Ukraine Had Nuclear Weapons. And No One Can Deny It

Ukraine's renunciation of nuclear weapons and the Budapest Memorandum. What signal was sent to the world by not fulfilling the agreements?

In March 2025, Richard Grenell, a special envoy of US President Donald Trump, said that the nuclear weapons that remained on the territory of Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR belonged to Russia, and that Ukraine simply returned them to Moscow because they were not Ukrainian property. This statement caused considerable resonance and outrage in Ukraine, as it distorts historical facts and ignores the legal aspects related to Ukraine's nuclear disarmament.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine inherited a significant nuclear arsenal, including approximately 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic bombers, as well as a significant number of tactical nuclear weapons. This arsenal included 90 UR-100N (SS-19) intercontinental ballistic missiles, 46 RT-23 (SS-24) ICBMs, and around 33 heavy bombers stationed on Ukrainian territory. This made Ukraine the third largest nuclear power in the world after the United States and Russia.

Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine

On September 10, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law “On Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations of Union Subordination Located on the Territory of Ukraine”, which recognized all property located on its territory at the time of independence as the property of Ukraine. This included nuclear weapons. In accordance with the provisions of the 1983 Vienna Convention on State Succession, Ukraine had every right to consider its nuclear arsenal its property.

After gaining independence, Ukraine faced international pressure, especially from the United States and Russia, to give up nuclear weapons. In 1992, Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol, committing itself to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. However, the process was complicated by security and compensation issues. In January 1994, the Trilateral Agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States was signed, which provided for the transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia in exchange for financial compensation and security guarantees.

Budapest Memorandum and U.S. Commitments

On December 5, 1994, in Budapest, Ukraine, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom signed the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the NPT, known as the Budapest Memorandum. According to this document, the signatories pledged to.

Respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine.

Refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.

Avoid economic pressure aimed at subjugating Ukraine to their interests.

To appeal to the UN Security Council in case Ukraine becomes a victim of aggression with the use of nuclear weapons.

Not to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

Consult in case of a situation that calls into question these obligations.

These commitments made the United States and other signatories responsible for ensuring Ukraine's security. However, Russia's violation of these guarantees in 2014, when it annexed Crimea, called into question the effectiveness of the memorandum and prompted criticism of the lack of response from the United States and the United Kingdom.

Could Ukraine Retain Its Nuclear Capability?

Theoretically, Ukraine could have retained nuclear weapons because it had physical control over them. However, in practice, it would be difficult because of the lack of necessary infrastructure to maintain and manage the nuclear arsenal, as well as international pressure. The United States and other countries insisted on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, fearing nuclear proliferation and instability in the region.

Richard Grenell's argument that Ukraine has “returned Russian nuclear weapons” is based on a distorted view of the Soviet legacy. Soviet nuclear weapons were all-Union weapons, created by the resources, scientific schools and factories of the republics, including Ukraine.

For example, it was the Ukrainian Yuzhmash (Dnipro) that produced strategic missiles, and Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv were powerful scientific centers. The very logic that weapons located on the territory of an independent state automatically belong to Russia contradicts international law and precedent.

The US Position: Between Guarantees and Interests

Back in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, Senator John McCain admitted: The United States “has not honored its commitments to Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum.” He called for a review of the US approach to security guarantees, emphasizing that breaking promises undermines global confidence in Washington as a guarantor of stability.

A similar view was expressed by Steven Pifer, a former US ambassador to Ukraine and negotiator in the 1990s. In his column for the Brookings Institution, he directly states:

“Ukraine has fulfilled all its obligations. It handed over nuclear warheads, destroyed launchers, and joined the NPT. But it did not receive what was promised - real security guarantees.”

The discussion about Ukraine's nuclear weapons is not just a dispute about the past. It is a question of the future international security architecture. South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan are closely watching how the United States fulfills its promises to Ukraine. After all, the Budapest Memorandum was a test for the concept of “non-nuclear guarantees.” And this test has failed.

If states that voluntarily give up nuclear weapons do not receive real protection, this is a signal to others: either arm yourself or survive on your own.

Conclusion: a History that Must be Accounted for

Richard Grenell's attempt to present nuclear weapons in Ukraine as “temporarily abandoned property of Russia” is not just absurd. It is dangerous. It legalizes Russian aggression, negates Ukraine's legal legacy, and, worse, weakens the West's position in the eyes of the world.

The truth is that Ukraine had nuclear weapons. It had all the legal, political and factual grounds to possess them. It gave it up - not out of naivety, but because of promises. And today, those who made these promises must be held accountable for them.

Today, for the second time, the Donald Trump administration is trying to convince Iran to abandon the development of nuclear weapons. It is about another “grand bargain” - a large-scale diplomatic agreement that provides for concessions from Tehran in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and security guarantees from the United States.

But a simple question arises: why should Iran believe these guarantees?

Iranian politicians are already publicly appealing to the example of Ukraine. They say it directly: Ukraine gave up the world's third largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for guarantees that did not work. It lost Crimea, Donbas, thousands of lives and millions of refugees. And it received nothing in return but sympathy.

This is not just an argument for Tehran. This is a systemic problem of trust in the United States as a guarantor that has global implications. When the United States calls on states not to develop nuclear weapons, it must show that there is an alternative that actually works. But after Budapest, there is none.

Petro Oleshchuk, political scientist, Ph.D, expert at the United Ukraine Think Tank