Putin’s Pandora’s Box: Why General Mobilization Threatens the Stability of the Russian State
General mobilization could theoretically strengthen the Russian army, but such a decision by the Kremlin threatens to unleash a cascade of political, economic, and social crises capable of undermining the very foundations of the regime and turning external aggression into an internal catastrophe
This is not merely a difficult choice; it is a choice that could become existential. Despite the fact that Russian military doctrine provides for the mobilization of all material resources and spiritual forces of the state to wage large-scale war, the Russian leadership has so far avoided this step. The reason lies in a deep awareness that the cost of such a decision could prove prohibitively high, transforming external aggression into an internal disaster. This analysis reveals the multidimensional risks that make general mobilization a true Pandora’s box for Vladimir Putin and his entourage.
The Threat to Russia’s Social Contract
The Kremlin’s authority rests on a fragile, unspoken social contract: the population’s passive consent to authoritarian rule in exchange for stability and insulation from the state’s direct, violent demands. General mobilization would not merely undermine this contract – would destroy it, turning the distant “special military operation” into a personal, profound crisis for millions of Russian families.
From the outset of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin’s strategy has been to maintain a façade of normal life, allowing the majority of the population to remain insulated from the true cost of the war. This strategy has enabled the so-called “rally around the flag” effect, where public support is broad but shallow. Sociological surveys demonstrate a high level of approval for Putin’s actions and a surge in national pride. However, this support is contingent on the war remaining a distant, televised event that does not affect the daily lives of ordinary Russians. The Kremlin has managed to convince a significant portion of society that the state provides them with much, and in return, they are willing to make certain sacrifices for it – a significant shift compared to previous years.
The so-called “partial” mobilization in September 2022 became a critical stress test for this model. It shattered the illusion of normalcy and instantly triggered a wave of “anxiety, fear, and horror” (47% of respondents), shock (23%), and anger (13%) in society. This event vividly demonstrated the fragility of societal consent as soon as the cost of the war becomes personal. As Denis Volkov, director of the Levada Center, noted, public sentiment sharply deteriorated in the fall of 2022 when the Kremlin announced the conscription of 300,000 reservists.
The Kremlin’s subsequent determination to avoid a new wave of mobilization, instead relying on recruiting prisoners, foreign mercenaries, and significant financial incentives, indicates that this lesson was learned. The authorities realized that the social contract is not based on ideological loyalty but on insulating the population from the war. General mobilization would be the ultimate violation of this contract, forcing people to choose between the state and their own families – a choice in which the regime is unlikely to prevail.
Contradictions in Public Opinion: A Ticking Time Bomb
Analysis of sociological survey data, particularly from the Levada Center, reveals a deeply contradictory state of Russian public consciousness. While the majority expresses support for military actions (78% in January 2025), a significant portion of the population believes it is time for peace negotiations (61% in January 2025, compared to 54% earlier).
This is not a logical contradiction but a reflection of societal priorities. The desire for peace is directly linked to avoiding personal losses: 65% support negotiations to prevent the deaths of more soldiers, and 59% to reduce economic costs for households. This shows that support for the war is conditional and depends on whether it directly affects individuals. At the same time, while Russians desire peace, they are categorically unwilling to make concessions, particularly regarding territories. For example, 75% consider it unacceptable to return the Luhansk and Donetsk regions to Ukraine, and 69% feel the same about the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.
This creates an impossible task for the Kremlin: society wants victory without paying the price for it. General mobilization would force society to confront this contradiction, likely leading to a collapse in support for the war itself. The gap between the desired outcome (victory and retention of territories) and the acceptable cost (absence of personal sacrifices) is a central vulnerability of the regime.
The Kremlin’s key dilemma is that abstract support for the war remains high, but the desire for peace grows in direct proportion to the realization of personal risks. This proves that the social contract is built on shielding the population from these risks, and general mobilization would destroy this shield.
The Precedent of 2022: A Dress Rehearsal for Disaster
The “partial” mobilization in September 2022 was chaotic, situational, and poorly managed. It revealed that the mobilization system is outdated, with inaccurate registries, a lack of instructors, and insufficient equipment. The process was so disorganized that military enlistment offices often ignored selection criteria, mobilizing anyone they could reach.
The social shock was immediate and profound. It sparked the largest protests since the invasion began, with nearly 2,500 people detained across the country. The protests were notable for their geographic scope, encompassing even repressive regions like Chechnya and Dagestan, where any dissent is rare. The brutality of security forces was unprecedented: detainees were beaten, forced to kneel, and men were handed conscription notices directly in police stations.
