Ukraine's Grain Corridor Doesn't Need the Kremlin
Turkey is pushing for the renewal of the Black Sea Grain Agreement, which has been the framework for Ukraine's maritime agricultural exports for the past year, operating without the participation or guarantees of the Russian Federation. Why now, and why include Russia? It’s likely because Ukrainian forces have pushed the Russian Black Sea Fleet into the eastern part of the sea, allowing maritime shipments from Ukrainian ports to reach pre-invasion levels. Consequently, Russia has lost a significant leverage point over the international community, particularly the G7. Now, it appears that Moscow’s long-time trading partner, Ankara, is trying to bring the Kremlin back to the negotiating table.
Despite the full-scale war initiated by Russia, Ukraine remains one of the key suppliers of food to the global market. The 2023/24 marketing year, during which Ukraine exported the 2023 harvest, concluded a few weeks ago. Export volumes have even increased compared to the previous 2022/23 marketing year.
This progress comes despite Russia’s withdrawal from the multilateral Black Sea Grain Initiative on 17 July 2023, which had been in effect since 22 July 2022. It is crucial to recall the events leading up to that agreement and the reasons why Ukraine is currently ramping up its maritime food exports.
Since late February 2022, Russia had been heavily bombarding port infrastructure and even commercial vessels in Ukrainian ports. At that time, the export of Ukrainian agricultural products via sea ports was virtually blocked. While some exports continued via road and rail to nearby European ports, these methods couldn't match the cost-effectiveness and capacity of maritime routes for supplying Ukrainian food to international markets.
The situation on the global food market called for swift and effective solutions. The removal of Ukrainian food from the global market was driving up prices for food and feed grains, as well as oilseeds and vegetable oil, which Ukraine supplied in substantial quantities.
The solution at that time was to negotiate with Russia to resume maritime exports of Ukrainian food. However, the deal was limited to food exports and required Russian military inspections of commercial vessels both en route to and from Ukrainian ports. This agreement was quite humiliating for Kyiv and the UN, but there were no alternatives at that time. The only concession the Ukrainian government managed was to make the agreement appear as a two-part deal. The UN and Turkey negotiated with Ukraine and acted as its guarantors, while the same parties negotiated with Russia and took responsibility for Moscow’s promises.
Unfortunately, this arrangement lasted only 12 months. Additionally, in the final months of the agreement, the Russians began sabotaging it. For instance, Russian military forces deliberately delayed the inspection process of commercial vessels, causing transportation losses and creating an artificial backlog of ships exiting and entering the Bosphorus Strait from the Black Sea side.
Exports Under Missiles and Drones
When the Black Sea Grain Initiative ended, maritime exports continued, expanding beyond just food products. Ukrainian companies began shipping products from their metallurgy and mining industries via sea. This was made possible as Ukrainian forces gradually pushed the Russian Black Sea Fleet from Crimea to Novorossiysk on the North Caucasus coast.
While Ukraine did not and does not have a powerful fleet in the Black Sea, attacks by Ukrainian missiles and both aerial and surface drones have led to significant losses in the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Consequently, the Russians were forced to relocate the remnants of their fleet to the furthest naval base from Ukraine in the Black Sea.
One might wonder why the Russians did not continue their missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian Black Sea ports such as Odesa, Izmail, and Mykolaiv. The fact is, attempts at such attacks did not cease; they simply became much less effective. Since early 2023, Ukrainian air defences have significantly strengthened, making a noticeable impact. Another factor is the threat to Russia’s oil export infrastructure in its Black Sea ports.
The Ukrainian armed forces conducted several demonstrative attacks on Russian oil infrastructure and even targeted a tanker. It seems this demonstration had an effect. Although Ukraine faced some criticism from its international supporters for these strikes, the message was clear, and maritime exports from Ukraine, while not without challenges, have continued robustly.
A demining coalition involving Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria – all NATO members and Black Sea countries – has formed. These countries’ mine countermeasure forces began hunting for mines and other explosive hazards near the coasts of Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in early July.
Thus, maritime exports from Ukraine have proceeded without Russian involvement or guarantees.
Looking at specific figures, they are indeed impressive. In the 2022/23 marketing year, which started on 1 July 2022 and ended on 30 June 2023, grain and leguminous crop exports amounted to 49 million tonnes. Of this, corn accounted for the largest share at 29.1 million tonnes, followed by wheat at 16.8 million tonnes. Ukrainian suppliers also exported 2.7 million tonnes of barley, 18,000 tonnes of rye, and 153,600 tonnes of flour.
In the 2023/24 marketing year, grain and leguminous crop exports from Ukraine exceeded 50.6 million tonnes, which is 1.6 million tonnes (3%) more than the previous season’s 49 million tonnes, according to the State Customs Service. The majority of this volume was corn at 29.2 million tonnes, slightly more than the previous season. The largest increase was in wheat exports, reaching 18.3 million tonnes, nearly 1.5 million tonnes or 9% more than the previous season. Barley exports slightly decreased to 2.5 million tonnes. Exports of flour and rye also decreased to 97,800 tonnes and 1,600 tonnes, respectively.
Russia Seeks to Return
The Kremlin is eager to be invited back to the negotiating table for a new variant of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Why is this necessary for them? There are many theories, but two are the most likely. First, such negotiations would give the Russians an opportunity to bargain for the lifting or easing of sanctions imposed on Russia for its aggressive attack on Ukraine. Notably, such easements were introduced as part of the first grain deal in 2022. Second, such negotiations would provide the Russians with leverage to demand that Ukrainians cease attacks on sensitive Russian oil export infrastructure.
During the meeting between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Washington on the sidelines of the NATO summit, the revival of the 2022 grain agreement was discussed.
“Stating that Turkey continues its efforts to conclude the Ukrainian-Russian war with a just peace, President Erdoğan added that efforts have begun to revive the Black Sea Grain Initiative. President Erdoğan also stated that Turkey is ready for any initiative, including mediation, to lay the groundwork for peace,” the official website of the Turkish President reported on 11 July.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky sees the resolution of this issue somewhat differently. “I had a productive meeting with President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. I am grateful for his unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” he wrote. Finally, after listing the points of discussion, Zelensky mentioned maritime agricultural exports: “We are preparing to hold a conference in Turkey dedicated to food security and freedom of navigation as part of the implementation of the decisions of the Peace Summit.”
Zelensky suggested shifting the discussion to the framework of the communiqué formed following the High-Level Summit on Peace for Ukraine, held in Switzerland on 15-16 June 2024. Specifically, the joint communiqué mentioned efforts towards global food security, for which Ukraine’s participation is a key factor.
This point was the second in the communiqué, indicating its role and importance: “Secondly, global food security depends on the uninterrupted production and supply of food products. In this regard, free, full, and safe maritime trade, as well as access to sea ports in the Black and Azov Seas, are extremely important. Attacks on commercial vessels in ports and throughout the route, as well as on civilian ports and civilian port infrastructure, are unacceptable. Food security must not be used as a weapon. Ukrainian agricultural products must be safely and freely supplied to interested third countries.”
These formulations are unlikely to be acceptable to the Kremlin. They leave little room for Moscow to pressure for the lifting of any sanctions. Moreover, these formulations clearly label Russia’s actions as contrary to the interests of buyers and recipients of Ukrainian food.
So now the ball is in Russia’s court, but the conditions are no longer the same as they were in the spring of 2022 when the Kremlin was elated by its audacity and temporary military achievements.