New Strategic Autonomy: How Europe Can Support Itself and Ukraine Without US

In the second Trump administration, transatlantic relations have suffered another blow. The European Union, which used to rely on the United States as a security guarantor, is now forced to reconsider its strategic positioning urgently. Whether about frontline supplies to Ukraine or long-term stability in the region, the US behavior, focused on isolationism and priorities in the Indo-Pacific, requires a new European security architecture. 

In this article, we will look at how cooperation between the US and the EU can be transformed, assess Europe's potential for autonomous support for Ukraine, and propose scenarios for a transition to a more independent defense policy.

Scenarios for the Development of US-EU Relations in the Context of the Trump Administration's Policy

From the first days of his return to power, Donald Trump has demonstrated his hostility to the EU, calling it hostile to US interests. At the Munich Security Conference, Vice President J.D. Vance explicitly stated that the values of the United States and Europe differ. Washington's isolationism, accompanied by tariff wars and the idea of annexing Greenland, has only exacerbated the already fragile transatlantic ties.

However, the biggest blow came from Ukraine. The temporary suspension of military and technical assistance to Kyiv, the attempt to exclude Ukraine and European allies from the negotiation process with Russia, and the public humiliation of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Washington all made the EU realize that it could no longer count on US protection.

In this situation, Europe needs to reconsider its role in the security and defense sector, both in supporting Ukraine and in protecting its territory. Accordingly, we can outline three basic scenarios for the development of European defense autonomy in the context of changed US policy.

Scenario 1: controlled transition. The United States recognizes the need to transfer part of the responsibility for security to Europe and promotes the development of the EU's defense capabilities. In this case, the EU will have the time, resources, and coordination to build its defense sovereignty.

Scenario 2: Hard break. The US not only stops supporting Ukraine, but also blocks any European initiatives to strengthen it by controlling logistics, equipment maintenance, spare parts exports, and Starlink.

Scenario 3: Double game. The United States publicly supports the idea of European autonomy, but unofficially hinders it by promoting its own arms sales and maintaining control over critical logistics hubs.

Depending on which of these scenarios materializes, the European Union will face varying degrees of challenge and pressure from the United States. But regardless of Washington's behavior, it is the EU's internal capabilities- economic, industrial, institutional, and political- that will determine whether the continent can maintain its support for Ukraine and at the same time ensure its own security.

So the key question is: How ready is Europe to assume this responsibility and overcome the barriers that may be created not only by Russia, but also by its former main ally?

The EU's Ability to Overcome Challenges and Counteract Potential US Pressure

The European Union has significant - albeit latent - potential to reorient its security policy. The problem is not a lack of capabilities, but rather the will, coordination, and institutional inertia. The EU faces several challenges in this area.

First, industrial fragmentation. European defense companies do not have large enough orders to scale up production. Government orders are too small to pay off investments in new plants or lines.

Second, regulatory barriers. In the UK, for example, the expansion of an explosives plant was blocked (by local authorities) despite the urgent need. In the EU, such examples are not the exception, but the rule.

Third, logistical dependence on NATO. Most of the transportation and planning of technical assistance to Ukraine takes place through structures where the United States plays a critical role. Without a controlled transfer of these functions, the EU will have to create duplicate structures.

Fourth, political fragmentation. Disagreements between Poland and Ukraine (particularly over agricultural policy), or between France and the UK (e.g., over fisheries), hinder unity.

Thus, although the European Union has the potential to form a strategic autonomy, real steps in this direction are complicated by a number of systemic barriers, from industrial dispersion to lack of political agreement.

However, strategic autonomy is not just a matter of a common European policy. It is embodied in the concrete actions of individual countries that are the first to face new security risks. Therefore, to understand the real state of affairs, it is crucial to look at national contexts, especially the situation in the Black Sea region, where the threat of Russian aggression has not only a hypothetical but also a very practical dimension.

The Black Sea Dimension of European Autonomy

The issue of EU autonomy in the security sphere therefore becomes even more relevant when looking at specific national contexts - especially border and frontline countries such as Romania and Bulgaria.

These states have found themselves at the forefront of the new geopolitical reality, especially due to Russia's increased activity in the Black Sea. For Romania, which is the closest NATO ally to Odesa, the issue of Black Sea defense has become critical - not only in a military sense, but also in an economic sense. It is through Romanian ports that most of Ukraine's grain export routes run, and these routes are increasingly becoming the target of hybrid attacks by Russia.

