How a Ceasefire — or Its Absence — Will Redefine the West’s Ukraine Strategy

The topic of a ceasefire in Ukraine remains on the agenda, although there is still no clear readiness of the Russian Federation to do so. In any case, the scenarios for further developments differ significantly depending on whether a ceasefire is reached or the war continues. 

This article analyzes how each of the options could change the course of bilateral relations between Ukraine and the United States, the United States and Russia, and Kyiv and Moscow-and what risks each of them carries. 

Istanbul Signals: Diplomacy Without Commitment

The Istanbul talks have shown: The Kremlin is not ready for a meaningful dialogue on terms that include the withdrawal of troops or even the formalization of a temporary truce. The Ukrainian delegation, headed by Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, voiced a clear position: a 30-day ceasefire should be the first step to create conditions for the safe operation of humanitarian corridors, stabilize the frontline, and prevent a new escalation in the summer. However, the Russian side evaded a direct answer, instead focusing on “the resumption of dialogue on the basis of the Istanbul Agreements of 2022.”

Thus, Russia is seeking to return to a favorable moment for itself, when the Ukrainian army was less equipped and the partners were not as united.

The United States: Between Symbolic Support and Limited Pressure

The United States has formally supported the ceasefire demand, but has not yet put enough pressure on Russia to implement it. An American delegation was present in Istanbul, but the format of the talks indicates Washington's observational rather than directive position. The Trump administration is not ready to escalate with the Kremlin for the sake of Ukraine, and is inclined to a strategic “de-escalation package” where a ceasefire could become a tool for temporary stabilization-without resolving key issues about Ukraine's territorial integrity.

At the same time, the United States is closely monitoring the reaction of its allies – if the EU, the UK, and the Baltic states continue to take a firm line, Washington will not risk splitting the Alliance.

US Special Representative to the President Steve Witkoff directly points to the need to reach some kind of compromise between Kyiv and Moscow. At unofficial briefings, the possibility of a “territorial exchange” is even raised, which is alarming not only in Ukraine but also in European capitals.

In the event of a ceasefire initiated by the United States, bilateral relations between Kyiv and Washington risk entering a dangerous phase of “restrained partnership.” Support may continue in the economic or defense sphere, but it will be neither rapid nor systematic.

An agreement without security guarantees is a direct threat of freezing the conflict. At the same time, the United States will be able to focus on domestic politics and China, promoting the thesis: “We stopped the war”. And even if it is only a pause, in Trump's rhetoric, it is already a victory.

If a ceasefire does not materialize, relations between Ukraine and the United States could cool even further. America, which had been expecting a “peaceful breakthrough,” may use the delay or failure of the negotiations as an excuse to gradually withdraw its support, at least to the extent that it was used to deter Russia.

US-Russia: Competition or Temporary Rapprochement?

For the Kremlin, a ceasefire is not peace, but a tool. The tactic of “freezing the conflict” allows Russia to regain strength, restructure its economy, and continue to influence the West through the tools of hybrid warfare. In this sense, a warming in US-Russia relations is quite desirable for Putin, especially if it is in exchange for Kyiv's concessions.

If the United States agrees to de facto recognize the front line as a new reality, this will open the way to “restoring constructive dialogue” with Russia – at least in some areas (e.g., nuclear arms control, the Middle East, containment of China).

However, even with this de-escalation, trust between Moscow and Washington will remain low.America will maintain sanctions, and Russia will maintain aggressive rhetoric. The most likely scenario is a limited rapprochement at the level of negotiating channels without a real “reset.”

Without a ceasefire, the United States and Russia will remain in a paradigm of conflict where Ukraine is not only a victim but also a battlefield for a new world architecture.

Ukraine-Russia: What “Peace” Means in the Kremlin's Logic

Russia is not seeking peace, but Ukraine's surrender in one form or another. Whether in Istanbul, the Vatican, Beijing, or Vienna, the Kremlin will talk about “historical justice,” “the commonwealth of the people,” and “the protection of Russian speakers,” trying to impose a new status quo. Therefore, the ceasefire may mean the end of active hostilities, but the beginning of a political struggle for the internal destabilization of Ukraine. Through economic pressure, provocations, and hybrid aggression.

