The War Innovators: How Ukrainian Spies Turned Sabotage Into Strategy
Russia's war against Ukraine has changed the very nature of armed conflicts in the 21st century. And at the forefront of this transformation are the Ukrainian special services.
The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (GUR MO) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) have demonstrated an unprecedented level of innovation, adaptability, and strategic thinking.
Instead of the inertia and dogmatism typical of the Soviet school of intelligence, they have employed complex, flexible, and asymmetrical actions that not only strike the enemy but also destroy the foundations of its informational, military, and economic stability.
Operation Spider Web: a Strategic Strike without a Single Aircraft
June 1, 2025, became a turning point in the history of the war. It was then that the Security Service of Ukraine carried out an operation codenamed “Spider Web.” For the first time in the entire full-scale war, Ukrainian FPV drones reached targets in five regions of the Russian Federation, including distant Siberia. More than 40 Russian aircraft were destroyed, including Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, as well as an A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft.
The operation was prepared over a year and a half. During this time, the SBU delivered the drones to Russia, hid them in wooden launchers camouflaged in truck bodies, and controlled the operation using Russian telecommunications networks. A particularly cynical detail is that some of the equipment was disabled right under the noses of the regional FSB offices.
This operation became a striking example of Ukraine's new tactics: instead of the expected frontal attack, it used targeted, exhausting, and symbolic strikes that undermine morale, resources, and the myth of the invincibility of the Russian army. At the same time, “Pavutina” confirmed that Ukraine is capable of operating on enemy territory not thanks to the permission of its partners, but thanks to its own technological and intelligence capabilities.
How the SBU is Gaining the Initiative at Sea and in the Air
In July 2023, the SBU carried out the second phase of its attack on the Crimean Bridge, using a Sea Baby marine drone capable of carrying up to 850 kg of explosives and moving at ultra-shallow depths. The strike was delivered under the road section of the bridge, resulting in extensive damage to the structure and completely blocking freight traffic for several weeks.
The first such incident occurred in October 2022 and was, by all accounts, carried out using a land-based explosive device in civilian transport that passed through several checkpoints — the operation was intended to exert psychological pressure on Russian society and demonstrate the vulnerability of even the most heavily guarded facilities. In the following months, marine drones were repeatedly used to attack military ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
In particular, the small missile ship Samum was disabled in Sevastopol Bay, the SIG strike tanker in the Kerch Strait, and the fleet's flagship Admiral Makarov, which suffered critical damage while entering for repairs. A distinctive feature of these attacks is the comprehensive use of navigation algorithms, which allowed the drones to avoid areas of active electronic warfare and air defense.
At the same time, the SBU consistently struck military infrastructure on the temporarily occupied Crimean peninsula. At least four aircraft were hit at the Saki airfield, and a Pantsir air defense missile system launcher and an aviation ammunition depot were destroyed. In Perevalne, several mobile radars and communication nodes that provided air cover were destroyed.
Strilkove became a target for kamikaze drones, which disabled elements of the radio monitoring base. In Berehove, a drone logistics hub was hit, presumably linked to the delivery of Shaheds to the Black Sea theater of operations. The most technologically complex attack was the combined attack on the night of December 6, 2024: Sea Baby naval drones simultaneously struck barges involved in the repair of the Crimean Bridge and a fuel bunker, while aerial drones attacked an ammunition depot and an FSB helicopter hangar near Cape Takil.
Ukraine Seeks to Gain an Advantage by Conducting Operations Behind Enemy Lines
Deep inside Russian territory, the SBU has focused its efforts on disrupting strategic logistics. Among the high-profile targets were a warehouse of KAB bombs and Iskander missiles in the village of Toropets (Tver region), a reserve fuel depot in Kotluban (Volgograd region), and the Aleksinsky chemical plant, where explosive components were manufactured. These strikes caused not only fires and detonations, but also a systematic reconfiguration of logistics routes within the Russian military-industrial complex. It is worth noting the destruction of the Devil's Bridge in Transbaikalia, which disrupted traffic on the Baikal-Amur Mainline, which is critical for the transfer of equipment from the Far East.
Cleaning up the Agency and Fighting on the Front Lines
On the counterintelligence front, the SBU neutralized more than 300 agents between 2022 and 2025. Several independent agent networks were discovered operating in large industrial cities and transmitting the coordinates of warehouses, power substations, air defense units, and logistics bases. The most high-profile operation was the exposure of agents in Kyiv who were operating within the ranks of the National Guard and transmitting the exact locations of IRIS-T and NASAMS mobile systems and generator substations. Attempts to infiltrate agents into rear medical facilities and energy companies in the Lviv and Volyn regions were also detected.
