Energy System During War: How it Works in Ukraine

Every day in autumn 2024, Ukrainian electricity consumers—essentially all Ukrainians—hear almost the same official announcements. They are informed that due to attacks by Russian missiles, drones, and bombs, energy supplies are limited in around 500 settlements across several regions. This usually means that approximately a third of a million consumers experience either complete power outages for a day or a day and a half or intermittent power cuts for several hours. However, the power supply is then restored. This has been the case for at least two years. Russia attempted to plunge Ukraine into a humanitarian and economic catastrophe two years ago. But they did not succeed then, nor are they succeeding now. Businesses are functioning, major cities are alive, lifts in high-rise buildings are operational, and heating, water supply, and sewage systems are working. How is this possible? It is achieved through the extraordinary efforts of Ukrainian energy workers, both private and state-owned energy companies, along with the support of international partners and donors. And, of course, thanks to the incredible effectiveness of Ukrainian soldiers who shoot down Russian drones and missiles.

Currently, almost daily, the Ukrainian state company "Ukrenergo," which manages the country's high-voltage transmission lines, reports in its morning updates on the latest Russian drone and missile attacks during the night, as well as the use of glide bombs targeting energy facilities near the frontline. Sometimes these reports are alarming. For instance, on the morning of 22 October, the company reported that on the previous day, Monday 21 October, a high-voltage line supplying the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) from the Ukrainian energy grid was damaged by Russian artillery shelling.

Yes, this largest nuclear power plant in Europe is practically located on the front line, on the left bank of the Dnipro River, under the control of the occupiers. The right bank of the Dnipro, opposite the plant, is controlled by the Ukrainian army. The six nuclear reactors, each with a capacity of 1,000 MW, have been shut down since 2022, but they still require electricity to remain in a safe inactive state. The Ukrainian power grid supplies energy to the inactive NPP via high-capacity transmission lines.

Within about a day, Ukrainian energy workers, despite the threat of shelling, conducted emergency repairs and restored the operation of the high-voltage line. This is far from an isolated incident. Systematic attacks on Ukraine's energy system have been occurring since autumn 2022. This marks the third consecutive cold season during which Ukraine has faced targeted strikes on its energy infrastructure.

Despite this, the country has not experienced total blackouts, only widespread rolling outages in specific areas and for certain types of consumers, followed by restoration of power supply. How is this possible? Could it be that the Russian strikes are not particularly severe? In fact, they are unprecedented in their intensity. Such an event is without historical parallel.

120+ Missiles in a Night, Plus Another Hundred Drones

The most massive Russian air attack on Ukraine took place on the night of 26 August, and its effects are still being addressed, according to the head of "Ukrenergo," although the most significant damage was repaired within about two weeks. How severe was this attack? Extremely severe. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, over two consecutive nights—on 26 and 27 August—Russia launched a total of 137 missiles and 190 attack drones on cities and energy facilities across the country. Almost all the missiles were used in the first night, with around two-thirds of the drones deployed then, and the remaining third in the second night. In total, the attacks involved:

• 6 Kinzhal Kh-47M2 aeroballistic hypersonic missiles;
• 7 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles;
• Iskander-K cruise missile;
• 82 Kh-101 cruise missiles launched from Tu-95MS aircrafts;
• 28 Kalibr cruise missiles launched from surface and submarine vessels;
• 3 Kh-22 supersonic heavy cruise missiles;
• 10 Kh-59/Kh-69 guided air missiles launched from Su-57, Su-34 aircraft.

Of these, 107 missiles and 159 attack drones were shot down. Some of the drones were suppressed by electronic warfare systems. However, around 30 missiles and several drones still damaged or destroyed numerous infrastructure facilities, primarily energy-related ones.

Since March 2024 alone, Russia has conducted nine large-scale missile and air strikes on Ukraine's energy system. As a result, for some time in the spring and summer, Ukraine had to implement planned rolling blackouts for consumers to balance the energy grid. Each day, according to specific schedules, different parts of cities and industrial consumers were sequentially cut off for several hours at a time.

Similar measures were also necessary after the first wave of attacks on Ukraine's energy system two years ago, in the autumn of 2022. Ukraine passed the winter of 2023/24 relatively calmly, as the attacks in autumn 2023 were not as intense. However, in 2024, it appears that the Russian leadership abandoned hopes of a quick victory and decided to go all-in, attempting to target even individual energy substations with missiles. Large thermal power plants had already been destroyed by missile attacks earlier in spring 2024.

Photo: Oleksiy Brecht, acting chairman of the state company "Ukrenergo": "We are setting records that our colleagues can now aim for." Source: "Ukrenergo"

"We Have Learned..."

Oleksiy Brecht, acting chairman of the state company "Ukrenergo": 

"During the latest large-scale missile attack (on 26 August), four of our 750 kV substations were hit. We restored their full operation within 13 days. This was possible because we have a fleet of equipment, a skilled team of people ready to step in and start the work, and we have almost everything we need right at the site that requires restoration—this greatly influences how much time it takes. We have learned to install an autotransformer within three weeks, transporting it from another region. Believe me, no one has ever done this in three weeks before. We are setting records that our colleagues can now aim for... We have a complete range of necessary electrical equipment, and we have a reserve emergency fleet of transformers. We are probably more prepared for this winter than ever, ready for all possible scenarios so we can respond appropriately."

Source – "Ukrenergo" Facebook page

Hard Lessons Worth Learning

Perhaps the most important conclusions that can be drawn from Ukraine's experience in maintaining its energy system under mass enemy strikes are as follows:

• Layered air defence with a strong aviation component is necessary. Both power plants and key substations on main transmission lines need to be protected.
• Large cities must care for alternative energy systems for heating, water supply, sewage, metro, and surface rail systems.
• Programmes that encourage the creation of highly decentralised electricity generation systems—small and medium solar, wind, thermal plants, cogeneration systems, and industrial battery-based energy storage—are essential.
• Energy suppliers must stockpile equipment and tools for urgent repair work and the restoration of damaged infrastructure.
• Emergencies require new approaches to consumption regulation. For example, in Ukraine, the most recommended hours for high energy consumption are during daylight, when solar power plants are active, as opposed to the traditional advice to shift energy use to the middle of the night.

Photo: Almost every night, Russian missiles and drones attack Ukrainian energy facilities and infrastructure. Ternopil region. Source: State Emergency Service of Ukraine.

This experience is already being studied by specialists from Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Romania, and Germany, as resilience in the face of threats from Russia is a pressing need.

At present, Ukrainians are perhaps the most energy-independent nation. Under the threat of long power outages, households have acquired an astronomical number of small petrol and diesel generators, private solar stations, and battery stations for powering household appliances, electronics, and lighting. A power bank has become as essential an accessory in a woman’s handbag as lipstick.

Businesses have purchased a vast number of their own generators of varying capacities—from 10-20 kW to hundreds of kilowatts. Solar panels now adorn the roofs and premises of most operational enterprises. The National Bank (financial regulator) has introduced a system of requirements for private banks, ensuring that interruptions in the operation of the financial system in the event of power outages are avoided.

Ukraine enters its third winter of war with the hope of receiving continued support from international partners, without which the country could hardly have stood so firmly. But it relies first and foremost on its own creativity and determination