Can Türkiye bring peace or ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine?

As Russia escalates its attempts to dictate the terms of peace through military offensives and diplomatic games, Türkiye quietly asserts its own influence. Straddling the line between East and West, Ankara remains outside the Western sanctions coalition yet supports Ukraine's sovereignty, trades with Moscow but arms Kyiv. Can Türkiye succeed where the West struggles to pressure the Kremlin?

Is Türkiye A Good Mediator that Russia and Ukraine will listen to?

In a situation where direct dialog between Moscow and most Western capitals is blocked, Türkiye has become almost the only bridge between the parties. And this is not just a diplomatic gesture.

In 2022, Türkiye, together with the UN, brokered a “grain deal” that allowed Ukraine to export food through the Black Sea after Russia attacked and eventually blocked Ukraine’s grain export, which accounts to one of the top among nations. This was one of the few examples of a real diplomatic breakthrough since the start of the full-scale invasion. Even after Russia withdrew from the agreement in 2023, the very fact of its existence proved that Ankara has unique access to Russia's political elite while maintaining contact with Kyiv.

Türkiye can use this mediation potential in the future, if it decides not just to maneuver, but to influence.

The Mistress of the Black Sea: Influencing the Balance of Power

Ankara has not only diplomatic but also strategic levers. According to the 1936 Montreux Convention,Türkiye controls the passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. In February 2022, shortly after the invasion, it closed the straits to warships, effectively limiting Russia's ability to deploy naval forces to the Black Sea.

That shift meant to send a clear signal: Türkiye is ready to use international law not in Russia's favor. And although it did not force the Russian fleet to retreat, Moscow's military potential in the region has significantly decreased.

What is Bayraktars and how does Türkiye-Ukraine,  Cooperation, and a Show of Force

Türkiye's support for Ukraine is not only symbolic but also practical. In particular, Bayraktar TB2drones became one of the key elements of Ukraine's defense in the first months of the invasion, destroying enemy convoys and boosting Ukrainian morale.

Turkish business is currently investing in the creation of a joint UAV production facility in Ukraine. This is not just a sale of weapons, but the creation of a technological alliance. Moscow has repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction with these steps, but Ankara is not backing down.

This is a painful signal for the Kremlin: even those who have not joined the sanctions can help Ukraine with weapons.

Economic Leverage: Trade and Dependence

After the invasion began, trade between Russia and Türkiye increased significantly. Ankara has become an important hub for circumventing sanctions: Russian companies have been importing technology, equipment, and financial services through Türkiye. However, the dependence is mutual.

Russia is increasingly in need of Türkiye as an economic partner: it is a market, logistics, and currency for transactions. Under Biden's presidency, the United States has repeatedly drawn Türkiye's attention to the risks of cooperation with Russia, and this pressure has gradually increased.

If Türkiye decides to reduce trade or join Western restrictions, the consequences for the Russian economy could be extremely painful.

A Voice for the Muslim World and the Global South

Türkiye has a unique geopolitical voice, especially in countries where the West has traditionally had no influence. These include Central Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Through the Organization of Turkic States and its extensive diplomatic networks, Ankara is able to shape an alternative narrative – not pro-Russian, but not Western either.

In those regions where Russia is trying to promote the thesis of “fighting the West” or “anti-colonial mission,” Türkiye can become an alternative center of influence that exposes the true nature of Russian aggression.

This is a slow but effective struggle for the world's information sympathies. And Türkiye is not a statistic here.

Erdoğan and Putin: a Balance Between Threat and Friendship

The relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin is neither an alliance nor a confrontation, but a constant struggle for superiority. They are united by pragmatism, but divided by interests in the South Caucasus, Syria, Libya, and the Black Sea.

In 2015, after the Turkish Air Force shot down a Russian Su-24, Erdoğan directly confronted Moscow. Despite the subsequent “reconciliation,” Türkiye then showed that it was ready to risk even a military confrontation. This formed a complex model for Putin's perception of Ankara – a partner that cannot be trusted, but is also dangerous to despise.

