Challenges for Rutte: What to Expect from NATO’s New Leader
In the first week of his role as NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte is still experiencing a sense of optimism. He has outlined his intentions, with his first official trip being to Kyiv. A major multilateral working meeting involving Rutte is scheduled for 12 October. This will be another “Ramstein” meeting and the first to take place in a format involving national leaders. A great deal of anticipation surrounds this event. The final assessments will be made in November, coinciding with the US presidential elections. The probability of Donald Trump’s victory is significant, and his tough demands on European NATO members are well known. Therefore, the new NATO Secretary General will face immense challenges if Trump returns to the White House.
Rutte’s visit to Kyiv was more than symbolic. Firstly, it was his first foreign visit in his new role. Secondly, during his time in Kyiv, air raid sirens sounded four times, including twice during his meetings with Ukrainian leaders.
The war in Ukraine, or rather, victory over the aggressor, is both the number one task for NATO’s new Secretary General and a major challenge for the Alliance as a whole. After all, Russian missiles and drones occasionally cross into NATO member states’ territories.
The second priority is the revamping of NATO members’ defence programmes. The third task is to revitalise NATO itself, as the Alliance has proven unprepared for the existential threat posed by a new wave of global threats that have emerged in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Time appears to be short for Mark Rutte, and it seems he won’t have a “honeymoon” period in his new role.
When assuming his position, Rutte announced three priorities for NATO:
Keeping NATO strong;
Increasing support for Ukraine;
Strengthening partnerships.
Ukraine Awaits Concrete Decisions
During his press briefing in Kyiv, Rutte addressed four key questions concerning Ukraine. The score was 3:1 – he gave a clear and definite answer to one question, while three others were left somewhat vague. Most likely, by 3 October, Rutte did not yet have the answers to these three questions, as the upcoming 12 October meeting with Ukraine’s partner countries in the “Ramstein” format is expected to provide more clarity.
The most definitive issue was regarding the scope and limits of NATO’s support for Ukraine, which was neither new nor unexpected. Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg had already stated that Ukraine would receive support for as long as necessary. From day one in his new role, however, Mark Rutte has insisted that this support will continue until Ukraine achieves victory. In particular, he posted on X (formerly Twitter) after his visit to Kyiv, declaring his commitment to strengthening support for Ukraine until its victory: “Important visit to Kyiv to meet my friend, President Zelenskyy. We discussed the areas where Ukraine needs further support. As the new NATO Secretary General, it is my priority to take this support forward to ensure that Ukraine prevails.”
The second question, which did not receive a straightforward answer, concerned Ukraine’s prospects for NATO membership. Rutte rightly referenced the scale of aid provided, the preparation of Ukraine and its armed forces for NATO membership, and even stated that “Ukraine is closer to NATO than ever before.” He also pointed to the declarations made at the NATO summit in July, which affirmed that Ukraine’s path to membership is irreversible.
“Only one country has crossed the red line here, and that’s not Ukraine but Russia, by starting this war,” said Mark Rutte.
Naturally, Rutte could not take responsibility for announcing specific timelines or conditions for Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Especially considering that two NATO members could complicate this path. Hungary has been flirting with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and has repeatedly blocked aid to Ukraine. Turkey also maintains a complicated position, as seen in its recent application to join BRICS.
The third question pertained to the use of long-range weapons provided by Ukraine’s partners to strike military targets deep inside Russian territory. Rutte firmly placed responsibility for the delays in granting such permissions on national governments, while fully supporting Ukraine’s right to use these weapons for deep strikes: “Ukraine has the right to defend itself, and international law is on its side. That right doesn’t end at the border.”
The fourth question, regarding the possibility of intercepting Russian missiles and drones, received the response that national governments must make such decisions. Rutte reminded that NATO is enhancing air and missile defence capabilities on its eastern flank, and members are consulting on countering Russian drone and missile incursions. However, as of early October, no Russian attack had been intercepted by NATO countries in their airspace, although fighter jets had been scrambled for interception missions.
