Russia Has Awoken NATO, But Not Completely Yet

NATO indeed has a chance to restore its primary role—ensuring the security of its members. However, this is not going as smoothly as hoped. The hybrid attacks by Russian forces and the increasing involvement of other autocracies in destabilising European security have yet to meet an adequate response. Nonetheless, the process has begun. NATO countries are restoring defence spending, aiming to reach the agreed level of 2% of GDP and even discussing increasing this target to 2.5% of GDP. NATO countries are also de facto integrating Ukrainian defence capabilities into the Alliance, although any discussion of Ukraine’s potential membership timeline is met with reluctance by most Euro-Atlantic leaders. Nevertheless, NATO’s defensive capabilities are being restored: previously withdrawn troops and equipment are returning to the Alliance's eastern borders, weapons production is being renewed, and strike forces are being updated. As it turns out, what NATO needed to reinvigorate itself was for Russia to start the largest war in Europe since the Second World War. A decisive signal of this new reality was the decision by Russian President Vladimir Putin to significantly alter his country’s nuclear doctrine. In essence, Putin declared in late September that his criteria for a nuclear strike no longer require substantial justification.

For the last three decades, NATO has unfortunately evolved into something of a club for distinguished gentlemen and ladies rather than a robust military alliance. The defence capabilities of its members rapidly declined, and participation in actual military operations was limited.

This led to the emboldening of authoritarian regimes, allowing them to pursue reckless policies and violate international law. By the end of 2021, the Alliance had demonstrated an inability to confront contemporary challenges, which, fortunately, did not lead to direct attacks on NATO members. However, it did create conditions for the start of Europe’s largest war since World War II.

Photo: The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) signed a contract with COMLOG (Germany) in 2024, worth nearly €5 billion, to produce up to 1,000 Patriot GEM-T missiles. COMLOG is a joint venture of Raytheon (RTX) and the European MBDA group. Source: RTX

A Long Peace and the Fall of the Soviet Union Misled NATO

The last truly large-scale NATO operation took place in Afghanistan, ending unsuccessfully. Twenty years of NATO forces in Afghanistan—from 2001 to 2021—and the deployment of 132,500 military personnel as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under NATO command did not achieve the desired results. Despite ISAF's overwhelming technological superiority, the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan, overthrowing the legitimate government.

The operation in Afghanistan was the first and only time in NATO’s history that the mutual defence clause was invoked, prompted by the Al-Qaeda attack on the United States on 11 September 2001. Over two decades in Afghanistan, NATO forces suffered nearly 3,600 casualties, while Afghan police and army losses numbered in the tens of thousands. This operation is indeed the most costly in NATO’s history.

NATO’s previous large-scale operation occurred in 1999 with "Operation Noble Anvil" in Serbia, aimed at halting the Serbian army’s attack on Kosovo. A series of airstrikes involved between 300 and 1,000 aircraft at different times, and after the air phase ended, ground forces were deployed in the region, numbering from 32,000 to 50,000 personnel at various times. However, the ground operation was more of a military-police peacekeeping mission rather than a traditional military one, resulting in only two NATO casualties.

A much larger operation was "Operation Desert Storm" in 1991, primarily carried out by NATO countries but not as an official NATO mission. It was conducted under the UN's mandate following a Security Council resolution to protect Kuwait from an Iraqi invasion. Multinational forces were predominantly composed of US, French, and British troops. The coalition included about 800,000 personnel, 4,000 tanks, 2,000 aircraft, and other weaponry, including naval forces, missile troops, and artillery. Coalition losses were approximately 120 killed or missing, with fighting lasting around six weeks and ending in Iraq's defeat.

Another operation in Iraq occurred in spring 2003, known as “Shock and Awe,” involving the US, UK, Australia, and Poland. Coalition forces attacked Iraq over roughly six weeks to dismantle Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction programme. The invading forces numbered about 108,000, with losses of up to 200 personnel.

