Why Ukraine Needs to Maintain a Large Army After the War

In recent years, Ukraine has been experiencing the largest military confrontation in Europe since World War II. Even if the active phase of hostilities is over, this will not mean the final end of the war or the disappearance of the military threat from the Russian Federation. During any peace talks, the issue of security guarantees comes to the fore, as new aggression or renewed hostilities could become a reality as soon as Ukraine weakens its defense capabilities.

The Kremlin is well aware that a strong and numerous Ukrainian army makes it impossible to pursue further expansionist plans and quickly conduct lightning operations aimed at limiting Ukraine's sovereignty.

The best international guarantee of security for Ukraine and its citizens remains NATO membership, but the Alliance is currently unwilling to extend a clear invitation to Ukraine.

At the same time, another important component of the security agenda is accelerated membership in the European Union, which provides political and economic benefits and strengthens the country's institutional capacity. Ukraine is ready to start negotiations on several clusters this year, but the final decision depends not on Kyiv but on the consensus of EU member states.

As an additional guarantee of post-war security, the option of deploying an international stabilization force on Ukrainian territory is being considered, but without a clear mandate that would include readiness to engage in combat in the event of new Russian aggression, such a mission would have limited impact on the security situation.

Security Realities

Given the international context and Russia's persistent demands to reduce the Ukrainian army to the point where it cannot be an effective deterrent, it is clear why external guarantees alone cannot fully protect Ukraine from another attack.

Ukraine's own Armed Forces remain the most realistic response to the Kremlin's challenge. The experience of previous decades shows that a significant reduction of the army creates an “open door” situation for a new invasion.

After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine had military units of more than 800,000 people, but later the number of personnel was quickly reduced to 400,000, and on the eve of the occupation of Crimea it was 120,000. The lack of an adequate personnel reserve, the abolition of conscription, and the lack of military equipment were the factors that added to Putin's determination in 2014.

Today, there are about a million people in the Ukrainian Defense Forces. It is economically and socially difficult to maintain such a large contingent in peacetime, and therefore the question of demobilization will inevitably arise. However, reducing Ukrainian troops to the level the Kremlin wants to see would mean setting a precedent where Russia could be tempted to invade again, hoping for quick success. Therefore, the reduction of the army should be balanced and gradual.

The simultaneous retirement of hundreds of thousands of military personnel will overload the social system, lack mechanisms for adaptation and rehabilitation, lose highly qualified military personnel, and ultimately lead to a sharp decline in the state's defense potential. It is important that a critical number of professionals remain to maintain the structure of the armed forces, that equipment and ammunition stocks are in good condition, and that a reserve is ready to quickly return to service. Only this approach will make it possible to maintain high combat readiness.

“New Sparta”

Ukraine is acting as a “shield of Europe,” demonstrating its readiness and ability to deter one of the continent's largest armies. The Kremlin openly declares that its enemy is the “collective West” and continues to undermine the situation in the Baltic region and other neighboring states.

For European countries, it is vital that Ukraine maintains its combat capability and has sufficient capacity to repel and defend itself. Weakening the Armed Forces would mean an increased threat not only to Kyiv, but also to the entire region, which risks becoming the next stage of the Kremlin's expansion. Therefore, a powerful Ukrainian army is a guarantee not only of national security but also of stability in the whole of Eastern Europe.

In the process of possible demobilization, the creation of a well-organized operational reserve remains an essential component. Its structure should make it possible to double the size of the Armed Forces in a short period of time, with reservists undergoing regular military training and receiving at least a symbolic but mandatory salary to maintain the proper level of motivation.

It is also necessary to recompose the existing combat units so that the technologically strongest and most modern units are in a state of constant combat readiness. At the same time, the salaries of career military personnel who remain in active service should be competitive with the civilian labor market.

Recent combat experience has shown how important high-tech means of destruction are, including strikes by drones and long-range missile systems, as well as the significant role of strategic aviation. Ukraine has already created the Unmanned Systems Forces, which is a revolutionary innovation. All of this together forms a “strategic non-nuclear deterrent” - a tool that significantly reduces the enemy's desire to resume escalation.

It is also critically important to preserve and develop our own defense industry. The “Danish model” of financing, when foreign governments provide funds directly to Ukrainian arms manufacturers, allows us to modernize the army and support the economy at the same time. This is beneficial to both international partners and Ukraine itself, as it allows for increased production of artillery, ammunition, unmanned systems, and precision missiles.

Ukraine's budget for the security and defense sector in 2025 is planned at 26.3% of GDP, which will amount to approximately UAH 2.23 trillion. It is planned to increase spending on military salaries to 1.16 trillion hryvnias, as well as on the development of weapons and military equipment to 739 billion hryvnias. With these funds, Ukraine will be able to continue to improve and modernize its army, carry out technical upgrades, and build up strategic stockpiles.

Some of these costs, especially those related to training and weapons procurement, should be covered by Western partners. Direct or co-financing of equipment, ammunition, and research and development will allow Ukraine to better prepare for the risk of renewed war.

After all, even if the active phase of hostilities ends, Russia will still retain significant capabilities and the desire to destabilize Ukraine again. Abandoning a powerful army or curtailing arms production would lead to a sharp increase in security threats and openness to a new attack.

Today, Ukraine is the de facto core of the European security system and a key “barrier” that restrains the Kremlin's aggressive ambitions. Therefore, maintaining a large and well-equipped army is necessary not only to defend its borders, but also to maintain stability in the region as a whole. It is the strong Armed Forces that guarantee that any revenge scenarios will remain unrealized, and the peace for which Ukrainians pay such a high price will be reliably protected.

Igor Popov, Political and Security Studies Specialist, expert at the United Ukraine Think Tank