Europe in the Crosshairs of the Kremlin
The Swedish Security Service has warned the government and businesses about the growing Russian hybrid threat. Is it too late? Russian hybrid attacks have been observed in most EU countries. Security services from seven European countries held a meeting to discuss the threat of Russian sabotage at Norwegian energy facilities. However, much has happened that, while not directly linked to Russian hybrid attacks, is only now being noticed because the actions of Russian intelligence agents and saboteurs have become increasingly blatant and demonstrative.
On 29 August, the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) warned that the risk of attacks from Russian intelligence services and their proxies in the country had increased. This is a clear statement that Säpo has taken appropriate measures and that the authorities were "recently informed."
“For some time now, we have seen signs of an increased Russian willingness to take risks, and this concerns activities that threaten security. This ranges from influence operations to even sabotage, which is aimed at the West and, therefore, at Sweden,” quoted Säpo’s press manager Karl Melin as saying on SVT Nyheter.
Sweden Prepares to Defend Itself
According to Säpo, the most likely reason for the Russian attacks is Sweden's broad support for Ukraine. It is worth noting that in May 2024, Sweden provided Ukraine with another, but record-breaking, military support package worth 13.3 billion Swedish kronor (£1.03 billion). As part of this package, Sweden delivered two Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) ASC 890 aircraft to Ukraine. These aircraft are now a key component of Ukraine’s air defence and electronic intelligence systems overall. They appear to be operating alongside the F-16 fighters that Ukraine finally received in August.
This could be considered the reason why Sweden and its arms factories and military facilities have come under threat. However, in reality, everything began much earlier, as Karl Melin explains: “For many years, the Security Police have raised the issue of illegal intelligence activities by foreign states, but only now are we seeing this difference and perhaps a tendency towards increased Russian risk. This is a change we take very seriously and are acting upon to counter this threat.”
So, this activity was present before, but against the backdrop of an open hot war in Europe, Russian sabotage has reached a new level. Of course, Swedish companies linked to the defence industry are already actively responding. “On the one hand, there have been cases where people have tried to physically enter companies’ facilities, but we have also seen drones attempting to document operations and transportation to and from these facilities,” said Robert Limmergård, Secretary General of the Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association.
There has been a focused discussion in Sweden regarding changing approaches to drone flights. For example, companies are demanding the right to counteract drone intrusions into the airspace above their facilities.
A Different Kind of Sabotage
Attacks on transport networks during the Olympic Games in France, similar to attacks on railway networks in Germany, follow a fairly typical pattern of inflicting damage. There is a high likelihood that these hybrid attacks were carried out not only to disrupt the Olympic Games, which Russia is boycotting. These attacks can also be seen as attempts to test the overall impact of attacks on transport infrastructure, as well as the ability of transport networks, security services, and armed forces to respond to similar attacks in the future.
Recently, Michal Koudelka, Head of the Czech Security Information Service (BIS), stated on Czech Television that, for Europe as a whole, the greatest threats are sabotage and intelligence operations by Russia, China, and Iran, among others. He listed forms of such hybrid attacks: hostile propaganda, provoked migration, the threat of Islamic terrorism, illegal arms trafficking, cyberattacks, and possible misuse of artificial intelligence technology.
Such a statement did not go unnoticed, even though it was made by the head of the security service of a relatively small EU and NATO member state. This is why this statement is diplomatically impeccable: the warning has been issued, the status of the source of the message is sufficiently respected, and further reactions are expected. However, as we can see, Russian hybrid activity has not diminished in any way since Michal Koudelka's statement.
One of the most scandalous cases involved flights in the second half of August over the industrial park in Brunsbüttel (north of Hamburg, Germany) by Russian reconnaissance drones, possibly long-range Orlan-10s.
According to open sources, these drones have an autonomous range of up to 600 km, but the distance in a straight line to the nearest Russian territory is about 700 km. Therefore, launching from Russian territory is unlikely. However, since the mentioned drone is relatively compact, it could be launched from any Russian vessel, including commercial ones. The Orlan-10 has a wingspan of just 3.1 m, a length of 1.8 m, and a loaded weight of up to 18 kg. It is also known from open sources that there is already a strike version of this UAV, so in addition to reconnaissance missions, sabotage is also possible.
Judging by the composition of the resident companies in the Brunsbüttel industrial zone, Russians might have been interested in chemical companies and the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal. This terminal is used as an alternative gas supply route to Germany, as opposed to Russian natural gas.
On 26 August, representatives of security services from seven European countries (Norway, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and Iceland) issued warnings about the threat of Russian sabotage at Norwegian gas supply facilities. Following the cessation of gas imports from Russia, Norway has become the largest gas supplier for European consumers.
In July, American military bases in Europe implemented additional security protocols due to the threat of intelligence and sabotage operations by Russian proxies.
Europe on High Alert
Currently, EU countries, the United Kingdom, and other NATO member states are in a zone of heightened risk from Russian hybrid attacks. This includes both attacks that have already been recorded and those that are likely, given the activity of Russian forces and their proxies in other regions:
- Cyberattacks
- Special psychological and informational operations, including on social networks and messaging platforms
- Intelligence intrusions through the use of drones and agents
- Sabotage of transport and energy networks, water supply networks, and natural gas pipelines
- Sabotage and intelligence activity at military depots, bases, airfields, and ports
- Sabotage and intelligence activities at defence, oil refining, and chemical industry enterprises
- Interference in electoral processes
- The creation and use of criminal and extremist groups for political destabilisation
Of course, this list is not exhaustive. Sweden has felt increased pressure, of course, in connection with joining NATO and its strong and clear stance on Russia's violation of the principles of territorial integrity concerning Ukraine. In general, such intimidation strongly resembles state terrorism, although Russia has not yet been labelled a terrorist state, despite all the evidence being present.