The mobilization triggered mass emigration: within two weeks, up to 700,000 people, mostly men of conscription age, left the country. This was a massive loss of human capital and a clear vote of no confidence in the state. General mobilization would multiply this exodus and internal protest potential exponentially. The state’s harsh response, including repressions and forced conscription of detained protesters, demonstrates the level of coercion that would be required, further alienating the population. Thus, the events of 2022 served as a stark lesson for the Kremlin about the dangers of breaching the unspoken agreement of a “distant war.”
Economic Straitjacket: General Mobilization as a Test of Economic Capacity
Russia’s “war economy” is a fragile, short-term construct. It lacks the financial depth, industrial capacity, and human capital to sustain a massively mobilized army, especially under the unprecedented pressure of international sanctions. General mobilization would expose the fundamental weaknesses of the economy and could precipitate a systemic collapse.
The reported GDP growth in Russia is an artifact of massive, unsustainable government spending on the military-industrial complex. This “growth” is financed by the rapid depletion of the National Wealth Fund, which has significantly diminished, and cuts to social spending. From late 2021 to mid-2025, the liquid portion of the fund shrank from 11 trillion rubles to less than 3 trillion.
Military spending in 2025 is projected to reach 7.2% of GDP, accounting for 40% of the federal budget – a level unseen since the Cold War. The costs are colossal: over 4 trillion rubles are forecasted for personnel maintenance (salaries, bonuses, compensations) in 2025 alone. This has created an overheated economy with rampant inflation, forcing the Central Bank to raise the key interest rate to 21%, and an acute labor shortage. The economy has become structurally dependent on military spending; its reduction would likely trigger a deep recession. This model is unsustainable; it does not generate real wealth but merely redistributes and consumes accumulated resources.
Are Sanctions Still Strangling Russia’s Economy? A Depleted Arsenal
Unprecedented sanctions have severely undermined Russia’s ability to produce modern weaponry, cutting off access to high-tech foreign components, particularly microelectronics. This has forced the defense industry to rely on largely unsuccessful “import substitution,” low-quality alternatives, and exorbitant markups (up to 10 times global prices) for components smuggled through third countries like Kazakhstan and China.
The battlefield consequences are evident: Russia is forced to pull outdated 1950s tanks (T-54/T-55) from storage and even seize equipment from film studios to compensate for losses of modern machines. Its ability to deliver precision strikes is limited due to a shortage of components for guided munitions. The quality of Russian military equipment is steadily deteriorating, while Ukraine’s, thanks to Western aid, is improving. Equipping millions of new conscripts with modern weapons and gear under these conditions is an impossible task.
Mobilizing Empty Workplaces: Can Russia Stem the Loss of Human Capital and Economic Collapse?
General mobilization would mean removing millions of working-age men from an economy already suffering from an acute labor shortage. This would deliver a devastating blow to non-military sectors. The “partial” mobilization and subsequent emigration already led to the loss of approximately 1.3 million people, representing at least 2% of the country’s workforce. This disproportionately impacted key industries like transportation, where shipping costs have surged.
The men mobilized or fleeing the country are predominantly younger, better-educated, and at the peak of their productivity, exacerbating Russia’s already dire demographic decline. This is not just a short-term shock but a long-term blow to Russia’s economic potential. Thus, the war economy is not a sign of strength but a structural weakness—a system that devours its own future: financial reserves, human capital, and civilian industry – to fuel the present. General mobilization would be akin to pouring gasoline on this fire, accelerating self-destruction to the point of systemic collapse. It is an attempt to solve a military problem by creating an unsolvable economic one.
We can currently observe a picture of economic instability, correlating explosive growth in military spending and troop numbers with the depletion of national savings and rising key interest rates to combat inflation. This visualizes the direct trade-offs the Kremlin is making, proving that the current course is financially constrained and that adding millions of soldiers through general mobilization would be fiscally impossible without hyperinflation or a complete collapse of the civilian economy.
Huge Risks in Center-Region Relations: Cracks in the “Power Vertical”
The myth of a monolithic Russian state shatters against the reality of complex relations between the federal center and regional elites. General mobilization would create unbearable pressure on these relations, placing governors in an impossible position and risking the ignition of separatist sentiments in ethnic republics already bearing a disproportionate burden of the war.
The system built by the Kremlin imposes conflicting demands on regional leaders: they must meet mobilization targets and contribute to military efforts while maintaining social stability and achieving development goals. General mobilization would make these demands incompatible. Enforcing an extremely unpopular draft would inevitably lead to protests and social unrest (as seen in Dagestan), for which governors would be blamed.
This creates incentives for passive resistance. There is already evidence of friction between elites, such as the reluctance of regional bureaucracies to integrate war veterans into positions of power despite Kremlin directives. Governors of border regions have also publicly demanded additional federal funds to cover war-related costs, indicating a readiness to resist when their own stability is threatened. General mobilization would turn this friction into a potential crisis of the federal system. Instead of being an instrument of power, mobilization would become a test of loyalty that the Kremlin fears conducting, uncertain of the outcome.
