The “Russian World” Concept Is a Threat to European Security

Is the Putin regime's use of ideological tools to legitimize repression internally, distract from socio-economic problems, and threaten European security through claims to influence in the post-Soviet space really dangerous for Europe and the world?

Almost every aggressive and expansionist policy of authoritarian regimes is based on ideological principles that justify starting wars, abusing people, claiming territories of other states, etc.

For modern Russia, such principles are the provisions of the “Russian world” concept, which is the unofficial ideology of Putinism. It is used to justify expansionist actions, such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and support for separatist movements in eastern Ukraine. The “Russian World” ideology also includes elements of cultural and historical revisionism that attempt to create an image of Russia as a “protector” of Russian populations in other countries.

This concept is often accompanied by rhetoric about threats from the West, which is used to legitimize repression at home and aggression abroad. The “Russian world” has become an important tool for strengthening domestic support for the Putin regime and shaping the image of the enemy, which allows to divert the population's attention from socio-economic problems.

The Origins of the “Russian World” Concept

The concept of the “Russian world” has deep historical roots that go back to the times of the Moscow Kingdom and the medieval idea of “Holy Rus”.

In the Middle Ages, the idea of “Holy Rus” emerged as a concept that united the Orthodox faith and national identity. It emphasized the role of Russia as the “third Rome,” which meant the continuity of the Orthodox tradition from Byzantium.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Muscovy began to actively shape its identity, claiming to be the successor to Kyivan Rus. This became the basis for the development of the idea of the unity of all Russian peoples under the auspices of Moscow.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Russian Empire expanded its borders to include numerous ethnic groups. The idea of the “Russian world” began to be used to justify a policy of assimilation and control over neighboring peoples.

In the XX century, after the 1917 revolution and the formation of the USSR, the concept of “Soviet patriotism” partially replaced the idea of the “Russian world” but retained elements of unity between different peoples and “Slavic brotherhood.” After the collapse of the USSR in 1990, the idea was revived by “methodologists” Gleb Pavlovsky and Georgy Shchedrovitsky, and with Vladimir Putin's coming to power in 2000, it became part of state policy.

In 2007, the Russian World Foundation was created to promote the concept abroad. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it became a tool to justify Russia's aggressive foreign policy and support pro-Russian movements in post-Soviet countries.

The “Russian World” as the Basis of Russia's Aggressive Policy

The concept of the “Russian world” cannot be separated from the idea of Russian messianism, which is also the basis for Russia's claims to dominate the world. Russian messianism is the idea that the Russian people are considered the only force capable of resisting “world evil” and leading the world, including the idea of Russians as a god-bearing people. This emphasizes the universal character of the Russian idea, its conciliarity and universalism.

Within this philosophy, Russia's function is perceived as counteracting anti-human civilization, especially the United States. If Russia gains enough strength, it will fulfill its messianic task. From the standpoint of Russian religious philosophy, Russia has sufficient potential to realize the idea of a god-bearing nation: creative potential, holistic consciousness inseparable from the highest spiritual principle.

Vladislav Surkov, one of the most influential ideologues of the “Russian world,” whom Putin recently returned to his inner circle, has said in public interviews with Western media that the “Russian world” exists wherever there is Russian influence in one form or another: cultural, informational, military, economic, ideological, or humanitarian.

For its part, the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW) notes that the Kremlin has repeatedly used the idea of the “Russian world” to justify military interventions in former Soviet states and to claim that the territories of the former USSR and the Russian Empire are historically Russian. “Surkov's statements about Russia's claims to the south and east of Ukraine and the future expansion of the 'Russian world' directly contradict Witkoff's statements that Russia has no territorial ambitions beyond Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions,” ISW noted.

What Threat Does the “Russian World” Pose to the European Security System?

To understand the extent of the danger of the Russian World concept and its multifaceted threat to European security and values, it is worth paying attention to the fundamental works of ideologues who constantly produce additions to it. And also to the role of the Russian Orthodox Church, which is an institution dependent on the Russian authorities for internal and external propaganda of the “Russian world” and its messianic narratives.

In particular, the works of Alexander Dugin, a key ideologue of modern Russian neo-imperialism who developed the concept of the “Russian world” through the prism of Euro-Asianism, are worth reading.

In his books The Fundamentals of Geopolitics (1997) and The Fourth Political Theory (2009), Dugin argues that Russia is a unique Euro-Asian civilization that opposes the “Atlanticist” West. He rejects liberal democracy, promoting an ideocratic state with a strong central authority.

Dugin interprets the “Russian world” as a geopolitical project that unites countries that were formerly republics of the former USSR under Russian influence. He calls for expansion to “protect” the Russian cultural core from the “degradation” of the West. To reinforce the “protective” discourse, the propaganda cliché of “protecting Russian speakers” is used, which is a key element of the “Russian world” policy in the former Soviet Union and beyond.

The main idea behind the cliché is that wherever Russian is spoken, there are Russian interests that Russia must protect by any means necessary, including the armed forces. In this context, the Russian-Ukrainian war is a precedent that could be repeated in other regions if “protecting Russian speakers” becomes a pretext for intervention.

The Russian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, combines religious and political components in promoting the “Russian world.” Thus, through its foreign parishes and the Russian World Foundation, the Russian Orthodox Church spreads its ideology in Europe, particularly among Russian diasporas in the Baltic States, Germany, and France. And by promoting the slogan “Moscow is the Third Rome,” it has adapted it to Putin's policy and justification for the lifetime of his power. The Russian Orthodox Church calls Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus “Holy Russia,” claiming that their spiritual unity is indissoluble. Now, during the Russian-Ukrainian war, Patriarch Kirill openly supports the aggression, calling it “the defense of Orthodox values” against the “satanic West.”

The concept of the “Russian world” has become an important element of the ideological basis of modern Russian politics, especially in the context of aggression against neighboring countries. This ideology proclaims the idea of the unity of all “Russian” people, regardless of their citizenship, and asserts that Russia has the right to protect their interests beyond its borders.

Russia's claims to a “sphere of influence” in Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states) contradict the sovereignty of states and the principles of NATO and the EU. The use of Russian speakers as a “fifth column” to fuel conflicts (for example, in Latvia or Estonia) undermines EU unity.

The anti-Western rhetoric of Dugin and the Russian Orthodox Church appeals to the European far right (the National Front in France and the AfD in Germany), weakening liberal democracy. As a result, Europe faces the risk of fragmentation, the rise of populism, and direct confrontation with Russia.

Anton Kuchukhidze, foreign policy analyst, co-founder of the United Ukraine Think Tank