Could Trump “Turn” Russia Away from China - and What Price Would the EU and Ukraine Pay for It?

What if Putin suddenly became an ally of the West? It sounds like a fantasy, but Washington is increasingly talking about trying to “win” Russia over to its side to isolate China. 

This idea has already been called a “reverse Kissinger” - a diplomatic inversion of the historic rapprochement between the United States and China in the 1970s. But what is behind this strategy-cold calculation or dangerous illusion? 

Who benefits from such a maneuver, and will Ukraine become the main victim of a big geopolitical game?

Geopolitical Temptation or Dangerous Illusion?

Washington is once again talking about a “great diplomatic exchange.” Just as Henry Kissinger in the 1970s helped the United States get closer to China by pitting it against the then-USSR, today Donald Trump's team hopes to pull off a “reverse Kissinger”: trying to tear Russia away from China and thus weaken the most dangerous pro-Chinese alliance of our time.

At first glance, this looks like a masterful strategy: exploit the differences between Beijing and Moscow (if any), offer Putin the “deal of the century” and turn him into a situational ally of the West. This idea is attractive to those who view geopolitics as a chessboard. But is Putin ready to change his partner? Who would benefit from such a move? And will Ukraine become the price for a new geopolitical “handshake”?

Why Kissinger Could Do It, but Trump Is Unlikely to

In 1971-1972, the United States used the deep conflict between the USSR and China, including armed clashes on the border island of Zhengbao, to open diplomatic relations with Beijing. China was then a poor, isolated state weakened by the Cultural Revolution. It had an obvious interest in normalizing relations with the West.

Today's Russia and China do not have such differences. They are united by a common vision of the world order, a desire for multipolarity, and a counter to the United States. Their strategic partnership is not a tactical alliance, but a systemic alignment of interests.

Is a Rapprochement Between Russia and the United States Possible?

The idea of a “reverse Kissinger” became popular again in 2021 after the publication of an Atlantic Council analytical report, which proposed to “rebalance” relations with Russia to prevent it from becoming even closer to China.

However, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, China became the Kremlin's main economic savior. In 2023, bilateral trade between Moscow and Beijing reached a record $240 billion. Russia receives weapons components, civilian goods, energy and technology investments from China. China, in turn, receives cheap resources and political support in the international arena.

Putin and Xi Jinping share a common vision of a multipolar world where democracy and human rights are tools of the West, not universal values. They seek to reshape the international order, where state sovereignty and power replace liberal institutions and rules.

What Trump Wants from Putin - and What He won't Get

For months now, Trump and his team have demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with Putin to end the war in Ukraine, from the idea of a frozen conflict to concessions on the issue of territories. But even if Trump makes significant concessions, this does not guarantee that Putin will break his alliance with China.

First, China is a stable source of funding and critical technologies. Secondly, Putin does not trust the American political system - he remembers that during Trump's first term, key sanctions were not lifted. Third, Trump himself is an unstable player. Even Kim Jong-un received only promises and selfies from him.

In addition, China can quickly respond to the US attempt to lure Russia: finalize the Power of Siberia 2 project, increase supplies to Russia's military-industrial complex, or intensify diplomatic cooperation in the BRICS or SCO.

In addition, Beijing could respond more strategically by strengthening its military partnership with Russia, particularly in the Arctic region or the Pacific theater. In the diplomatic dimension, China may change its tactics toward Taiwan, becoming tougher in its rhetoric or maneuvers near the island to demonstrate its independence and strength. Ultimately, any attempt by the United States to break the Sino-Russian partnership will only galvanize Beijing in its efforts to continue the war “in the shadows,” supporting Russia tactically but decisively.

Who Stands to Gain the Most?

The United States could benefit by weakening China's geopolitical weight. But this advantage would be temporary. Russia is an unreliable partner with limited resources and destructive behavior. The benefits of an alliance with Moscow are limited for Washington, and the risks are enormous.

So, at first glance, the United States could benefit if it could at least partially distance Russia from China. This could:

- weaken China's geopolitical weight by depriving it of a powerful rear ally in the north;

- reduce the risks of two-front competition - especially if the United States simultaneously faces challenges in the Indo-Pacific (China) and in Europe (Russia)

- to disrupt coordination within the BRICS and SCO blocs, since the Russian-Chinese core provides the anti-Western vector of these associations;

- to gain arguments for domestic policy - Trump or his allies can present this as a “grand bargain” that will bring peace and reduce American spending abroad.

However, these hypothetical benefits are short-term and unsustainable. In reality, an alliance with Russia poses far more risks for the United States:

1. Destruction of allied trust. European partners, especially the Baltic States, Poland, and the Czech Republic, may perceive rapprochement with Putin as a betrayal and begin to look for alternative security guarantees, up to and including the idea of a “European nuclear umbrella” without the United States. Some Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) may also suspect that the United States is capable of abandoning its allies if it is beneficial in the global game.

2. Undermining the sanctions system and international law. If the United States begins to ease sanctions or de facto recognize the annexation of Ukrainian territories, it will send a signal that force works, but agreements and rules do not. Such steps would undermine not only the credibility of the United States, but also the very architecture of the liberal world order on which American power has been based since World War II.

3. Putin's return to global subjectivity. Moscow will use any warming in relations to break out of isolation, to get investments, technology, and political recognition. However, it will not side with the United States in its confrontation with China; on the contrary, it will try to play on contradictions, manipulating both camps.