Units of the Special Operations Center “A” participated in combat operations as part of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. During the defense of Kyiv, they destroyed Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the areas of Irpin, Gostomel, and Bucha. Subsequently, SBU units worked in operations in the Kharkiv region, in particular participating in the de-occupation of Kupyansk and the cleansing of the eastern regions of the region from collaborators.
According to the SBU itself, thanks to intelligence data and artillery correction, more than 1,700 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, more than 250 air defense systems, and 550 electronic warfare elements were destroyed. The SBU's drone units were particularly effective in the south, taking out air defense systems, electronic warfare stations, and command posts ahead of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' counteroffensive in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.
Maritime Drones: How the GUR Won the Black Sea
The GUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine created something that had never existed in classical military doctrine: an autonomous fleet of maritime drones. From the first strikes on Russian frigates to the destruction of the Ivan Khurs, Caesar Kunikov, Sergei Kotov, and dozens of other ships, Magura V5 marine drones have become the main weapon against the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
Unlike the archaic Russian model of warfare, the GUR uses the principle of “compressing the maximum into the minimum”: instead of expensive frigates, it uses autonomous drones that cost orders of magnitude less but have strike accuracy down to the meter. This allowed Ukraine to destroy up to a third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet's ships, force the Russians to abandon their direct presence in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, and effectively destroy the myth of Russia's naval dominance.
The Battle for Symbols: Strikes Against Russian Aviation & Air Defense
The GUR and SBU have become masters of strategic hunting for symbols. Among the most striking examples are the destruction of an A-50 aircraft at an airfield in Belarus, as well as two more such aircraft in the sky over the Sea of Azov. These “flying radars” provided airspace control and detection of Ukrainian tactical aviation. Their elimination not only demoralized the enemy, but also left Russian air defense partially “blind.”
The destruction of the Su-57 in Akhtubinsk was no less humiliating for the Kremlin. The unique fifth-generation fighter, the pride of the Russian military-industrial complex, was hit by a strike drone at a distance of almost 600 km from the front line. It was the first combat strike on the Su-57 in history.
A New Type of Cyber Warfare
A separate front of the GUR is cyber operations. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian military intelligence has carried out more than 100 comprehensive cyberattacks. Russian databases, financial systems, enterprise management systems, and defense-related information platforms have been hacked. Terabytes of confidential information have been seized and are being used to target manpower and equipment on the battlefield.
The strike on the Container radar station in Mordovia, which controlled 3,000 km of airspace, was not only a technological achievement but also a symbolic one. After this strike, the entire concept of the Russian Federation's “total radar protection” was called into question.
Azovstal, Mariupol, Zmiinyi: Operations of Desperation and Strength
At the most critical moments of the war, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense proved itself not only as an intelligence agency but also as the vanguard of special forces. Helicopter raids on the surrounded Azovstal became legendary. Seventeen times, Ukrainian crews broke through the dense air defense of the Russian Federation to deliver medicine and ammunition and evacuate the wounded. These missions became a symbol of sacrifice and technical skill.
The liberation of Zmiinyi was another example of a brilliant multi-level operation. The GUR, together with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, destroyed the garrison that held the island under control, destroyed enemy equipment and radar stations, thereby opening the way for the “grain corridor” and lifting the blockade of the Odesa region.
Operation “Sinitsa”
On August 23, 2023, a Russian Mi-8 helicopter landed in Poltava. Its pilot, Kuzminov, as part of Operation Titmouse, transported aircraft parts for Russian aircraft directly into the hands of Ukrainian intelligence. This was the first operation of its kind in Ukraine's history, resulting not only in captured equipment but also in access to critical technical secrets of Russian aviation.
Global Intelligence and Operations in Sudan, Syria, and Africa
The GUR is waging war not only on the territory of Ukraine. In Syria, Ukrainian drones destroyed a Russian mobile electronic warfare complex at the Kuweires airbase. Attacks on Russian convoys and mercenary positions also took place in the Golan Heights. In Sudan, the GUR is actively fighting the Wagner Group, conducting interrogations, eliminating instructors, and destroying warehouses.
There is no place where the GUR does not operate. The slogan of the head of the service, Budanov — “we will destroy Russian military criminals anywhere in the world” — has already become not only a political slogan, but also a reality of modern special warfare.
The GUR and the SBU have long ceased to be “shadow” structures. Their actions are systematic, large-scale, and technological. They know how to act asymmetrically: to strike when the enemy least expects it, in places that the enemy considers “sacred.” They are a new type of weapon: mobile, non-hierarchical, fast. And they are setting a new standard for warfare in the 21st century.
Bohdan Popov, head of digital at the United Ukraine Think Tank, communications specialist, and public figure