Soft Occupation

Ukrainian journalist Oleh Manchura made this post in August 2021, nearly a year before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In it, he analyzed the tragic experience of Georgia and the socio-cultural markers that vividly illustrated Russia's position in a foreign country and its attempts to softly reintegrate rebellious Georgia into the orbit of Kremlin's geopolitical interests.

He compared the Georgian cultural and everyday space with what was happening in Ukraine at that time, on the eve of the invasion. Unfortunately, some conclusions can only be drawn after the tragedy has occurred—and this applies both to Ukraine and to Georgia, where a "creeping Russian occupation" is once again taking place through Russian food products, pop culture, and so-called "Russian refugees," who have flooded the country once again since 2022, despite waging a ruthless and cynical war against it in 2008.

"When I first arrived in Georgia—in August 2008—one of the most vivid impressions was the abundance of Ukrainian products. If it weren't for the Georgian script, I would have thought I was in Ukraine. It was total dominance: from 'Bogdan' buses and 'Privat' ATMs to oil, juices, pasta, tomato paste, vodka, preserves, etc. 'Chumak,' 'Oleina,' 'Khortytsia,' 'Sandora,' 'Veres,' 'Nizhyn'—all these brands flooded the shelves, too many to count. 

The most vivid memory was in 2013, in a remote province, Surami, where Lesya Ukrainka died: I bought 'Rud' ice cream. The fridge was full of only Ukrainian ice cream. It was brought two thousand kilometers! Ice cream! 

Georgians greatly valued Ukrainian food for its quality, and they, of all people, know good food. After that, I encountered our brands in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, even in Germany and Scandinavian countries. But nowhere like in Georgia. And I won’t see it again in Sakartvelo. 

No, our products haven't completely disappeared from the shelves. There are just far fewer of them now. Much fewer. What was the reason? Cold political relations between Kyiv and Tbilisi? The Georgian government's tolerance towards Moscow? Perhaps, all of the above. 

Now, Russian products dominate the Georgian shelves. There's an overwhelming amount of them, even though there weren't any before. The last time I saw something similar was a few years ago in Armenia—everything was Russian. But that's a member of the CSTO, and Georgia still aspires to join NATO. 

The soft return of Georgia into Russia’s orbit—I noticed it in such seemingly secondary facts five years ago. It may not be a return in the classical sense—in a country where 20% of the territory is occupied, only a political suicide would dare it. 

Rather, we're talking about the triumph of the 'What difference does it make?' policy. When we rightly criticize passive Ukrainian collaborators and 'waiting room' types, let’s not fall into messianism. This isn't an exclusive trait of Ukrainians—it exists in Georgia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Estonia. Each has different circumstances, a different percentage of this 'biomass,' but is it not noticeable in Poland? 

So, during New Year's Eve in a Georgian apartment in 2017, the television was turned on—and there was a parade of wax figures. I was transfixed. Dead men, at least to me, were singing, dancing, and drinking champagne. After three years of Russian channels being banned in Ukraine, I had simply forgotten what those monsters looked like. 

Even if you weren't a consumer of this media pop trash, you had to breathe in these fumes because they filled every gap. 

Then I went to the ski resorts of Bakuriani and Gudauri and was shocked by the number of Russian tourists. As usual, they behaved arrogantly and swinishly. And they treated the Georgians not even as servants, but as slaves. And the latter patiently endured it. 

In Tbilisi, right on Freedom Square, where Georgians, through mass demonstrations in Soviet times, nearly caused an uprising—they were the only ones in the USSR who won the right not to enshrine Russian as an official language in the Constitution—there stood a large bus with Moscow license plates, adorned with St. George ribbons and slogans like 'To Berlin,' 'We Can Do It Again,' and 'Great Victory.' It stood there for several days, and none of the proud Georgians touched it. I can't imagine such a thing in Kyiv. 

By the way, about the language. At that time, Georgian friends told me that Russian had been reintroduced in schools. The government set the trend. Russian was becoming popular again. There were queues for kindergartens with Russian-speaking groups. There was a shortage of Russian-speaking nannies in the market. 

What do we have now, five years later? (I'm not talking about Batumi—it's a resort town with its own specifics). Russian is spoken by those born in the USSR and the very youngest. But it's a pleasure to see 16–20-year-olds who haven’t learned Russian and haven't heard it from the TV. This is a completely English-speaking generation. And since they are the ones working in cafes and restaurants, I have the impression that I'm in Europe. Orders are taken only in English. They sincerely don't understand and simply can't help you in Russian. These are free people. Free from the 'Russian world.' Because knowledge of Russian doesn't make us richer, as Moscow's liberal fascists lie, but rather enslaves us. 

These children communicate with the civilized world, not the wild horde. Which, unfortunately, is once again taking over Georgia—I doubt it’s without the help of the government. I wouldn't call it pro-Russian; they are typical profiteers, Russophiles, and those for whom the issue of the Russian language falls into the 'What difference does it make?' category. 

But it's enough for the government not to be anti-Russian for Moscow to return.

 The Georgian case is also ours. Ukraine is following the same path. The massive landing of Russian stars this summer/autumn (2021), the return of collaborators like Ani Lorak and Svetlana Loboda, the 'vatnik' concert for Independence Day, the lifting of entry bans on Kirkorov and other trash, the media’s disregard for the law on the state language—this is just the beginning. I sincerely hope it doesn't end with Russian TV channels, tourists, and products. Moreover, all of it is so bad that only, to put it mildly, 'undemanding people' can consume it.

The Russians invaded Georgia through the Roki Tunnel back then. 

Later, the Roki Tunnel became the Georgian government. 

In the autumn of 2022, I flew to Georgia again, and the situation had become even worse than in the summer of 2021. Tbilisi was teeming with aggressive Russian refugees. Soon there will be as many of them as there are locals. 

And after Georgian volunteers return from Ukraine and overthrow the collaborator government—they will have to conduct a police operation as well. 

Deportation."