4. Undermining the moral authority of the United States. How to explain to American society the alliance with a regime that poisoned oppositionists, deported children, and started a bloody war in Europe? And how to convince democratic states in Africa, Asia, or Latin America that Washington's words about democracy and human rights are sincere?

5. Domestic political turbulence. Such a course may cause strong opposition from the Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department, as well as the media and part of the Republican establishment. This will further polarize American society and paralyze US foreign policy.

The main beneficiary is Putin himself. He will: get a chance to legalize his military achievements in Ukraine; reduce sanctions pressure on the Russian economy; destroy transatlantic unity; sow distrust between Washington and Kyiv; avoid complete dependence on China by balancing between the two centers of power. And all this without a real break with Beijing. It would be a diplomatic victory without commitments.

In addition, the geo-economic limitations of an alliance with Russia for Washington should be taken into account. Russia is not an attractive market for American companies: it is a weak economy, limited by sanctions, with a corrupt judicial system and high reputational risks. Successful investment examples like ExxonMobil in the 2010s failed with each new Kremlin aggression. Against this background, the EU looks like a much more reliable and profitable economic partner for the United States than a potentially “rehabilitated” Russia.

Ukraine as a Bargaining Chip?

Ukraine is not just a battlefield, but a key test for the entire system of international law. If the United States makes concessions to Russia for the sake of a strategic game against China, for example, recognizes the de facto annexation of part of Ukrainian territory, limits military aid, or agrees to a change in political leadership in Kyiv, it will mean that the forceful rewriting of borders is no longer taboo.

The Guardian wrote that Putin is already demanding the lifting of sanctions, the termination of aid to Kyiv, and Zelenskyy's resignation. Partial implementation of these conditions will not only destroy Ukrainian statehood but also set a dangerous precedent in global politics.

Consequences for the United States:

- undermining its reputation as a defender of democracy and international order;

- loss of trust on the part of allies, including the Baltic States, Poland, Taiwan, and South Korea, who may decide that the United States can no longer be relied upon;

- moral discredit in regions where the United States is fighting for influence with autocratic regimes (Africa, Latin America);

- strengthening China's position as a supposedly more “stable” and consistent partner for countries that do not want to depend on Washington's changing moods.

Implications for the EU:

- Fragmentation of unity in support of Ukraine: Some countries may increase assistance, while others may distance themselves.

- Decrease in Europe's influence on the Eastern European space - Ukraine may lose its European perspective, and the countries of the region may lose confidence in Brussels;

- Russia's return as an influential player in the region directly contradicts European interests and security.

Thus, the use of Ukraine as a bargaining chip is not only a betrayal of a strategic partner but also a long-term defeat for the West on the moral, political, and geostrategic levels.

Risks for Europe

For the European Union, the potential rapprochement between the United States and Russia is a challenge to unity. If Washington strikes a deal with the Kremlin without taking Brussels' position into account, it could

- deepen the split in the EU. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, the Baltic states, and the Czech Republic) may perceive U.S.-Russian rapprochement as a betrayal of the region's interests. France or Italy, on the other hand, may see it as a chance for stabilization. Such a difference in approach will only deepen the existing divisions within the EU, undermining the consensus on foreign policy;

- Weaken NATO. If the United States negotiates with Russia without consulting NATO, the Alliance will lose its coordinating role. Countries may begin to doubt the effectiveness of Article 5 collective security guarantees. Pressure will grow to create an alternative European defense system without U.S. involvement, leading to even greater fragmentation.

- demoralize Eastern Europe. Countries on the eastern flank, especially those that share a border with Russia or Belarus, may lose their sense of security. They will begin to rearm on their own or look for new guarantees, up to and including reconsidering participation in joint EU and NATO projects. This will create centrifugal trends in the region;

- push Ukraine off the European agenda. If the United States changes its focus and “freezes” the war on terms favorable to the Kremlin, some European governments may also lose interest in long-term support for Ukraine. This will slow or destroy Ukraine's European integration progress and send a signal that Europe no longer sees Kyiv as a priority partner.

- Provide Russia with space to regain influence in the region. A conditional “normalization” of relations between Moscow and Washington could open the way for the Kremlin to return to diplomatic and economic formats in Europe. Russia will have the space to restore its narratives, lobbying networks, and strategic pressure in the Balkan countries, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, and others.

All this could lead to the EU losing its role as an independent geopolitical player. If Brussels is forced to accept someone else's decisions, it will cease to be an arbiter on its eastern flank. This will mean a concession not only of interests, but also of Europe's strategic subjectivity.

Geopolitics does not tolerate illusions, so the “reverse Kissinger” looks impressive only on paper. In reality, this strategy: underestimates the strength of the Russian-Chinese alliance; overestimates Trump's ability to influence Putin; and ignores the risks to allies, especially Ukraine and the EU.

A strong U.S. strategy is not about trade with Ukraine or Europe, but about consistent support for partners who share common values. And the sooner Washington realizes this, the more chances it has to maintain the trust of its allies and prevent new crises in the world order.

Hugging an aggressor is always a temptation for short-term gains. But every alliance with a dictatorship has a price – it is paid not by the diplomat, but by the people.

Ihor Petrenko, founder of the “United Ukraine” Think Tank, Doctor of Political Sciences