Who Will Lead the Post-War Order: The Fight Between Institutions and Coalitions
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the failure of institutions like the UN and OSCE to address modern threats. In their place, coalitions such as Rammstein, and the Security Compact have emerged — fast, flexible, and effective — shaping a new global order where action takes precedence over consensus and legitimacy.
Russia's systemic war against Ukraine has not only changed the security architecture of Europe, but has also become a crash test for global institutions. Organizations that ensured a conditional “order” after World War II — such as the UN, OSCE, and IMF — are increasingly proving ineffective in the face of hybrid conflicts, technological dynamics, and the collapse of consensus. At the same time, situational coalitions are emerging that operate outside the classical international system but are effectively shaping new rules of the game.
The most striking example is the Rammstein format — a mechanism for coordinating military aid to Ukraine, created ad hoc but with a real ability to influence the balance of power. In this new world, it is not universal forums with the aggressor's veto that have the upper hand, but effective coalitions of the willing — from JEF to Compact. The post-order no longer needs global tables — it is enough for it to have narrow rooms with a specific purpose.
A Сrisis of Universal Institutions Is Unfolding Before Our Eyes
The United Nations is increasingly perceived as a declarative forum. Its central problem is Russia's membership in the Security Council with veto power, which blocks any real decisions on aggression. Since February 24, 2022, the General Assembly has adopted more than a dozen resolutions on Ukraine, but none of them were binding. Appeals to the UN Charter are becoming ritualistic but ineffective. Moreover, the UN itself has failed to fulfill its primary function — to stop the war or at least ensure humanitarian access to the combat zone. The position of Secretary-General António Guterres is perceived in many capitals, including Kyiv, Warsaw, and Washington as a compromise, and sometimes even as complicit capitulation to pressure from the Russian Federation.
The OSCE, which emerged as an instrument for monitoring security parameters in Europe, found itself blocked even before the full-scale invasion. The lack of consensus led to virtual paralysis. OSCE observers were forced to leave Ukraine in 2022, which became a symbol of the loss of institutional capacity in the context of a hot conflict. Despite attempts to reform or shift its focus to long-term processes — such as maintaining dialogue in the South Caucasus or the Balkans — the OSCE has been unable to relaunch its mandate under the new conditions.
The IMF and the World Bank remain partially functional, but their bureaucratic inertia lags far behind the speed of situational decisions. The allocation of aid packages to Ukraine is often hampered by internal procedural constraints or disputes between donors. At critical moments in 2022–2024, it was the G7 state packages, not the mechanisms of the Bretton Woods institutions, that saved economic aid. Thus, financial multilateralism is giving way to ad hoc financing.
Rammstein, JEF, “Coalition of the Willing”: a New Geopolitics of Efficiency is Emerging
In response to institutional paralysis, the world began experimenting with formats that do not require global consensus but unite the willingness to act. The most successful example was the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), known as the “Ramstein format.” It was initiated by US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in April 2022. The format includes more than 50 countries and has become a platform for coordinating military, financial, and logistical assistance to Ukraine. It does not have a rigid legal structure, does not require ratification or procedures, but provides real influence. Major weapons were transferred through Ramstein: HIMARS, Leopard 2, F-16.
The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), led by the United Kingdom, is another example of a functional situational structure. It includes the countries of Northern Europe — Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Baltic states, and the Netherlands. Its main goal is to respond quickly to threats in the Baltic and North Sea regions. In 2022–2025, the JEF increased joint training and military presence in the region, including logistics to support Ukraine.
The term “coalition of the willing” has become part of a new geostrategy, where capability is more important than legitimacy. It is precisely such coalitions that ensure the functional defense of Ukraine's airspace, form defense alliances in Asia, and support sanctions against Russia and Iran. They are characterized by flexibility, technological modernity, and no need to seek consensus with China or Russia.
How the War in Ukraine Highlighted the Need for New Rules of the Game
After 2022, it became clear that the world could no longer rely on the institutions created in 1945. The war in Ukraine showed that new types of threats — hybrid, cyber, energy, and information — do not fit into the classic mandates of the UN. The situation with arms supplies, sanctions, energy security, and even humanitarian initiatives is being resolved outside the existing universal structures. This leads to the formation of a “network of coalitions” that function in the “here and now” mode, backed by political will and resources.
Ukraine has become not only an object but also a subject of this new order. It was Kyiv that promoted the idea of a new security architecture, enshrined in the Crimean Platform, in G7 agreements on long-term support, and in multilateral security agreements. Thus, the war has become a catalyst for the formation of a post-institutional world order, where concrete effectiveness prevails over abstract legitimacy.
Ukraine is Counting on New Security Alliances: From a Triangle to a Compact
Security alliances that Ukraine is forming with individual states or mini-clubs occupy a special place in the new geopolitical architecture. Their advantages are speed, substance, and the ability to respond flexibly to changing situations.
