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Why Ukraine Should be Allowed to Attack Russian Oil Refineries – Benefits for the US and EU

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Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian CEO of Rosneft oil company Igor Sechin, right, visit "Zvezda" Shipbuilding Complex in the Bay of Bolshoy Kamen, in the far eastern region of Primorsky Krai, Russia, Monday, Sept. 11, 2023. Source: AP
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian CEO of Rosneft oil company Igor Sechin, right, visit "Zvezda" Shipbuilding Complex in the Bay of Bolshoy Kamen, in the far eastern region of Primorsky Krai, Russia, Monday, Sept. 11, 2023. Source: AP

Strikes on Russian oil refineries transform the Kremlin's energy sector from a source of war financing into a chronic vulnerability, ensuring the west economic benefits, strengthened security, and more effective isolation of the aggressor

As of October 2025, strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces have disabled or significantly damaged Russian oil refineries (ORs), accounting for approximately 38–40% of total refining capacity (including 16 attacked facilities with a capacity of 123 million tons per year).

According to estimates by President Zelensky and Reuters, operating capacity has been reduced by 17–20% (approximately 1.1 million barrels per day), causing fuel exports to fall to their lowest level since early 2022. These refineries are located at considerable distances from the Ukrainian border – from 500–800 km (for example, the plants in Orsk or Ryazan) to over 2,000 km (as in Tyumen or Ukhta), which highlights the effectiveness of the SBU and Armed Forces of Ukraine's long-range drones in striking the aggressor's critical infrastructure.

The destruction or disabling of oil refining capacities in Russia is not just a tactical operation. It is a strategic tool that strikes at the financial backbone of the Kremlin, destroys the logistics of its exports, and simultaneously opens the market for American and European energy suppliers. Continuing this campaign means weakening Russia's ability to wage war, minimizing its foreign currency revenues, and strengthening the energy security of the West.

Halting Foreign Currency Inflows Is a Direct Blow to Moscow's War Machine

Oil and petroleum products are one of the main sources of the Kremlin's daily foreign currency inflows. When refineries are operational – crude oil is transformed into gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel, which are exported with a high margin; when refineries are disabled – crude oil can be exported as even cheaper raw material or get stuck in internal logistics nodes.

How does oil destruction of Russian oil refineries impact the war? 

The destruction of refining capacities reduces the profitability of the chain and directly cuts the flow of currency that finances the army. The latest strikes on key facilities and disruptions in refining have already had a noticeable effect on inflows over the results of months – overall revenues from the export of fossil fuels have significantly dropped compared to the peak indicators after 2022.

Why is this important for the US and EU? First, every dollar that the RF budget does not receive is less money for purchasing weapons, fewer resources for mercenaries, and a smaller potential to sustain prolonged aggression. Second, weakening oil revenues increases the effectiveness of sanctions: the combined effect of technical strikes and financial restrictions intensifies economic pressure.

The Destruction of Russian Logistics Becomes a Funeral Operation for Sanction Evasion Schemes

The Russian oil-spilling infrastructure is not just refineries; it is a network of reservoirs, pipelines, terminals, and tankers of the "shadow fleet" that ensures the endurance and routing of flows. By striking key elements of refining, we do not just remove the product – we break the chain of its logistics. The consequence is an increase in logistics costs, delays, shortages of certain types of fuel in RF regions, and increased dependence on transshipment and "shadow" transfers. Reuters and other analysts describe how exactly the "shadow fleet" and fake flags became the Kremlin's response to sanctions; but these schemes have limitations – they will not withstand a prolonged strike on refining and maritime infrastructure.

For the West, this is a double win. First, the Kremlin's technical ability to quickly reorient export flows will be broken; second, it frees up hands for strengthening control over the rogue fleet and international inspection – therefore, sanctions become more effective and long-term.

Replacing Russian Energy Carriers – An Economic and Strategic Advantage for the US and EU

When part of Russian refining is disabled, demand for alternative supplies grows. Here, simple market logic comes into play: scarcity leads to higher prices, which in turn encourages suppliers who can quickly ramp up exports. For the US, this means additional export opportunities for LNG and petroleum products; for the EU – a chance to accelerate the diversification of supplies and reduce the final dependence on Russian energy carriers.

We are already seeing that imports of American LNG to Europe have surged, and the EU is accelerating plans to reduce Russian supplies to their complete cessation on the horizon of 2026–2028. This gives the US a serious geoeconomic benefit – growth in exports, political influence, and strengthening of transatlantic energy interdependence.

Politically, this also removes Moscow's argument about the "dangerous consequences of Europe's energy isolation." On the contrary: continuing the strike campaign on refineries accelerates the process of market replacement and makes the EU's energy transformation more realistic.

Russia Is Forced to Introduce Export Restrictions, Which Harm It Even More

The Kremlin's behavior is telling: in response to real problems with refining, the government is forced to introduce partial bans or restrictions on the export of petroleum products, which only worsens the long-term financial situation and creates internal deficits. Such restrictions are nothing other than the Kremlin's self-punishment: they reduce foreign currency inflows and increase economic costs for supporting regions and the army. Reuters has already noted that Moscow is applying partial bans on diesel/gasoline to stabilize the market after attacks.

Risks and Mistakes: Why "Striking at Refineries" Is Not the Same as "Striking at Markets"

Critics say: "Strikes on refineries harm the global energy market and hit Europe." This is incorrect for several reasons. First, the modern market has high supply elasticity: the US, the Middle East, and even India/Africa can compensate for the deficit in the short- to medium-term perspective. Second, the strategic goals of strikes on refineries are not to create a deficit in Europe, but to take out of circulation those capacities that serve the aggressor's war machine. Third, there is a well-thought-out strategy – for strikes, infrastructure nodes are chosen, not international interceptors of civilian market supplies, which allows minimizing collateral risks.

The US and EU Must Not Only Permit but Also Push This Campaign

Continuing strikes on Russian oil refineries is a sensible from an economic point of view, legally protected, and politically necessary strategy.

The US benefits from additional export revenues, strengthening of global influence through energy; for the EU – accelerated diversification of supplies and reduction of dependence on the Kremlin. And most importantly – this is a direct blow to Russia's financial capacity to wage war.

By combining military strikes with diplomatic coordination and stricter control over the "shadow fleet," the West can do what sanctions alone cannot: transform the RF's energy sector from a source of financing aggression into its chronic vulnerability.

Volodymyr Kuznetsov, communications specialist, expert at the United Ukraine Think Tank

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