The Moscow–Tehran Axis: How Iranian Weapons in Ukraine Threaten the Middle East

Iran’s partnership with Russia has turned Ukraine into a testing ground for drones and missiles that could soon reshape the balance of power across the Middle East. The West faces not one war, but two interconnected fronts.
As Russia’s war against Ukraine drags on, the Kremlin is increasingly reliant on external partners for weapons supplies. While China maintains a balance between benefits and reputational losses, Iran has chosen an open line of support for Moscow.
Shahed drones, missiles, and ammunition supplied from Tehran are already significantly impacting the course of hostilities in eastern and southern Ukraine. However, this cooperation extends far beyond the Ukrainian front – it is reshaping the balance of power across the entire Middle East. This is precisely why the West – from Washington to Brussels and Tel Aviv – is forced to seek responses to this dangerous Moscow-Tehran axis.
Russia Gains a “Second Wind” Thanks to Iranian Drones and Missiles
Shahed strike drones have become a symbol of Russia’s strategy of mass attacks on Ukrainian cities. Their low cost and mass deployment have allowed Moscow to strike energy and civilian infrastructure, exhausting Ukraine’s air defense systems. In exchange, Russia provides Iran with advanced technologies, particularly in aviation and air defense systems, and assists in evading sanctions. This “synergy of outcasts” transforms two states with regional ambitions into strategic partners attempting to challenge the West on a global scale.
What Iranian Weapons Are Being Used in the War Against Ukraine
At the center of attention, of course, are the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, which in their Russian versions are called “Geran-1” and “Geran-2.” These are relatively simple and inexpensive devices equipped with civilian-grade engines, capable of carrying warheads weighing 30–50 kg. They are launched in groups, overwhelming Ukraine’s air defenses. The cost of a single Shahed is estimated at $20,000–$40,000, while intercepting such a drone sometimes requires an air defense missile costing hundreds of thousands of dollars. This economy of asymmetry makes them an effective weapon of attrition.
In addition to drones, Iran has supplied missiles – according to Western intelligence, these include ballistic Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar missiles with ranges of several hundred kilometers. These missiles threaten not only frontline cities but also Ukraine’s deep rear. There is also evidence of the use of Iranian guided artillery munitions and anti-tank missiles.
Importantly, many components of these systems originate from Western markets, acquired through third countries and shell companies. Thus, Iran not only exports weapons but also creates a parallel logistics network for evading sanctions, simultaneously serving Russia. In effect, the Ukrainian front is currently a testing ground for the full spectrum of Iran’s arsenal: from kamikaze drones to medium-range missiles. For Tehran, this is an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that its products are effective and competitive, while for Moscow, it is a chance to continue strikes on civilian cities as its own arsenal depletes.
Russia Localizes Shahed Production on Its Territory
Another dangerous trend is that Moscow is no longer merely importing Shahed drones from Iran but has also established their production domestically. According to Western intelligence, a factory in Tatarstan is assembling thousands of drones based on Iranian technologies. Russian sources call this “import substitution,” but in practice, it involves the complete transfer of technical documentation and production lines from Tehran. This allows the Kremlin to reduce its dependence on imports and gain the ability to produce weapons on an industrial scale. This project has been made possible through the use of Western components – engines, chips, and navigation systems – that reach Russia through third countries, including Turkey, the UAE, or Kazakhstan.
In effect, Russia’s localization of Shahed production highlights the failure of sanctions policy: even in a state of international isolation, Moscow finds ways not only to purchase weapons but also to establish their production. For Ukraine, this represents a long-term threat: even if supply channels from Iran are cut off, Russian factories are already capable of supplying the front with thousands of drones monthly. For the West, it is a warning that sanctions control must become stricter and more global, with a focus on microelectronics supply chains. If this trend continues, Moscow could transform Iranian technology into its own mass-produced product, using it against Ukraine and in potential future conflicts.
Tehran Uses the War in Ukraine as a Testing Ground for Its Ambitions
The Iranian regime, which for decades has sought to prove its ability to confront Israel and the United States, has gained a unique opportunity to test its weapons in real combat conditions. What is being tested in Ukrainian skies today is also being used in the Middle East – against Israel, and potentially later against Saudi Arabia or U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf. Iranian military forces are gaining invaluable experience, and the regime’s propaganda uses footage from Ukraine as proof of the “effectiveness of Islamic weapons.” This creates a new level of threat for the region, where any escalation could draw the U.S. and EU into direct conflict.
Moscow and Tehran Form an “Alliance of Sanctioned Economies”
Beyond military cooperation, Russia and Iran are building a joint model for surviving under sanctions. Trade in national currencies, joint banks, and a shadow fleet for oil transportation are tools that allow both regimes to stay afloat. At the same time, this creates alternative funding channels for terrorist groups in the Middle East sponsored by Iran. While Moscow provides the financial infrastructure, Tehran supplies fighters and weapons. Together, this undermines not only Ukraine’s security but also the stability of the entire region, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean.
Israel and the U.S. See a Threat in the “Reverse Export” of War
For Israel, Iran’s assistance to Russia is not just a Ukrainian problem. It means that Hezbollah and other proxies could receive upgraded weapons honed on the Ukrainian front. The U.S. and EU also recognize that if Iran strengthens its position through its alliance with Moscow, it will jeopardize their ability to control the situation in the Persian Gulf and ensure the security of energy supplies.
The cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is not a temporary alliance of convenience – it is a long-term survival strategy for two regimes seeking to undermine the international order. For Ukraine, this means more drones and missiles in the skies. For the Middle East, it raises the prospect of a new war with Iran, backed by Russian technologies and Moscow’s political cover in the UN Security Council. For the U.S., EU, and Israel, it necessitates the development of a unified containment strategy that extends beyond the Ukrainian theater of war.
Volodymyr Kuznetsov, communications specialist, expert at the United Ukraine Think Tank