It’s important to note what Rutte declared in Kyiv on the day four air raid sirens sounded in the city. While such a number of alarms in one day is not extraordinary for Kyiv, several consecutive ballistic missile attacks are an unusual coincidence. There’s little doubt that the Russians were welcoming Rutte’s visit in their own way.
It seems that the upcoming “Ramstein” summit this week will serve as a watershed moment. Either NATO demonstrates its capabilities in response to the threats Russia poses to its eastern flank with its attack on Ukraine, or NATO reveals an inability to counter the global dangers generated by local conflicts.
NATO’s Revamp
Mark Rutte’s main personal mission is to surpass Jens Stoltenberg. This is reflected in two of his three priorities – “Keeping NATO strong” and “Strengthening partnerships.”
Rutte’s predecessor, Jens Stoltenberg, served as NATO Secretary General for two terms, a total of 10 years. During his tenure, Stoltenberg is credited with transforming NATO from a “club of stately gentlemen” into an organisation capable of providing its members with military support when necessary. Currently, NATO has tens of thousands of capable soldiers from its member states deployed on its eastern flank, whereas ten years ago, only national forces were present. A German brigade is stationed in Lithuania, and a powerful airbase is being constructed on Romania’s Black Sea coast – these are just the latest developments in the expansion of forces on the eastern front.
Donald Trump’s dream has also been realised. During his presidency from 2016 to 2020, Trump demanded a significant increase in European allies’ financial contributions to defence budgets. Now, 23 out of 32 NATO members have reached defence spending of at least 2% of GDP, compared to just three members 10 years ago.
But is this really the result of Stoltenberg’s efforts? In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and seized part of its territory. Although Stoltenberg was NATO Secretary General at the time, he didn’t perceive this as a sign of a looming full-scale war on Europe’s doorstep. In 2014, Russia invaded Crimea and annexed it, while Russian proxies seized territories in eastern Ukraine. This took place under Stoltenberg’s watch, yet NATO’s response remained subdued. Ukraine did not receive substantial military support, nor were there calls to reassess defence budgets.
Mark Rutte will have to convince NATO member governments to radically reassess their defence funding and draw attention to Article 5 of the Treaty.
After 2014, European NATO members even continued to supply Russia with weapons, components for weapon manufacturing, and relevant technologies. European components, including highly effective targeting systems, were found in Russian tanks and armoured vehicles destroyed by Ukrainian forces in February and March 2022. It is the NATO Secretary General’s responsibility to insist that member states halt the supply of arms, military technologies, and dual-use technologies to the aggressor. But until February 2022, no significant sanctions had been imposed. Surely, it’s also the Secretary General’s role to coordinate governments’ efforts to limit the aggressor state’s capabilities?
All these tasks now fall to Mark Rutte. He has no reason to delay, and likely will not. The former Dutch Prime Minister, now NATO Secretary General, pursued an active policy of strengthening his country’s defences in his previous role. Although the Netherlands only reached the target of 2% of GDP for defence spending this year, Rutte has consistently demonstrated the importance of supporting Ukraine, which now acts as a shield against Russian aggression in the West.
Judging by Rutte’s declarations, both before and after taking up the position of NATO Secretary General, he views the revitalisation of the Alliance as his mission. To achieve this, Rutte will need to promote the idea of significantly increasing European members’ defence budgets. The “2% of GDP on defence” target is now considered outdated by NATO’s eastern members. These countries will support Rutte in demanding both the fulfilment of the current target and its reassessment to at least 2.5%, if not 3%.
An even greater challenge for Rutte, and all NATO leaders, is finding a suitable way to demonstrate that the Alliance has not abandoned its founding principle of “one for all, and all for one.” Many are now eager to test Article 5 of the Treaty, which stipulates NATO’s collective defence in the event of an attack on one of its members.