How Europe is Preparing for a Great War
More than three years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe is rapidly reshaping its defense landscape. With unprecedented military spending, coordinated industrial efforts, and innovative financial tools, the continent is transforming itself from a military bystander into a unified defense powerhouse—preparing not just to deter, but to withstand a possible great war.
Europe’s Strategic Shift: From Promises to Preparedness
The growth of defense budgets and weapons production has reached levels not seen since the end of the Cold War. The Lithuanian defense minister frankly articulated the reason for this: defense against Russia has become an existential priority, more important than any domestic reforms, and therefore even highly indebted EU states have developed a joint off-budget instrument, ReArm Europe, worth €800 billion, which will allow financing rearmament without formally increasing national debts. It is no coincidence that Vilnius has already reserved 5.5% of GDP for defense in 2026, while the average for the Alliance barely exceeds 2%.
Industrial Mobilization: Building the Arsenal of Europe
Real money is backed by a sectoral strategy. In March 2024, the European Commission launchedEDIS/EDIP, a package of legislation that allocates at least €2 billion in grants and loans to the defense industry to bring the annual production of shells to two million pieces by 2025 and create an industrial Schengen for weapons components. This package financed the modernization of 11 ammunition plants in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain, as well as the deployment of additional explosives lines in Bassanker, Belgium.
National programs are even more ambitious. After the Zeitenwende, Germany redistributed more than €100 billion to a special fund, and Rheinmetall is converting two automobile plants in Baden-Württemberg to produce armored vehicles and air defense modules – the first Skynexes are due to roll off the line this fall.
France has approved a seven-year, €413 billion Military Planning Program; half of the funds will go to unmanned systems and the Mamba NG medium-range missile defense system, which doubles the production of Aster missiles.
Poland spends more than 4% of GDP: mass assembly of Abrams tanks has begun in Hlivice, and a line of Korean K2 PLs is being built near Bydgoszcz; by 2026, Warsaw plans to operate the largest tank fleet in Europe – 1,100 vehicles.
European Support for Ukraine: Funding and Logistics
In parallel, Brussels is increasing its direct funding for Ukraine. The European Peace Fund has received an additional €5 billion, allocated exclusively for the purchase of weapons for the Armed Forces, a separate barrel of funds unrelated to the humanitarian or macro-financial block.
In 2025, this money was combined with the Czech initiative for the rapid supply of shells: Prague, with the support of Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada, bought a shipment of 850,000 155 mm ammunition on the world market and organized its delivery by rail through Slovakia. Donor governments are funding not only the purchase but also the conversion of Czech and Slovak presses to NATO caliber, which will double their capacity by 2026.
A separate line of defense integration is plants within Ukraine itself. In August 2023, the British BAE Systems registered a subsidiary in Kyiv, signed a framework agreement with the Ministry of Strategic Industries, and is now setting up a site for a series of L119 light howitzers in Zhytomyr.
Rheinmetall and Ukroboronprom are entering a joint armor hulls workshop for Marder 1A3 and Luna NG unmanned aerial vehicles in the west of the country. The model is simple: a Western concern invests equipment and know-how, the Ukrainian side provides personnel and preferential taxation, and the final product is divided between the front and export contracts to the EU, effectively turning Ukraine into an “outpost incubator” for European military engineering.
Innovative Financial Mechanisms and Joint Procurement Initiatives
Financial mechanisms are also evolving. Denmark centralizes aid through its own Ukraine Fund, which accumulates energy tax and directly pays for orders from Danish companies – Copenhagen financed a €250 million batch of Caesar II air defense systems.
Last year, the Netherlands set up a €2.5 billion trust fund, with 40% going to direct arms purchases and 60% in the form of grants to the Ukrainian defense industry to localize the repair of Leopard 2 A6. Similar schemes are being implemented by Sweden and Italy, in effect recognizing that investing in local production is cheaper and faster than transporting heavy equipment across half the continent.
The European Union, for its part, is relying on a long series of programs. ASAP (“Act in Support of Ammunition Production”) reimburses up to 35% of capital expenditures for companies that increase the production of gunpowder and TNT, and in 2025 this rate will rise to 50% for plants located in the border countries of Russia or Ukraine. EDIRPA stimulates joint purchases: if three or more states buy weapons together, Brussels subsidizes up to 20% of the contract, i.e. Poland and Romania have already saved $380 million by ordering Patriot air defense systems together.
Building Infrastructure and Training for Rapid Deployment
Against the backdrop of this industrial race, the density of military training grounds is growing along with the numbers of defense budgets. Lithuania is completing the construction of the Auschwitz training ground for rapid certification of NATO brigades, Finland is modernizing the Parkano ammunition tunnel storage facility, and Slovakia is opening a European-style ultra-fast track between Kosice and Uzhhorod to speed up the logistics of equipment to the Ukrainian border. In this way, infrastructure enhances the effect of production growth by minimizing the time from the factory floor to the front line.
The symbolic culmination was the second Ukrainian tranche of the Eurofighter 2030+ program: Germany, Spain, and Italy included an option to integrate Ukrainian radars and artificial intelligence algorithms in the terms of reference, the first time that Ukrainian developments have been officially included in a platform that will be exported to NATO countries. Although the combat readiness of the aircraft is scheduled for the end of the decade, the very fact of co-design demonstrates this: Kyiv is gradually joining the club of not only consumers but also developers of defense technologies on the continent.
What is a new European deterrence formula?
First, budgets are growing faster than in the 1980s due to special funds and borrowing.
Second, the industry is completing the “Schengen for arms,” where parts and software move without duties and quotas.
Third, Ukraine itself is becoming a production cluster that is rapidly meeting its own needs and bolstering the stockpiles of its allies.
Thus, preparations for a major war in Europe go beyond the classic pre-war race: the continent is building a system in which the front, the factory, and the political decision are welded into a single, supranational infrastructure capable of operating 24/7. And even if a large-scale clash is avoided, this industrial renaissance is already transforming the EU from an economic giant and a military dwarf into an actor that can not only pay but also fight for its own security.
Bohdan Popov, Head of Digital at the United Ukraine Think Tank, communications specialist, and public figure