Analysing these operations, in which either NATO as an Alliance or its members participated, reveals that the power and effectiveness of military actions rapidly declined from the early 1990s to the early 2020s. This is likely due to the gradual weakening of the Alliance’s military capabilities. However, the most significant factor was not merely the decline in NATO’s forces but the erosion of the resolve to use them.

Only 23 out of 32 NATO countries meet the 2% GDP defence spending target.

It was this weakening resolve and the apparent failure in Afghanistan that acted as the trigger for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, leading to a comprehensive hybrid attack on Western Europe and NATO as a whole.

In previous limited hybrid attacks, Russia instigated, for example, the migration crisis in 2015-2016, which was partly rooted in the Russian war in Syria. The “Yellow Vests” movement in France also had apparent Kremlin connections. This gradual undermining of European NATO countries was met with increasing pressure. But only after admitting defeat in Afghanistan did the Kremlin militarily assault Europe by launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, posing a direct military threat to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary. Hybrid elements also intensified, including the 2022 energy crisis and repeated attempts to reignite migration crises.

How did NATO countries respond? Up to 2022, they mainly reacted by reducing actual defence spending, closing defence industry facilities, and withdrawing forces from NATO’s eastern flank.

The scale of reductions in what was once a leading NATO army, Germany's, was dramatic. In 1992, Germany had 4,000 modern tanks; by 2004, this number had fallen to 2,400, and by 2021, only 340 tanks remained—a reduction by 12 times. The number of howitzers dropped from 3,000 in 1992 to just 120 by 2021, a reduction of nearly 25 times. Only the number of fighter jets declined at a slower rate, halving between 1992 and 2021.

Photo: Andrius Kubilius, the incoming European Commissioner for Defence and Space, aims to work more closely with Ukrainian arms manufacturers. "They have real experience," Kubilius said, referring to the growing role of drones and missiles in modern warfare. Source: Andrius Kubilius Facebook.

“This is a Matter of Political Will”

Andrius Kubilius, the EU Commissioner for Defence and Space in the upcoming European Commission from November 2024, commented:

"We consider the UK a part of Europe... Democratic Europeans must be as united as possible. I see danger in our weakness… and Putin might be tempted to look for more mischief.

…But the Chinese are also watching. They will draw one simple conclusion: the West is quite weak. Despite the fact that the combined economic capacity of the West is 25 times greater than Russia’s, we cannot prevail. Why? This is a matter of political will.

Why don’t we have some criteria called military security to keep certain numbers of artillery shells and other products... let’s say, gunpowder [explosives], in reserve?

You create added value for the security of member states, but beyond that, you create a permanent demand for products, which is the biggest issue for the defence industry. They lack stable long-term production orders."

The New Secretary General Must Be Tougher

The future development path of NATO largely depends on the group of countries that make the most substantial contributions and have the largest economies. However, the role of the Secretary General of the Alliance is also crucial. This role requires a mix of diplomacy, strategic vision, and personal charisma. Jens Stoltenberg, who will step down from this position in the coming week, has performed more than respectably in light of current challenges. He effectively coordinated aid to Ukraine and managed to shift perceptions, with Russia now being seen as a real threat rather than just a usual trading partner.

Stoltenberg’s path likely developed this way because he took up the post of NATO Secretary General in October 2014, when Russian forces were already advancing into eastern Ukraine. Although this was not yet a full-scale invasion, it followed the missile attack on a Dutch passenger plane, Russian tanks intruding on Ukrainian soil in Donbas, and the annexation of Crimea. It appears that Stoltenberg actively steered NATO towards restoring its capabilities precisely for these reasons.

However, two circumstances remain in memory that prevent his image from being seen as nearly perfect. Firstly, during his tenure, most NATO members ignored the requirement to spend 2% of GDP on defence. Secondly, even after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s initiatives to enhance Ukraine’s military capabilities and impose new sanctions against Russia were slow, fatally delayed.

Indeed, sanctions against the aggressor state are imposed by the governments of individual countries and the EU. However, the role of the NATO Secretary General in promoting and coordinating sanctions efforts should undoubtedly be more forceful. There is a compelling reason for this: sanctions pressure on the aggressor, and consequently its weakening, is as critical a component of security as NATO’s own armaments and those of its members.

