China for aiding Russia in drone production and supplying gunpowder marked a turning point in bilateral relations. Kyiv has also repeatedly reminded Beijing of its security guarantees to Ukraine from 1994 and 2013, which have been effectively ignored.
China’s policy toward Ukraine is not only a function of its relationship with Russia but also a testing ground for strategies in a potential Taiwan conflict. Beijing closely studies the West’s response to Russian aggression: the speed and scope of sanctions, NATO’s cohesion, the effectiveness of nuclear blackmail, and logistical challenges in supplying weapons to a partner country. China’s own actions – using economic levers to bypass sanctions and deploying “neutrality” rhetoric to sow division in the international community – are tactical moves that could be applied in a Taiwan crisis. Thus, Ukraine’s struggle for its territory takes on an additional global dimension. Ukraine’s success or failure in resisting aggression and holding its enablers accountable sends a direct signal to Beijing about the potential cost of its own revisionist ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region.
Strategic Conclusions and Opportunities for Ukraine
In the new geopolitical reality, where China plays an increasingly assertive role, Ukraine must develop a pragmatic and multifaceted strategy to minimize threats and leverage available opportunities.
Any hopes for a constructive role for China in resolving the war are illusory. Ukraine’s foreign policy must be based on a clear understanding that Beijing’s strategic interests currently align with Moscow’s. This means abandoning any ambiguity and publicly positioning China as a state that enables aggression against Ukraine. This does not necessitate severing diplomatic ties but requires a realistic assessment of Beijing’s role and an end to attempts to engage it as an impartial mediator.
Ukraine should actively expand its diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific region. By framing its struggle in universal terms of defending sovereignty against a revisionist state, Kyiv can find common ground with countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, which face similar threats from China. Creating an informal “second front” of diplomatic pressure on Beijing could force it to consider the reputational and political risks of overtly supporting Russia.
Kyiv must systematically document and publicize evidence of China’s role in supplying components for Russia’s war machine. This information should be shared with Western partners to bolster arguments for secondary sanctions against Chinese companies and banks. Simultaneously, Ukraine should emphasize China’s violation of its own security guarantees to Ukraine on all international platforms, undermining Beijing’s image as a responsible state that honors its commitments.
Discussions about China’s potential role in Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction require extreme caution. Allowing Beijing a significant role in this process would be a strategic mistake, as it would reward an accomplice to aggression and create long-term economic and political dependence, which contradicts Ukraine’s path toward European integration. Any engagement with Chinese companies should be minimal, tactical, and governed by strict conditions of transparency and management, fully aligned with EU and international financial institution standards.
Finally, Ukraine has a unique opportunity to challenge the Chinese-Russian narrative in the Global South. While Beijing and Moscow attempt to portray themselves as leaders of an anti-colonial movement against “Western hegemony,” Ukraine can offer a powerful counter-narrative.
Russia’s invasion is not a struggle against NATO but a classic 19th-century imperial war of conquest. This narrative resonates deeply with many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which have their own historical experiences of fighting for independence. By framing its struggle as anti-imperial, Ukraine can reshape perceptions of the conflict for Global South audiences.
The war ceases to be a distant conflict between great powers and becomes a relatable fight against imperialism. This complicates China’s efforts to portray its alliance with Russia as a progressive, anti-hegemonist force and creates an opportunity for Ukraine to gain diplomatic support where it is currently lacking.
Ihor Petrenko, founder of the “United Ukraine” Think Tank, Doctor of Political Sciences