Boiling Point on the Ethnic Periphery: From “Cannon Fodder” to Rebellion
Numerous pieces of evidence indicate that the “partial” mobilization and war losses disproportionately affected Russia’s ethnic republics, particularly in Siberia and the North Caucasus. While some analysts attribute this to economic inequality rather than deliberate ethnic policy, the perception in these regions is clear: they are being used as “cannon fodder” in a colonial war.
This perception fuels deep historical grievances tied to Russian imperialism and forced Russification. Protests in these regions have taken on a distinctly anti-colonial character, with slogans like “No to genocide!” General mobilization would be seen by these minorities as a deliberate policy of demographic destruction.
As the former president of Mongolia stated, it is an attempt to “exterminate ethnic minorities.” This creates the risk of transforming local protests into organized separatist movements, threatening the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation itself. Thus, mobilization is not merely a logistical order but a political stress test for the entire federal structure. It would force regional elites to choose between Moscow and their own people/region. The Kremlin’s avoidance of this test suggests it is not confident in the outcome.
An Inefficient Leviathan: Where to Draw Reinforcements for Military and Repressive Capacity
Even if Russia could overcome social and economic obstacles, a massively mobilized army would likely become a military burden rather than an advantage. The influx of millions of unwilling, poorly trained recruits would overwhelm Russia’s already strained military structures and could create an internal security crisis that the state’s repressive apparatus would struggle to manage.
Expert analysis from RAND Corporation and other sources indicates that the Russian army has suffered from poor logistics, ineffective command and control, and low morale since the war began. The “partial” mobilization of 2022 already demonstrated that Russia lacks the capacity to properly train and equip large numbers of new soldiers. The result was a “patchwork quilt” of units with poor coordination.
Flooding this flawed system with millions of new conscripts – many of whom would be older, less physically fit, and utterly unmotivated – would likely lead to a collapse in unit cohesion and discipline. RAND analysis highlights that significant losses and a brutal command style already threaten to undo 20 years of army professionalization efforts. Mass mobilization would accelerate this process, creating a larger but potentially far less effective – and more fragile – army.
The “will to fight” is perhaps the most critical factor in war, and it would be absent in a massively mobilized force. The Kremlin would face a situation where an attempt to solve a military problem (shortage of manpower) creates an even bigger military problem (an unmanageable, ineffective army) and a new, existential internal security problem (nationwide unrest).
Limits of Repression: Can Rosgvardiya Control an Entire Nation?
Russia’s internal security apparatus (Rosgvardiya, FSB, police) is formidable and has effectively suppressed organized, localized opposition from liberal circles. However, a nationwide reaction to mobilization, especially if it includes spontaneous, mass protests by soldiers’ families (like the “Put Domoy” movement) and unrest across dozens of regions simultaneously, would pose a challenge of an entirely different order.
The protests of 2022, though ultimately suppressed, required significant police mobilization. General mobilization could spark unrest that would stretch these forces to their limits. There is also a risk that local police, especially in the regions, may be unwilling to use excessive force against their neighbors, friends, and relatives protesting the draft.
The state’s repressive capacity is immense but may not be limitless or universally reliable in the face of a genuine national crisis. This is a gamble that could lead to defeat on two fronts simultaneously. The risk lies not only in losing the war in Ukraine but also in losing control over Russia itself.
Excessive Risks: General Mobilization as Too Great a Gamble Even for Russia
Analysis of the political, economic, social, and military risks shows that general mobilization is not a viable political option for the Kremlin but a strategic trap. The Russian leadership finds itself caught between the military necessity of waging a war of attrition, which requires ever more manpower, and the harsh reality that a full-scale attempt to secure that manpower would likely trigger a systemic crisis.
This crisis would manifest in a shattered social contract, economic collapse, rebellion among regional elites, and the potential for simultaneous military and internal security failure. Each of these risks is threatening on its own; together, they create a scenario that could lead to destabilization and even the disintegration of the state.
This explains the Kremlin’s current strategy: a costly, exhausting war fueled by “covert” mobilization, massive financial incentives for “volunteers,” and a desperate hope that Ukraine and its Western partners will break before Russia’s own fragile system does.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, the current bloody and costly status quo is a manageable problem. General mobilization would be an uncontrollable catastrophe. Thus, the decision to refrain from this step is not a sign of weakness but rather an expression of the regime’s instinct for self-preservation, recognizing that some doors are better left unopened.
Ihor Petrenko, founder of the “United Ukraine” Think Tank, Doctor of Political Sciences