Russia's War: from Beginning to End

The war that Russia has unleashed against Ukraine has several dimensions, without understanding which it is impossible to adequately assess its course or predict its end. Even if we take seriously the Kremlin's rhetoric and the arguments used to justify its invasion (despite the fact that they do not stand up to any rational criticism and do not provide any legal grounds for such actions on the part of Russia), we cannot help but notice the desire to destroy the Ukrainian state, if not de jure: either by dismemberment or by occupation and subsequent "anschluss," then at least de facto: by preserving formal state sovereignty, but creating a political regime in Ukraine that would move entirely in line with the national interests of the Russian Federation. 

Ultimately, such a movement was to culminate in Ukraine's involvement in Moscow's integration projects aimed at recreating a conventional Soviet Union, the socialist camp (Warsaw Pact), or the Russian Empire, with all the consequences for Ukrainian and European identity, culture, language, etc. 

In this dimension, the annexation of Crimea or any other territories of Ukraine is unlikely to satisfy Russians, especially if it results in Ukraine becoming a part of Euro-Atlantic integration projects de jure and de facto, becoming a part of the European Union and NATO. With this in mind, the minimum program for Russian dictator Vladimir Putin is to annex as much of Ukraine's territory as possible and to establish conditions under which Ukraine will not be able to integrate into the democratic world. Simply put, to create a kind of springboard for further expansion. 

Nine years of occupation of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts have clearly demonstrated that Russia is not interested in the development of the occupied territories and does not perceive them as a self-sufficient value. This is natural in principle, as Russia is clearly not short of territories. Russia's goal is not to seize certain territories, including Crimea. The goal of the Russian Federation is to bring Ukraine back under its control and involve it in its integration projects. 

It is worth recalling that the Russian Empire once emerged, in part, as a result of the Pereyaslav Rada, where the leader of the Ukrainian Cossacks, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, agreed to unite with the Moscow Tsar. And later, Ukraine, under the rule of the Communists, became one of the founders of the Soviet Union. That is, despite Putin's propaganda nonsense, neither the terrorist Vladimir Lenin nor the Soviet Union created Ukraine. Rather, Ukraine, conquered by the Bolsheviks, was one of the cornerstones for the emergence of the future Soviet Union. It seems that this is the scenario that the current Kremlin ruler hopes to repeat.  

Thus, it would be a mistake to look at the Russian-Ukrainian war solely as an armed conflict between two states, one of which has territorial claims to the other, and would deprive us of a broader perspective. 

In fact, it is part of a larger process that becomes apparent if we see the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine not in isolation, but in the context of Russia's attempts to re-establish its dominance in the post-Soviet space. Or at least, to make it impossible for post-Soviet states to participate in other (non-Russian) integration processes. 

Moreover, in the long run, it is about restoring Russian dominance not only in the post-Soviet space, but also in the post-socialist space, that is, in Central and Eastern Europe. This is evidenced by the Kremlin's absolutely unceremonious statements demanding that NATO "get out" of the states that fell under the Euro-Atlantic umbrella as a result of the bloc's expansion after the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, Hungary and Slovakia, which "do not feel threatened by Russia because they are protected by NATO," should listen more carefully to statements from Moscow and be more careful about their content. 

Thus, the second dimension of the war waged by Russia is regional and concerns Europe in the first place. Russia has never hidden its desire to destroy European unity. This applies to both the EU and NATO. 

Finally, the third dimension of Russia's war is the global one, in which Russia challenges the existing world order. To be more precise, it acts as a kind of "battering ram" and guide for forces that openly declare their desire to destroy the current world order. 

And the helplessness of international organizations, including the UN, shows that Russia is succeeding to some extent. There are more and more doubts about the effectiveness of the current system of international relations and the efficiency of the institutional infrastructure that ensures the functioning of the world order, which unleashes both destructive forces such as openly terrorist organizations such as ISIS, Hamas, and the Taliban, and no less terrorist regimes of individual states such as North Korea.

Unfortunately, in this dimension, Russia can count on the support of those forces that, on the one hand, are not interested in the complete destruction of the existing world order, and, on the other hand, are interested in changing their place and increasing their importance and role in it. It is to such states that China primarily belongs. 

However, it should be realized that China, like some other states that benefit from Russia's international isolation by building openly discriminatory relations with it, at least in the economic sphere, is not interested in Russia becoming stronger as a result of the war. It is precisely because of its current weakness that Moscow agrees to numerous concessions for those who are willing to cooperate with it.

At the same time, being interested in weakening Russia and using relations with it as a bargaining chip in relations with the conditional "collective West," China is afraid that its competitors, especially the United States, will not get stronger at the expense of Russia. 

This is also true for the United States, which also fears that a weakened Russia could lead to a seriously stronger China, or even worse, various terrorist regimes and organizations. 

The Delicate Balance and Stakes of Key Players

In short, in their attitude to Russia, key players in the international arena have to balance between: on the one hand, preventing the Putin regime from realizing its goals of destroying the current world order, and on the other hand, preventing the risks associated with Russia's possible collapse. In this dimension, it is not about the future of Ukraine, but about the future of Russia, about its ability and readiness to become an element of global security, not a source of chaos and a generator of threats not only for its neighbors but for humanity as a whole. 

So, in fact, Russia is simultaneously waging war on three levels: against Ukraine, against a united Europe, and against the existing world order. And in each of these dimensions, it has potential allies who share common goals with it, driven by conflict issues that have nothing to do with Ukraine itself. 

In view of the above, any end to the war in Ukraine that does not resolve the issues that are conflicting in each of the dimensions will not be final and will in fact become the basis for a war in the future, and on a much larger scale.  

So, in fact, it is not only about the territorial integrity and state sovereignty of Ukraine. However, without the restoration of Ukraine's state sovereignty and territorial integrity, it will not be possible to reach an acceptable solution in other dimensions of this war.