Talks in Istanbul Didn’t Stop Putin in 2022 — Why Would They Now?
In 2022, in Istanbul, Ukraine and Russia tried to agree to end the war, but the talks turned out to be a trap that hid the Kremlin's imperial ambitions. The consequences of those agreements still threaten Ukraine's sovereignty today, making them unacceptable for any future agreements.
Russia tries to tie the previous negotiations with the peace talks in 2025 not acknowledging new reality and Russian losses in the war.
What Was Agreed Upon in Istanbul in 2022, Early Months Into the war
In the spring of 2022, against the backdrop of hostilities after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, negotiations on ending the war took place in Istanbul, which did not lead to anything at the time, although they had some far-reaching consequences.
The meeting between the delegations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation on March 29, 2022, mediated by Türkiye, raised some hopes but showed a radical difference in the parties' positions. The negotiation process itself had deeper contradictions that became apparent shortly after the presentation of the first documents.
After the failure of the Russian offensive on Kyiv, the partial retreat of the Russian army from the northern regions of Ukraine, and the collapse of the Russian “blitzkrieg,” the aggressor state changed its tactics and proposed to intensify diplomatic efforts. Moscow sought a political outcome that could be sold to its domestic audience as a “victory” and relieve the pressure of Western sanctions. At the same time, Ukraine, which had just stopped the enemy, saw an opportunity to record its achievements, stop the bloodshed, and receive international security guarantees.
The negotiations took place in the format of direct contacts between the delegations. The Ukrainian side was represented, in particular, by the MP and Chair of the “Servant of the People” faction, David Arakhamia, former diplomat Oleksandr Chaly, and advisor to the Head of President’s Office Mykhailo Podolyak. The Russian side was represented by Vladimir Medinsky and Deputy Defense Minister Fomin.
As a result, the parties discussed an expanded draft security assurances agreement, which provided for a mechanism of international security guarantees for Ukraine, as well as separate regulation of the issue of the territories temporarily occupied by Russia. Russia sought to legally enshrine Ukraine's neutrality, recognize its control over the occupied territories, and impose strict restrictions on the Ukrainian armed forces.
The Main Problems of the Istanbul Agreements
One of the most serious flaws in the Istanbul Agreements was the concept of the so-called “neutrality of Ukraine.” Russia promoted it as the main condition for the cessation of hostilities. At first glance, the idea of neutrality may seem like a compromise. In reality, however, it poses profound threats to Ukraine's sovereignty and ability to defend itself.
In international practice, neutrality is a specific status that implies a refusal to participate in military alliances, deploy foreign bases, or engage in hostilities. It works only under the following conditions:
the complete absence of a military threat from neighbors;
existence of a powerful army capable of deterring an attacker on its own;
a system of international obligations that has an enforcement mechanism.
None of these conditions correspond to the realities of Ukraine. The country has already been the object of aggression, the guarantees of the Budapest Memorandum have turned out to be a fiction, and international partners are not automatically obliged to enter the war on the side of a neutral state.
The draft Istanbul agreements envisaged the creation of a system of security guarantees from a number of countries, including China, Türkiye, the United States, France, and Germany. However, these guarantees were not clearly legally defined. It was not specified how the guarantors would act in the event of a new attack; whether their assistance would be automatic; what type of assistance would be provided (military, sanctions, diplomatic).
In addition, Russia itself promoted the inclusion of countries that were loyal to it (for example, China or Belarus) in the list of guarantors, which completely undermined the meaning of such guarantees. The danger also lay in the fact that the text contained exceptions, such as the guarantees not applying to Crimea or the occupied territories of Donbas.
Agreeing to the Istanbul draft would mean political recognition of the aggression and its consequences. Ukraine, by abandoning its path to NATO, would effectively be left without a systematic mechanism for self-defense. At the same time, security guarantees would have no legal force, and the issue of the occupied territories would open the way to a long-term “freezing” of the conflict.
In addition, Russia did not provide any confirmation that it would withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine, even if the agreement was signed. This created a risk that Russia would maintain control over the occupied areas under the pretext of a “peaceful settlement.”
The Istanbul agreements, as promoted by Russia, were a tool for imposing a new form of dependence and political surrender on Ukraine. They did not eliminate the causes of the war, did not ensure security, and only recorded the result of the aggression. It was not peace, but a trap disguised as a diplomatic compromise.
Why there Will Be No Agreements Based on the Istanbul Talks in 2022
More than three years of war have passed since the Istanbul talks, which have radically changed reality. The Istanbul Accords, which could have been seen as a temporary political solution at the time, have no relevance, no legitimacy, and no political future in 2025.
In 2022, the negotiations took place against a backdrop of military uncertainty, after the failure of the Russian offensive on Kyiv. In 2025, Ukraine is fighting a full-scale defensive war, with the support of dozens of countries, a well-developed defense economy infrastructure, a modernized army, and a public consensus on the goals of the war. A return to the conditions of spring 2022 is unacceptable and impossible.
Ukraine and the international community have no reason to believe in Russia's sincerity or good faith. All previous agreements – Minsk-1, Minsk-2, Sochi, and the Geneva agreements – have been violated by the Kremlin. Returning to “Istanbul” would be another act of complacency that increases the risks to Ukraine's security.
All of this shows that no agreements based on the 2022 Istanbul talks can be discussed anymore. They are outdated, dangerous, and contrary to the interests of the Ukrainian people.
