The Attempt to Privatise the G20 Has Yet to Succeed

The establishment of a new platform for the "Global South" to replace the G20, combating climate change, a new wave of escalating global tensions, and the situation surrounding the war in Ukraine were the main items on the agenda of the two-day G20 summit hosted by Brazil on 18–19 November 2024. A year ago, India hosted the summit, which unfolded with far more uncertainty than in 2024, possibly due to the shared stance on the war in Ukraine taken at the time by India, China, and Russia. The issue of the war in Ukraine has already become something of a "gold standard" for assessing how committed a country is to international law and democratic principles.

Ukraine was indeed at the centre of attention during the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, the documents were agreed upon before the summit began, as is often the case at gatherings of this scale. Diplomats sought to replicate the near-feat of the previous year, where the G20 summit's resolution on the section addressing the war in Ukraine was entirely devoid of substance.

In autumn 2023, the joint statement of the G20 participants was formulated on the basis of consensus, which resulted in a document stripped of meaningful content. Responsibility for this lay primarily with China, which insisted that the summary contain no reference to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, although a general reference to the "war in Ukraine" was included in the final statement.

What about this year? According to sources, representatives of the summit's participants attempted to replicate last year's precarious balancing act while preparing the text of the joint statement for the G20 leaders. They created a preliminary document that called for peace but avoided labelling Russia as an aggressor or describing the occupation of Ukrainian territory as such.

This construction seemed destined to collapse following a massive Russian airstrike on civilian targets in Ukraine on 16 November. But the summit discussions yielded, at best, a narrow consensus on the escalation of the war in Ukraine, focusing on "human suffering" and the economic consequences of the conflict. This outcome was hardly really better than that of the previous year.

Similarly vague positions were reflected in last year’s statement regarding the pace at which the world should phase out fossil fuels. Coincidentally, such ambiguity about the timeline for reducing fossil fuel use also serves China’s interests, as it remains the world's leading emitter of carbon dioxide.

What happened at the G20 summit this year in general? The situation mirrored last year’s, but with heightened tensions. The summit's main themes included international trade, climate change, and global security. Naturally, the broad scope of participants enabled numerous meetings on the summit's sidelines, which warrant separate attention for their outcomes.

It is also worth noting that the leaders of India, Brazil, and China had been primed by the preceding BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Despite attempts by developed nations to maintain the G20’s status as a rational and neutral platform, China is relentlessly pushing its agenda. The scenario suggests that Beijing is trying to extend its umbrella to include as many Global South representatives as possible while simultaneously advancing its interests under the guise of collective demands from countries classified as part of the Global South. This approach is taking on increasingly sophisticated forms.

For instance, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced an initiative involving Brazil, South Africa, and the African Union to disseminate scientific and technological innovations across the Global South. On the surface, it all appears commendable and positive: leveraging innovations built up in advanced economies to give developing nations a competitive edge in the global labour division.

A striking slogan, "Artificial intelligence should not be a game of the rich countries and the wealthy," was proclaimed by Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, as reported by China’s state news agency Xinhua. The full statement suggested that AI should not become "a game for the wealthy and privileged."

In reality, however, such declarations, along with calls to lift restrictions, resemble instruments aimed at countering sanctions against China. It is worth recalling why Washington imposes these sanctions on Beijing: because China utilises AI research achievements as components in the arms race.

The situation regarding markets' protection is similar. Developed countries employ trade measures such as protective tariffs to mitigate the harm caused by aggressive Chinese exports, which benefit from substantial state subsidies. And what does President Xi say? Naturally, he calls for the restoration of fairness: "We need to improve global trade governance and build a world economy characterised by openness" (a quote from China's state agency Xinhua). This seems like an attempt to shift blame from the perpetrator to others.

What is most surprising is that even leaders of some developed nations perceive the activities of "axis of evil" member states as a process of restoring historical justice. Yes, the share of developing nations in the global economy is indeed growing. Yes, platforms like the G20 should ensure equal status for all participants. But no, this does not justify attempts to undermine international law, as practised by members of the "axis of evil."