Ukraine's Missile Program 2025: What Already Exists, What Is Maturing to Series Production, and Where the Export Potential Lies After the War
Ukraine has transformed the missile program from a set of prototypes into a full-fledged deterrence ecosystem that is already striking the enemy and promises an export boom after the war
In 2025, Ukraine has definitively moved away from the logic of “we request long-range missiles” into the mode of creating its own missile ecosystem – from ballistic and cruise missiles to hybrid “missile-drones.” This is no longer a set of individual R&D works (scientific-research and experimental-design works), but a production and technological line that operates under fire and is deployed across several classes of armaments simultaneously.
The key shift: parallel development of the ballistic direction (Sapsan/Hrim-2), cruise (Neptune in the naval, and then land-based version) and new heavy cruise missiles of the Flamingo type (FP-5), as well as long-range “missile-drones” like Peklo. These programs already have combat history or at least confirmed footage/statements about testing and the start of series production.
The Ballistic Line: SAPSAN/HRIM-2—This Is the "Cornerstone" of Deterrence
The Ukrainian operational-tactical ballistic complex Sapsan/Hrim-2 long remained a “gray box.” In 2024–2025, public signals synchronized: Kyiv announced successful testing of its own ballistic missile and the transition to combat use of prototypes at ranges on the order of 300 km; independent experts and specialized media confirmed the fact of a probable combat test; the Russian side – in its characteristic manner – attributed to itself the “destruction” of related facilities and depots. Collectively, this removes the main question – whether Ukraine has an operational SRBM class (short-range ballistic missiles) of its own development – and leaves secondary ones: the scale of the series, accuracy, nomenclature of the warhead.
What is more important than “passport figures” – short-range ballistic missiles systematically penetrate the most difficult section for air defense/missile defense: high speed, short flight profile, maneuvering on the terminal section. CSIS analysis directly records: it is the SRBM class in Russia's war against Ukraine that demonstrates the highest “probability of penetration” to the target compared to other strike means. For Kyiv, this means that its own SRBM is not a “symbol of sovereignty,” but a practical tool for destroying enemy command and logistics nodes in depth.
Hence the strategic consequence: the presence in the Armed Forces of Ukraine of a serial Sapsan/HRIM-2 with a range of ~300+ km, sufficient to strike targets such as command posts/radar stations/depots, provides a stable “belt of pressure” on objects in temporarily occupied territories and in Russia's border regions, forcing the enemy to disperse air defense, relocate depots, and change logistics. The effect is enhanced under the sanctions background, which complicates Russians' import of components for missile defense and air defense systems.
Cruise Missiles "NEPTUNE": From Anti-Ship System to Long-Range Land Strike
Neptune proved its combat capability back in 2022, when the sinking of the cruiser “Moskva” became a turning point in the “Black Sea game.” Further – evolution: modified “land-based” Neptunes were used against Russian positions and complex air defense targets in Crimea in 2023; in 2025, photos/videos and reports appeared about “Long Neptune” with a significantly enlarged fuselage and a range of up to ~1000 km in the land-based version.
Ukraine has transformed the naval anti-ship missile into a multi-mode platform for striking ground targets at great ranges. This transformation eliminates another “structural” deficit: dependence on allies' political permissions to use Western long-range nomenclature on Russian territory. Own cruise missiles – with natural integration into the national intelligence contour – close the niches of planned strikes on air defense, logistics, and military-industrial infrastructure of the enemy without external restrictions. That is why the modernization line of Neptune (ground targets, increased warhead/range) is not an “alternative” to ATACMS/Scalp/Storm Shadow, but their multiplier.
Flamingo (FP-5): Heavy Long-Range Cruise Missile as an "Industrial Test"
In the summer-fall of 2025, Ukraine publicly showed a new heavy cruise missile with a declared range of up to 3,000 km – Flamingo (FP-5) from Fire Point. Yefrem Lukachevsky (AP) filmed the product in the workshop; Associated Press and The Guardian published materials and photos; politicians confirmed the start of series production, and subsequent reports – also the first combat uses. For the industry, this is a test immediately on three things: series production in wartime, quality of navigation/EPR on a long route, survivability in a zone of saturated air defense.