In the historical perspective, Russia has repeatedly used diplomacy as a tool to secure tactical advantage, not a mechanism for peace. The same thing happened in 2022: The Istanbul talks were just a convenient tool for pausing the fighting.
After the meeting in Istanbul, the Russian side did not take a single step to de-escalate. On the contrary, troops were deployed to Donbas, and aggression in the south intensified. This was not an attempt to find a compromise, but a strategic regrouping. The goal was to create the impression of a “peace initiative” while preparing a new offensive.
Historical Precedents of Russian Use of Peace Agreements to Continue Aggression:
Georgia, 2008: after a six-day war, Russia agreed to a peace plan but left its troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Moldova, 1992: a ceasefire agreement was used to keep Russian troops in Transnistria.
Chechnya, 1996-1999: A temporary ceasefire under the guise of the Khasavyurt agreements ended in a large-scale war and the destruction of an independent Chechnya.
Ukraine, 2014-2022: The Minsk agreements served only as a shield for Russia, which was preparing for a full-scale war.
It should also be added that Russia itself has also been constantly “supplementing” and “expanding” its own demands on Ukraine since the spring of 2022. After the failure of the Istanbul talks in March 2022, Russia gradually changed its rhetoric and put forward a number of new or additional demands on Ukraine. They were formed against the backdrop of the military situation, the political situation within Russia, and in response to international events. The change in wording did not mean abandoning the key goal of subjugating Ukraine or destroying it as an independent state.
After the failure of the “blitzkrieg,” the Kremlin began an active propaganda expansion of the concepts of “denazification” and “demilitarization.” “Denazification” came to mean:
change of power in Ukraine (under the sauce of “illegitimacy of the Ukrainian president”);
the prohibition of what they called “Russophobic” laws (linguistic, historical, cultural - everything that ensures the preservation of Ukrainian identity);
liquidation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as an institution capable of serious resistance.
Thus, in fact, it was a matter of surrender hidden under terms from the Soviet lexicon.
Since the summer of 2022, Russia's rhetoric on territorial claims has gone far beyond Crimea and Donbas. It claimed the “historical belonging” of southern Ukraine, Kharkiv region, and even Kyiv. After the fake “referendums” in the fall of 2022, Russia declared the annexation of four regions, making any compromises within the Istanbul agreements impossible.
The Kremlin also increasingly demanded guarantees of nonjoining NATO, recognition of Ukraine's neutral and non-aligned status at the constitutional level, rejection of any form of military cooperation with the West, and so on.
These demands would actually mean Ukraine's foreign policy isolation and the control of its international course by the Russian Federation.
In 2023-2024, Russian statements also included a “reform” of the Ukrainian education and culture system towards a “Russian-friendly” one, amnesty for collaborators and legalization of pro-Russian parties, restoration of the influence of the UOC-MP, etc. All of this went far beyond diplomacy and interstate relations.
In general, after the failure of forceful pressure on Kyiv, the Kremlin tried to impose on Ukraine the format of “institutional surrender”: changing the Constitution, destroying political subjectivity, federalization, and control through “guarantees.” All of this is incompatible with Ukraine's existence as an independent, European state. These demands have nothing to do with real peace – they are a set of ultimatums.
In Istanbul, Russia acted according to an old, well-worn imperial template. Instead of serious steps toward peace, it made declarative statements that served propaganda purposes. It was important for Putin to create the illusion of a “lost opportunity for peace” in order to accuse Ukraine and the West of continuing the war in the future.
These agreements are not diplomacy, but a trap. Its goal is to split Ukrainian society, destabilize the West, and prepare a new round of aggression. Therefore, any return to the texts developed in Istanbul is a direct threat to Ukraine's security.
The Istanbul Agreements Are a Fiction, not a Chance for Peace
Summarizing all the arguments presented, we can draw an unambiguous conclusion: “The Istanbul Agreements of 2022 cannot be the basis for any realistic, sustainable, or fair peace agreement. This draft was created in the context of military blackmail, under the threat of bombing, without guarantees from the aggressor, and without genuine international support for its implementation. Even its conditional provisions contained systemic threats to Ukraine's sovereignty, security, and future.
Key conclusions
The document was beneficial only to Russia: Its goal was to record the achievements of aggression, force Ukraine to make political concessions, and freeze the conflict without guarantees.
Russia had no intention of fulfilling it: the experience of negotiations in Chechnya, Moldova, Georgia, and Donbas shows that the Kremlin uses peace initiatives as a screen for aggression.
Ukraine's neutrality is unacceptable: it does not provide security, increases vulnerability, and contradicts the will of Ukrainian society.
The Istanbul Agreements are legally and politically dead: more than two years of war have passed since their inception, which has radically changed the positions of the parties and the international context.
The only realistic path to peace is Ukraine's victory: not a concession, not a compromise with the invader, but the full restoration of sovereignty and security guarantees within NATO and other collective mechanisms.
Returning to documents that were born in conditions of weakness and coercion is not a sign of diplomacy, it is a direct path to repeating the mistakes of the past. Ukraine has already proved that it is capable of resisting, mobilizing society and the army, and gaining the support of its partners. It has proved that it deserves justice, not compromise. That is why references to Istanbul are just an attempt by Moscow to resume pressure through manipulation, not a real step toward peace.
Petro Oleshchuk, political scientist, Ph.D, expert at the United Ukraine Think Tank