Without a ceasefire, the war will continue in a tough form. The Kremlin will be looking for breakthroughs on the frontline, as well as “peacekeeping initiatives” through intermediaries (such as China or the Vatican) to shape a favorable information agenda. However, Russia will remain a threat to both Ukraine and Europe.

Scenarios of Further Developments

If we take the achievement of a 30-day ceasefire as a priority goal, the achievement or non-achievement of which will determine the further course of the war to some extent, we can distinguish three potential scenarios:

Scenario 1: Achievement of a 30-day ceasefire. The probability of this scenario is medium (25-35%), depending on US pressure, the position of the EU and Türkiye. The consequences of its implementation could be: a temporary decrease in the intensity of hostilities; a window for diplomatic consultations – but with the risk that Russia will use it to regroup.

The United States could present this as a “success of the peace initiative” while avoiding the topic of security guarantees; the West's attention would shift to “reconstruction,” which may be premature, as Russia does not abandon its main goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood.

If this scenario is realized, Ukraine may face the following risks: legitimization of the “contact line” as a new reality, unless there are clearly defined conditions (withdrawal of troops, international control), and the ceasefire will become a tool for freezing the conflict.

Scenario 2: Russia refuses to support the ceasefire and launches a new offensive. The probability of this scenario is high (45-55%). The following events may result: Russia uses diplomatic channels as a smokescreen before the summer campaign; pressure on Ukraine from some partners for “intransigence” increases; the West risks losing moral unity: some countries call for negotiations, while others increase support; the United States distances itself, focusing on China and the Middle East or domestic issues in general.

Under this scenario, Ukraine will face the following risks: escalation without guaranteed support, reduced arms supplies, disappointment in the West, and public fatigue.

Scenario 3: Diplomatic stalemate and war of attrition. The probability of this scenario can be estimated as moderate (30-40%). Its consequences may include: negotiations continue, but without substantive content; Russia conducts limited hostilities, maintaining pressure but not launching a large-scale offensive; Ukraine remains on the information front with a constant struggle for an agenda. Risks for Ukraine here may include a decrease in world attention, loss of media focus, and the gradual “transfer of the war to the background.”

What should Ukraine Do?

In all three scenarios, the main threat is the loss of subjectivity, i.e. a situation where negotiations or hostilities take place without Ukraine's active participation in decision-making. To prevent this, Kyiv must:

First, institutionalize the format of the “coalition of the resolute” as an independent voice at the level of NATO and the EU. This will reduce the risk of backroom deals between the US and Russia.

Second, to seek specific conditions for a ceasefire, including international verification, sanctions levers, and a ban on strengthening Russia's positions in the occupied territories.

Thirdly, to strengthen strategic communication in the West, explaining that a truce without guarantees is not the end of the war, but its new phase. Emphasis: freeze = next war (next phase of war).

Fourth, to consolidate society by demonstrating that the war is not just about territories, but about the future of Ukrainian statehood.

Fifth, to expand the circle of non-NATO partners, particularly in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, to avoid complete dependence on one coalition.

The crossroads at which Ukraine finds itself is a difficult one. On the one hand, there is pressure for “peace at any cost,” and on the other hand, there is a war of attrition. In this trap, the main thing is not to lose subjectivity.

The results of the Istanbul talks clearly outlined who is ready for real peace and who is using the truce as a tactical tool. For Ukraine, the main thing is to remain a subject of the process, not to allow the West to project a “convenient end to the war,” and to maintain the initiative on the diplomatic and information fronts. After all, in this war, defeat is not only a loss of territory, but also a loss of voice.

A ceasefire is not a solution if it is not based on international law, security and justice guarantees. Ukraine should not be a passive player responding to the signals of the great powers, but an active actor shaping a new security architecture for itself and for Europe.

And no matter how the coming months unfold, only internal unity, allies, technological modernization, and strategic thinking will give us a chance for a real and acceptable outcome, for peace – real peace, not peace imposed by Russia.

Ihor Petrenko, founder of the “United Ukraine” Think Tank, Doctor of Political Sciences