On the other hand, Erdoğan has repeatedly publicly disagreed with Putin in statements, as he did during Russia's aggression against Ukraine. In particular, in 2022, he called Russia's actions “unacceptable” and clearly stated his support for Ukraine's territorial integrity.

What do relations of Zelensky and Erdoğan tell about potential impact of Türkiye?

Unlike the cold meetings with Putin, the dialogue between Erdoğan and Zelenskyy is lively and public. Türkiye has initiated personal meetings between the presidents several times, including in Lviv in August 2022 and during official visits by Ukrainian delegations to Ankara.

In addition, after the prisoner exchange in 2023, five Ukrainian commanders from Azovstal who were in Türkiye unexpectedly returned home with Zelenskyy, despite the lack of coordination with Moscow. This provoked an angry reaction from the Kremlin and proved once again: Erdoğan is not afraid to play against Putin if it suits his interests or the image of a regional leader.

Türkiye is not just a geopolitical power. This is Erdoğan's Türkiye, and the leader's personal relationship with Putin and Zelenskyy may play a bigger role than sanctions or military aid at a critical moment. That is why Ankara should not be underestimated as a player in the issue of future peace for Ukraine.

Crimea Is a Personal Issue for Erdoğan

Türkiye's attitude to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 remains unchanged: Ankara does not recognize Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. This is the official position, repeatedly voiced by the Turkish president himself. For example, in 2024, at the Crimean Platform Summit, Erdoğan stated: “Our support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence is unwavering. The return of Crimea to Ukraine is a requirement of international law”.

This approach has not only geopolitical but also domestic political roots.

Türkiye has historically considered itself the patron saint of the Crimean Tatar people, a large part of whom lives in modern Türkiye. This diaspora is not just an ethnic community, but an influential part of the Turkish electorate, especially in the coastal areas of the Black Sea.

Erdoğan has consistently emphasized his concern for the Crimean Tatars, calling them the “indigenous people of Crimea” who must be guaranteed the right to expression, education, language, and security. Ankara has repeatedly demanded that Russia release Crimean Tatar political prisoners, including journalists, activists, and representatives of the Mejlis.

In 2021, Türkiye openly protested the sentence to Crimean Tatar leader Nariman Dzhelal, calling his arrest politically motivated. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Dzhelal's conviction “does not comply with justice and legal norms”.

This humanitarian and political factor strengthens Türkiye's position on the status of Crimea. Ankara claims to be the guarantor of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people in the post-war settlement, which means that it will not accept a peace formula that will consolidate Russia's occupation without taking into account the rights of the indigenous population.

This fundamentally distinguishes Türkiye's position from that of some neutral or pragmatic players in the Global South. Not only does Türkiye not recognize the annexation of Crimea, it has an internal political motivation to actively oppose its legitimization.

For Erdoğan, the issue of Crimea is not just a point in his foreign policy strategy. It is a tool for mobilizing his own electorate, a reflection of the historical memory of the Ottoman Empire, and a real interest in a peace formula that cannot ignore the Crimean Tatar issue.

Ankara Is a Balancer with the Potential to Become a Player

Ankara is not a legal ally of Ukraine. It has not imposed sanctions against Russia, nor has it called for a break in relations. However, its actions have already deterred Russia at sea, armed Ukraine in the air, bargained with Moscow on an equal footing, and engaged in a dialogue with countries that have not yet decided on their position.

This unique status allows Türkiye to influence events more than it seems at first glance. And if at some point Ankara decides to bet on a just peace with the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity, it could become the key to reformatting regional security.

The world should look more closely at the Bosphorus – today it is not just a crossroads of sea routes, but a geopolitical artery of future peace.

Ihor Petrenko, founder of the “United Ukraine” Think Tank, Doctor of Political Sciences