The Lublin Triangle is a format for cooperation between Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania, launched back in 2020. After 2022, it transformed from a symbolic platform into an operational format for security and political dialogue. Regular meetings of defense ministers, joint exercises, and information support have become part of the work of this mini-alliance.
The Quadriga format is a bilateral initiative between Ukraine and Turkey, launched in 2020, which provides for cooperation in four areas: foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, and security. After 2022, this mechanism became a key channel for coordination on the supply of military technology, in particular drones, ensuring maritime security in the Black Sea, and strategic dialogue on Crimea.
The Ukraine-Poland-United Kingdom Security Alliance, launched in 2022, has become the basis for operational support and intelligence sharing. Poland acts as a logistics hub, while the UK provides technological and military expertise. This trilateral partnership has a clear defense focus and operates without unnecessary bureaucracy.
The Security Compact for Ukraine is not a single treaty, but a series of bilateral agreements concluded by Ukraine with partner countries on the basis of the G7 Joint Declaration adopted in Vilnius in July 2023. They set out specific commitments by the parties on long-term military support, joint planning, air defense, intelligence sharing, defense industry support, sanctions coordination, and actions in the event of renewed aggression.
As of June 2025, the Compact has been signed with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Latvia, Finland, Estonia, Portugal, Sweden, and others. The agreement provides for regular reviews and crisis coordination.
As of June 2025, Ukraine's security alliances not only form a new architecture of strategic partnership, but also provide real financial, military, and logistical resources measured in billions of dollars.
The Lublin Triangle format continues to demonstrate its effectiveness through concrete support from Poland and Lithuania. In particular, in May 2025, Poland announced a new military aid package worth approximately €230 million, including equipment, ammunition, and armored personnel carriers. Taking into account previous deliveries, total aid from Poland includes more than 318 tanks, 536 armored vehicles, and at least 136 artillery systems. Lithuania, for its part, confirmed in 2025 that it would allocate €200 million, of which €110 million would go directly to military support and the rest to logistics, electronics, and humanitarian aid. Thus, these two countries alone have provided more than €400 million in security assistance over the past year.
The Quadriga format between Ukraine and Turkey, despite the lack of official figures, is considered extremely important in the field of technology, drones, and maritime security. According to estimates by think tanks, the supply of Bayraktar drones, intelligence data, and security support in the Black Sea provided Ukraine with technical assistance worth approximately $200–300 million for the period 2023–2024. Turkey remains an active participant in shaping security policy in the region, and the Quadriga remains a stable channel for coordination.
The Ukraine-Poland-United Kingdom security alliance is one of the most effective formats. As of mid-2025, the United Kingdom had provided Ukraine with at least £7.8 billion in military aid alone, and London's total support, including macro-financial and humanitarian components, amounted to £12.8 billion.
The most ambitious structure is the Security Compact for Ukraine, a multi-level system of bilateral agreements based on the G7 joint declaration adopted in Vilnius in July 2023. As part of the Compact, Canada announced a new $1.5 billion aid package in June 2025, bringing its total contribution to security to $3.1 billion out of a total of $13.5 billion in Canadian aid.
Germany, which has become one of the key participants in the format, plans to provide Ukraine with approximately €9 billion in military support by the end of 2025. In addition to the deliveries already made, the United Kingdom signed a ten-year framework agreement in January 2024 for further funding of £2.5 billion. In addition, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Portugal, Latvia, Finland, and Estonia have signed bilateral agreements with Kyiv, with total commitments ranging from €500 million to €2 billion on each side, depending on the defense budget of the specific country.
Taking into account the commitments of Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom alone, the total amount of security assistance to Ukraine under the Compact already exceeds US$20 billion. If we take into account the packages from other European countries, this figure will reach $25–35 billion. Thus, situational coalitions such as the Security Compact demonstrate not only diplomatic and military solidarity, but also the financial capacity to provide sustainable armaments, air defense, intelligence, and strategic depth to Ukraine's defense capabilities.
Who will Rule the World After the War?
In 2025, it is already clear that the “all with all” formula no longer works. The world after the war in Ukraine will not be post-institutional, but post-consensus. It will be defined not by global forums, but by horizontal networks of effective players. Coalitions of the willing, regional defense alliances, financial pacts, and digital coordination systems are replacing the UN, OSCE, and IMF.
Paradoxically, it is the crisis of institutions that has made it possible to revive effective geopolitics. The global order is no longer being created in Geneva or New York — it is being born in Kyiv, Warsaw, London, Oslo, and Canberra. Ukraine has become not only a front line, but also a platform for creating a new system of global coexistence. In this world, those who are ready to act, not discuss, survive.
And although institutions still exist, the real order is already being built without them.
Bohdan Popov, Head of Digital at the United Ukraine Think Tank, communications specialist and public figure