Photo: The US spends more on defence than the next nine countries combined. The problem is that only three of these nine are NATO members, and two are NATO partners. Source: Peter G. Peterson Foundation

In October 2024, Mark Rutte, aged 57, will assume the position of NATO Secretary General, having been appointed at the NATO summit in July this year. Before this role, he led the Dutch government from October 2010 to July 2024—a 14-year tenure that is a record for the Netherlands and a remarkable achievement in the modern history of Western Europe.

On 1 October, during the handover ceremony from Jens Stoltenberg, Mark Rutte is expected to say something genuinely significant.

It is worth recalling Mark Rutte’s farewell speech on 30 June, when he stepped down as Dutch Prime Minister. Among other things, he stressed the clear stance of NATO, the EU, and the Netherlands on Russian aggression: “It is extremely important that our country remains integrated into the European Union and NATO. Together, we are stronger than alone. Especially now.” He also emphasised support for Ukraine, “for peace there and security here.”

The Netherlands is one of the leaders in providing aid to Ukraine. The total amount of bilateral aid (excluding contributions to aid on behalf of the EU) since February 2022 is €5.7 billion, of which €4.41 billion was for military equipment, ammunition, weapons, and auxiliary materials. In relative terms, the scale of aid from the Netherlands is impressive—0.6% of annual GDP, placing it 9th overall. For comparison, Germany provided Ukraine with various forms of assistance totalling €14.6 billion, but this is only 0.4% of its GDP. This is important to consider, as Mark Rutte was head of the Dutch government when these decisions were made to allocate these resources to assist Ukraine.

This suggests, at the very least, that the new NATO Secretary General perceives the threat from Russia as more than real and significant. For the Dutch politician, there is also something personal in this: the Netherlands vividly remembers the tragedy of flight MH17 in 2014, when the plane was shot down by a Russian missile, killing all 298 passengers and crew, including 196 Dutch citizens. In his speech on 30 June, Rutte acknowledged that this tragedy was “perhaps the most vivid and emotional event” during his leadership of the Dutch government.

It is certainly striking to see such an emotional response, which is somewhat unusual for politicians with many years of experience in dealing with major tragedies. But it is precisely this personal perception of threats and history that turns strong politicians into truly historical figures.

Photo: Polish Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz received assurances from the government and parliament about NATO’s record defence spending level—4.7% of GDP. Source: Polish Defence Minister Facebook.

Poland Becomes a Champion in Security Restoration

Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, Polish Minister of Defence, September 2024:

“During the 32nd International Defence Industry Exhibition, we signed additional contracts worth 2 billion zlotys*, which will strengthen the capabilities of the Polish Army and domestic industry. Our priority is ensuring security, and next year’s record budget of 4.7% of GDP for defence will help us achieve this goal.”

*Approximately 400 million euros

First Steps Towards Self-Reliance

In 2023, defence spending in France amounted to 1.9% of GDP, 1.7% in Germany, and only 1.5% in Italy. While most NATO countries began increasing their defence expenditures from 2023, Romania, Greece, and Italy kept their spending levels unchanged. However, they will need to increase them: according to data published by Bloomberg, Russia's state budget draft for 2025-2027 indicates a nearly 30% rise in military spending next year compared to 2024, reaching $142 billion or 6.2% of GDP. Estimated figures for the next two years suggest a slight reduction in the share of military spending to GDP, down to 5.6% and 5.1%. However, as no negative GDP growth is expected in Russia, the nominal volume of military spending will remain high, at levels reached in 2025.

This should prompt NATO governments to reconsider their stance on defence spending. However, this is unlikely to affect everyone equally: the US defence budget for the 2023-24 fiscal year was $916 billion, accounting for 3.345% of GDP. This is almost twice the share of defence spending relative to GDP compared to Germany(1.7%), the largest EU economy . The US even outspends the UK, which is the only major European economy meeting the “at least 2% of GDP on defence” requirement, having allocated 2.3% of its GDP to these needs in 2023.

