Moscow Prepares for a Revenge in Moldova After Sandu's Victory

In Brussels, London, and Washington, there was a collective sigh of relief following Maia Sandu’s victory in Moldova’s presidential election. Why such interest in a small nation nestled between Ukraine’s south-western regions and Romania? Because Moscow views this country as a gateway to the Eastern Balkans and a backdoor into Ukraine. A narrow strip of Moldovan territory remains under the control of the puppet government of the self-declared Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. So, it is premature to celebrate Moldova's presidential election outcome, as parliamentary elections are slated for the first half of 2025, with Moscow already setting the stage.

The Moldovan presidential election was held in two rounds on 20 October and 3 November, coinciding with a referendum on EU membership on 20 October. Moldovan voters narrowly endorsed EU integration, with only 50.46% in favour. In general, the referendum vote was very precarious. First, out of 3.02 million registered voters, only 50.69% or 1.53 million showed up at the polls. Of the 1.488 million valid votes, 749,000 voters said “yes” to EU membership. These figures are important to remember.

Migrant Workers Saved the Election

In the first round of the presidential election, nearly 1.563 million voters participated, or 51.74%, including around 240,000 abroad. Slightly more voters participated in the presidential vote than in the referendum, which took place at the same polling stations. Pro-European candidate Maia Sandu secured approximately 42.45% in the first round, while pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo received 25.98%. The remaining nine candidates lagged far behind, with Renato Usatii, leader of the populist “Our Party,” trailing with 13.79%, and no other candidate surpassing 6%. Neither Usatii nor any other candidate posed a threat to the two frontrunners.

Following the first round, Moldova received a surge of commentary about the potential outcome of the second round. Strong pro-Russian propaganda aimed to rally the voters who had supported the eliminated candidates. Prorussian expert voices circulated two main ideas:

• Sandu had reached her support limit, and her high negative rating meant that supporters of the eliminated candidates were more likely to abstain than to back her in the second round.
• Electing Sandu would lead to confrontation with Russia, potentially resulting in war. Advocates of this idea frequently pointed to the lukewarm support for EU membership shown in the referendum.

Reality, however, defied these predictions: in the second round, 54.34% or 1.641 million voters cast their ballots, including approximately 330,000 at overseas polling stations. Revisiting the first-round data, 1.563 million voters turned out, 240,000 of whom were abroad. This means the overall turnout increased by only 78,000, while overseas turnout rose by 90,000. Domestic turnout, in fact, decreased by 12,000. While this decrease may not seem dramatic, the second-round results are telling.

The leader of the pro-European liberal Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), Maia Sandu, won 55.33% of the vote, while her opponent, former Prosecutor General and leader of the pro-Russian Party of Socialists, Alexandr Stoianoglo, garnered 44.67%. The vote split was approximately 930,000 to 750,000, a difference of 180,000. Notably, in overseas polling, the balance was 271,000 to 56,000, underscoring that the mobilisation of overseas voters played a crucial role in Sandu’s victory.

Overseas voters accounted for roughly 20% of all votes, although it’s worth noting that not all of them are pro-EU. Approximately 90,000 ballots were issued at polling stations in the Russian-controlled Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.

The Parliamentary Challenge

Sandu’s victory is not without concerns for her allies in Chisinau. Ukrainian experts expressed deep apprehension before the election, understanding that the Russian enclave in Transnistria remains a persistent threat. The presence of a Russian contingent composed of local residents and the large stockpile of Soviet-era arms left there exacerbate this concern. Indeed, establishing a land corridor to Transnistria was one of the goals of Russia’s failed 2022 “push to Odesa,” thwarted by the defenders of Mykolaiv and Odesa.

Both the presidential election and the EU membership referendum took place under intense Russian interference, including efforts by Russian intelligence, financial influence, and political operatives. Among the most daring acts was employing Russian money and resources to transport paid voters from Russia and Transnistria to polling stations in Moldova, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

Statements about Russian interference in the election came from EU spokesperson Peter Stano after the first round and were reiterated by EU High Representative Josep Borrell following the second. In a joint statement, the EU High Representative and the European Commission acknowledged Moldova’s efforts to conduct successful elections despite “unprecedented interference from Russia, including vote-buying schemes and disinformation aimed at undermining the country’s democratic institutions and its European path.”

This interference included at least $39 million in voter payments via Russia’s Promsvyazbank and an extensive disinformation campaign costing Moscow an estimated €100 million.

Russia may have suffered a defeat in Moldova’s presidential election, but it is far from giving up with parliamentary elections ahead.

Moldova’s parliamentary election procedures present a significant challenge for Sandu and her pro-European party. Moldova’s parliamentary election system, which allocates 101 seats based on proportional representation in a single nationwide district, features notably low thresholds for smaller players. For individual parties, the threshold is 5% of the national vote, for two-party blocs, it’s 7%, and for blocs of three or more, it’s 11%. Independent candidates need only 2% to pass.

Thus, only about 32,000 votes, assuming a turnout similar to the second round of the presidential election, would suffice to secure a seat for an “independent” candidate, creating ample opportunity to introduce “dark horses” into parliament. But even small parties can bring surprises.

In the 2021 snap parliamentary election, Sandu’s PAS achieved an impressive result, winning 63 seats. A bloc of two ultra-left parties, the Communists and Socialists, which supports Alexandr Stoianoglo, holds 27 seats (10 for the Communists and 17 for the Socialists). Five seats are held by independents, while the “Șor” Party, named after its Moscow-based founder Ilan Shor, controls six seats.

According to renowned political expert Marianna Prisiajniuk, Shor and two other pro-Russian oligarchs, Vladimir Plahotniuc and Veaceslav Platon, financially backed nine out of eleven candidates in the presidential election.

Sandu’s presidential opponents may have a strong chance to assert themselves in the parliamentary elections, potentially forming a coalition to counter Sandu’s party. In the 10th Parliament (2019-2021), Sandu’s party and its allies held only 44 of 101 seats, a configuration that could easily recur. Under immense pressure from Moscow, such an outcome may be almost inevitable.

The Kremlin has refined the “elections under duress” tactic in Georgia, applying intense propagandist pressure with the simple message: “Choose pro-Russian parties, or face war like in Ukraine.”

What can Moldova counter this with? President and her team hold a few trump cards: during the presidential election, Russia’s intelligence agencies exposed their influence networks. Taking a hard line on corruption and fraud, and removing Russian proxies from the political sphere, is the only viable path left for Moldova’s pro-European leadership.