Are Ukraine’s Allies Ready to Take Sanctions Against Russia to the Next Level in 2025?
Sanctions against Russia are a war of attrition. They move slowly and often face criticism, but their strategic importance cannot be overstated. Instead of delivering a quick, decisive blow, sanctions work steadily and persistently, gradually weakening the aggressor’s economy and its ability to sustain the fight. The challenge is that Ukraine’s allies hesitate to take the final step and strike where it would truly hurt.
Sanctions as a Weapon that does not Finish: Where We Stand Today
As of mid-2025, the sanctions system against Russia has accumulated thousands of restrictions. They cover almost all sectors: banking, energy, transportation, defense, logistics, aviation, IT, and high-tech exports. More than 1,800 people and more than 2,000 companies are subject to personal sanctions by the West. The EU has already adopted 16 sanctions packages, the US has issued several hundred directives, and the British sanctions regime, Canada, Japan, and Australia have separate sanctions regimes - all of which create an unprecedented pressure front in terms of volume and width.
But the effect is insufficient. The Russian economy has adapted. The Central Bank's rate stabilizedthe ruble, and trade routes were reoriented through China, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and the UAE. The “shadow fleet” continues to deliver oil. Drones and microchips enter Russia through third countries. Propaganda buys time and imitates self-sufficiency.
Sanctions hurt. But they do not stop. They slow down the pace, but they don't stop the mechanism of aggression. And that is why the question is being raised more and more often: either the allies will bring the sanctions policy to an end, or they will recognize it as a tool of political simulation.
Grounds for New Sanctions: Arguments in Favor of Toughening
Every new bombing of Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, every missile attack on thermal power plants, every act of energy blackmail in Europe is a legally justified basis for strengthening sanctions. But it's not just about moral arguments. There are also practical ones: the current sanctions have struck a blow, but not enough. It's like a half-burned cigarette – there is damage, but little effect.
Russia is resuming missile production, expanding its drone program, and launching new microelectronics import chains through third countries. All of this is a consequence of the fact that secondary sanctions are being imposed slowly and selectively. Hundreds of Chinese and Central Asian companies openly supply dual-use goods to Russia, and payment systems from Dubai and Shanghai create a parallel financial reality where SWIFT or OFAC cannot reach.
Added to this is another reality: since 2024, Russia's budget has been in surplus again. This is thanks to petrodollars, a workaround with traders in Singapore, indexation of domestic debt, and the mobilization of the economy. This means that sanctions cannot be a half-measure. They either end the war or become a background.
Political Will: Who Slows Down, who Advances
The biggest issue is not the tools, but the will. The United States is currently the leader in the sanctions offensive. The OFAC (US Treasury Department) and the State Department are proactive, aggressively pressuring companies in third countries, including Singapore, the UAE, and Turkey. The UK has stepped up its efforts after a long stagnation, with sanctions against the shadow fleet, shipowners, and insurers. Canada, Australia, and Japan are supporting, but cautiously.
The EU is the most difficult player. Multivector interests, veto power, business influence, energy fears – all this slows down. Germany is afraid of new blows to the industry. Italy looks to Maloni, who wants to balance rhetoric and business. Orban directly blocks everything that is not favorable to the Kremlin. Open sabotage and covert opportunism turn European sanctions policy into a compromise without consequences.
But the mood of society is changing. Scandals with sanctions circumvention, stories about millions in Russian banks, exposure of Western companies in cooperation with Russia – all this is causing a demand for toughness. If the elites are not more radical, this demand will be intercepted by populists. And then sanctions will become a bargaining chip in domestic games rather than a foreign policy tool.
What Could Be the Next Sanctions: Scenarios and Goals
A real strengthening of the sanctions policy is possible in several ways. The first is a blow to the remnants of the Russian high-tech industry. We are talking about software, “white” IT companies, and the offshore service industry. Russia is still earning billions from cloud solutions and digital services, and its personnel work on Western exchanges.
The second is full control over oil and gas flows. Sanctions on the tanker fleet are just the beginning. It is necessary to expand restrictions on oil logistics, introduce a total ban on re-exports through third countries, and create a unified insurance and freight monitoring system where participation in the transportation of Russian cargo is equal to sanctions.
The third is nuclear energy. Rosatom is still not under EU sanctions. This is absurd: a country that attacks Ukraine's energy sector is also supplying fuel and technology to Europe. Sanctions against Rosatom are not only a blow to the market, but also to Russia's lobbying ties in Europe.
The fourth is deeper personal sanctions. We are talking not only about ministers and generals, but also about propagandists, judges, rectors, directors of defense plants, and family members. All of them should feel the personal cost of war. It is also worth extending sanctions to governors who mobilize.
The fifth is financial instruments. Complete disconnection of all Russian banks from SWIFT, total control over payment systems, blocking operations through cryptocurrencies, sanctions on Russian government bonds and related exchanges.
The Potential for a Sanctions Strike: What Else Can Be Hacked in the Russian Economy
The Russian economy is a house of cards, propped up by government subsidies, manual regulation, and propaganda powder. But there is a crisis inside. There is a shortage of specialists, a shortage of technology, a shortage of trust. Sanctions have already taken away more than 20% of Russia's imported component base. 60% of civil aviation is without spare parts. Military production is working for cannibalism – old equipment is being dismantled.
After the secondary US sanctions on Chinese companies that supplied chips, drones, and lasers, the flow fell by 35%. Sanctions on the shadow fleet are already blocking up to 25% of transportation. If the logistics are squeezed, oil will lose profitability.
Russia's foreign exchange reserves are frozen. The gold and foreign exchange base is shrinking. The ruble exchange rate is stable only due to administrative pressure. In 2024, Russia spent a record $140 billion on the war, which is more than 40% of the budget. This model is not sustainable. Sanctions can accelerate its collapse.
The true power of sanctions is not in the loudness of their introduction, but in their systematic nature, rigor, and ability to close loopholes. If the West decides to do so, Russia will not survive until 2026.
Sanctions meant to be a strategic tool for changing behavior. But it works only when it is applied logically, systematically, and without exceptions. If Ukraine's allies really want to speed up the end of the war, the moment has come when the “packages” should become blows, not gestures. There is still time.
Bohdan Popov, head of digital at the United Ukraine Think Tank, communications specialist, and public figure