Romania has already initiated the creation of a regional coordination center for mine action in the Black Sea, and is also advocating for an increased NATO presence in the region. However, amid declining U.S. support, Bucharest is increasingly looking to Brussels, expecting the EU to move beyond declarations to real defense coordination.

Bulgaria, which has long maintained a cautious stance, is also gradually becoming more active. In 2024, it approved the first direct arms supplies to Ukraine and agreed to deploy elements of allied air defense within NATO. However, internal political polarization and the influence of pro-Russian forces make long-term strategic planning difficult. For Sofia, it is critical to obtain guarantees of joint protection from the EU, especially in the areas of maritime security and air surveillance.

These examples show that without Europe's strategic autonomy, the countries of the region remain vulnerable. The Black Sea is turning into the main foothold of the hybrid confrontation between Russia and the West. If the EU does not take the initiative on security in the region, the vacuum will be filled by other forces, with unpredictable consequences.

At the same time, maintaining stability on the southern flank cannot be an isolated task. It is Ukraine, as a state on the front line, that continues to deter Russia and thus buys time for the whole of Europe. The next question is no less important: can Europe take full responsibility for supporting Ukraine, at least in the transitional phase, when transatlantic unity is at stake?

Can Europe Support Ukraine on its Own?

Yes, but with reservations. Europe can replace the United States as the main donor of aid, but not in all areas and not immediately.

Area 1: combat operations - artillery support. In 2023, Ukraine received approximately 1.6 million 155-mm shells. In 2024 - 1.5 million. At least 2.4 million per year is needed to deter the Russian offensive. Without the United States, this volume is difficult to cover, but not impossible. For example, the UK's missile manufacturing capacity has increased 16-fold, but the government does not place orders, and there is a lack of charge material. New plants are being blocked by local authorities.

Area 2: Air and Missile Defense. Ukraine currently has the US Patriot system, the only one capable of intercepting aerial ballistic missiles. The EU cannot produce a replacement. But IRIS-T and SAMP/T are effective against cruise missiles. Most of Russia's strikes are not ballistic. Therefore, even without Patriot, it is possible to protect critical infrastructure.

Sphere 3: Logistics, repair, support. 4,000 pieces of equipment in Ukraine are awaiting repair. If the US refuses to supply spare parts and service, the situation will become critical. The EU can take over the repairs, but only partially and not immediately.

Thus, Europe has the potential to partially or even fully replace American support for Ukraine, but this process will be uneven and limited in time. In some areas - such as munitions or air defense systems - the EU can quickly build up capabilities, while in others - such as logistics and maintenance of U.S. equipment - the transition will be more difficult and will require time and institutional effort.

To move from potential to actual ability to support Ukraine without U.S. involvement, the European Union will need to make a series of decisions that are decisive, coordinated, and obviously politically difficult.

What should the EU do?

First, consolidate the defense industry. The EU should combine orders for defense companies to guarantee their profitability. Joint financing of projects, scaling up production, and deregulation at the national level are needed.

Second, invest in logistics and communications infrastructure. Create structures to coordinate military assistance to Ukraine parallel to NATO. Launch an alternative to Starlink or enter into a long-term agreement with service providers to provide services, even if U.S. support is terminated.

Third, introduce political solidarity. Western European countries should bear the brunt of the financial burden. Differences between member states should be temporarily set aside for the sake of a common goal.

Fourth, explain to citizens. Breaking away from dependence on the United States means not only costs, but also geopolitical subjectivity. Supporting Ukraine is not “altruism” but an investment in the continent's security.

Europe has every chance to take responsibility for its own defense and for supporting Ukraine. The United States has long demonstrated a desire to reorient itself to the Indo-Pacific region, and Trump has only radicalized this trend.

Replacing American support will not happen in a few months. But in 12-18 months, with sufficient funding, coordination, and political will, the EU can not only keep Ukraine together, but also provide the foundation for a new European security, where Europe will not be a junior partner of the United States, but an equal actor.

The main question is not “whether the EU can” but “whether it will.” And not only the fate of Ukraine, but also the future of Europe itself depends on this answer.

Ihor Petrenko, founder of the “United Ukraine” Think Tank, PhD in Political Science