What does Flamingo give on the battlefield? First, this is a “depth pressure tool”: the possibility of routine strikes on military and military-industrial complex targets at distances several times greater than those of the “base” Neptune. Second, this is an investment signal – the appearance of a heavy cruise missile with serial assembly means the maturation of the Ukrainian chain of engines, composites, control systems, inertial navigation, electronic warfare protection. Third, this is a political factor: unlike imported ammunition, Flamingo has no external “red lines” of use. It is precisely this that causes the nervous reaction of the Russian Federation to international cooperations—in particular, to Denmark's decision to place production of fuel for Ukrainian long-range missiles.
"Missile-Drones" Peklo: A Cheap Bypass of Saturated Air Defense
A separate class – long-range “missile drones” Peklo (literally “Hell”) with ranges up to hundreds/700+ km according to official statements from the Ukrainian side. This is a cheaper, “mass” degree of long-range strike with flexible logistics, which neatly fits into the trend of modern warfare described by CSIS experts: combined waves of strikes with UAVs and cruise missiles that exhaust air defense and open corridors for heavier carriers. For Russian air defense, this is an increase in the “cost of interception”; for Ukraine – the possibility to maintain the pace of strikes under production budgets.
How These Classes Interact and Why This Really Affects the Course of the War
The key property of the Ukrainian missile ecosystem is the mutual complementarity of classes. SRBM strikes command nodes/radar stations with minimal “warning time,” medium-range cruise missiles (Neptune in the “land-based” variant) work on air defense/depots in depth, heavy cruise missile Flamingo keeps strategic military-industrial objects of the enemy within reach, and Peklo provides saturation and distraction. This is not theory: regular strikes on Crimea in 2023–2024 with the disablement of air defense elements and strikes on fleet headquarters – empirical proof of the viability of the “multiaxis/multiplatform” model.
Industry and Compliance: Why "Industrial Architecture" Is No Less Important Than Tactical-Technical Characteristics
The second half of 2025 showed that Ukraine is not only designing missiles but also forming a network industry – with private “missile startups,” relocation of productions, foreign sites (example with fuel in Denmark) and a policy of managed exports to close the cash gap in production during wartime. This is already the framework voiced by the state of “managed exports” – first saturation of the front, then formation of reserves, and only then – sales through separate platforms under strict export controls.
At the level of unwavering legal base, Ukraine has been a participant in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) since 1998. This means that the export of category I items (>300 km and >500 kg) “does not occur” by general rule, and category II – is possible with strict case-by-case control. Accordingly, the post-war export profile is either products with limited range/warhead (export modifications), or cooperative programs with “distribution” of critical technologies in such a way as not to violate MTCR and national obligations.
Export Potential "For Tomorrow": Where the Demand Is and What Exactly to Sell Realistically
After the end of the active phase of the war, global demand for long-range deterrence means will remain high – Europe, Asia, the Middle East are systematically building up the “missile layer” of their defense concepts. For Ukraine, the window lies in three niches.
The first – export models of operational-tactical missile complexes within MTCR (export “Grom-2/HRIM-2” with a range of up to ~280–300 km and a strict accompanying control package), oriented to countries that do not have political access to ATACMS/PrSM and are looking for “non-US” options with a configurable control system. Here, the precedent of the 2010s with Middle East interest in Grom-2 works. Ukraine's win – production base and combat reputation. Risks – politics and competing offer from Turkey.
The second – cruise missiles of medium range in “category II”/“trimmed” parameters (Neptune-E land-based/ship-based, without ranges and warheads that bring the product to category I). Demand – in countries strengthening coastal defense/anti-access and seeking cheaper integration with their own sensors. Reputational asset – “Moskva,” the campaign in the Black Sea, and proven strikes on air defense.
The third – heavy cruise missiles and “missile-drones” as a service and technological kits: joint lines/assembly, engines, navigation, means of electronic warfare breakthrough. Here, the potential is opened precisely by the Flamingo case with the relocation of part of fuel production to the EU: on this field, the European legislative field and oversight simplify the legal export of cooperative “kits” without direct sale of full-fledged category I products.
Dry figures confirm the demand SIPRI: Europe continues to increase imports of major armaments, and Ukraine, having passed the peak of imports in 2020–2024, simultaneously builds its own export framework – this is a direct argument “after the war” for scaling production under external orders without cutting supplies to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Volodymyr Kuznetsov, communications specialist, expert at the United Ukraine Think Tank