The NATO countries most diligently preparing to defend themselves are those bordering Russia. Poland already spends 3.8% of its GDP on defence and plans to raise it to 4,7%. Besides purchasing and stockpiling weapons, Poland is actively recruiting new soldiers, with advertisements encouraging people to join the Polish Army widely seen across the country. Finland, which recently joined NATO, already has defence spending at 2.5% of GDP. Comparable defence spending is seen in Latvia (2.4%), while Estonia and Lithuania have even higher rates—2.9% and 2.8% of GDP, respectively.

How is this reflected in the production and procurement of weapons? Old production facilities are being swiftly restored, and new ones are being established. Lithuania, in collaboration with Germany’s Rheinmetall, is setting up its own ammunition production. In Germany, Rheinmetall has secured an €8.5 billion contract, which will increase artillery shell production to 60,000 units per month by 2025—around four times the current combined consumption of shells by Ukraine and Russia. Gunpowder production is expected to reach 10,000 tonnes per year next year, despite recent reliance on India and China for supply chain components.

The US government has responded particularly rapidly. The story of artillery shell production is especially striking. During the Cold War, American factories had the capacity to produce 438,000 shells per month. Although this capacity was never fully utilised, it was maintained and could be turned on if needed. However, decades of peace led to significant relaxation, and the global situation seemed different to generals, as the last significant use of artillery shells occurred a third of a century ago.

Consequently, in 2021, just before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the US Army requested permission to reduce production of 155mm shells to 6,200 per month. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine brought everyone back to reality, revealing that Russian forces were using about 10,000 shells of similar calibre per month.

The response was swift but has only recently been implemented: the US Army requested $3.1 billion to restore supply chains and increase 155mm shell production to 100,000 per month by the end of 2025. Congress proved even more forward-looking, increasing the allocation to $6.414 billion—double the initial request. This was included in a $95 billion supplemental security bill signed by Joe Biden on 24 April. However, 155mm shells remain in short supply for now.

Photo: Germany is trying to restore its fleet of precision PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers to make up for reductions in previous years and supplies of these systems to Ukraine. Source: Bundeswehr

Modern Warfare Requires Modern Technology

If it seems that the war in Ukraine has brought the demand for armaments back to World War II technology with its huge appetite for artillery shells, that’s not entirely accurate. NATO countries are increasing purchases of advanced fifth-generation multi-role F-35 fighter jets. Greece’s recent contract for these aircraft is particularly notable, signed in July for the delivery of the first 20 jets between 2028 and 2030. Lockheed Martin is to deliver the first eight jets from its US plants, with the remaining 12 coming from its factory in Cameri, Italy, as stated by J.R. McDonald, Vice President of F-35 Business Development at Lockheed Martin, in an interview with the Greek newspaper Kathimerini.

In early September, the US also approved Romania’s request for F-35s, making Romania the 20th country to equip its air force with these jets.

Interestingly, this Greek contract could be the first to involve relocating F-35 production to Europe for European customers. Concurrently, the US is establishing a new training centre specifically for training European pilots on F-35s, with Polish pilots among the first students, following Poland’s 2019 contract for 30 Lightning II aircraft.

The experience of using portable anti-tank Javelin systems in Ukraine has been so impressive that demand has significantly increased. For example, in the second half of September, the US State Department approved Bulgaria’s request to purchase 218 Javelin FGM-148F missiles worth approximately $114 million, including 107 launchers.

Procurements from the US are helping to meet the urgent needs of NATO’s European members. While the restoration and expansion of air forces in European NATO countries appear to be progressing well, the same cannot be said for tanks and artillery. In Germany, production of precision howitzers and Leopard 2 tanks is only just beginning to replace those transferred to Ukraine and decommissioned in previous years.

Moreover, the guns ordered this year will not cover the quantity given to Ukraine, and most importantly, this year’s orders will only be fulfilled in 2025. The good news is that the increased deliveries expected in 2025 will consist of significantly more modern and effective models, offering substantially higher combat effectiveness.