Ukraine's Strategic Interests in Romania

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, Ukraine has been forced to rethink its foreign policy. While until 2022 Romania was seen more as a peripheral partner on the southern flank, today it has become a critical element of Ukraine's security, logistics, and economic survival. As Romania just held the presidential elections in May 2025, it's worth thinking about what unites Ukraine and Romania.
Geographical proximity, EU and NATO membership, and control over key Black Sea infrastructure hubs make Bucharest not just a partner, but Ukraine's gateway to the South. And at the same time, a source of potential threats.
Friendship with Risks
To begin with, the war has effectively zeroed out Ukrainian logistics in the southern direction. The ports of Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson are partially blocked, partially destroyed, or under threat of shelling. Under these conditions, Romania has become the main hub for Ukrainian exports via the Danube and the port of Constanta.
In 2023 alone, more than 60% of Ukraine's agricultural exports left the country via this route. In 2024, despite the partial unblocking of the grain corridor, the pace of cargo transportation through Romanian territories did not slow down; on the contrary, investments in border infrastructure on both sides only increased.
Romania's importance is not limited to the port of Constanta. The Danube cluster is the heart of Ukraine's new transportation system, where Galati, Braila, and Tulcea play the role of distribution centers for Ukrainian grain, metal, timber, and fertilizers. In addition, the rail and road crossings on the Romanian-Ukrainian border, from Dyakiv to Porubne, are being actively modernized. The emergence of new terminals, checkpoints, and increased capacity is a response to the realities of war, where the speed of logistics is equal to the level of national resilience.
However, Romania is not just a channel for exports. It is also a market and an economic partner. Despite the political crises in Bucharest, the rise of populism and far-right movements, trade between the two countries is breaking historical records. In 2024, the trade turnover exceeded $3.5 billion.
Ukraine exports agricultural products, metal, and electricity, while importing fuel, engineering products, fertilizers, and chemicals. But therein lies the problem. Romanian farmers are a key pressure group that demands restrictions on Ukrainian exports because of competition in the European market. These sentiments are skillfully picked up by right-wing populists who are already entering the highest echelons of power in 2025.
The economy is becoming a new field of conflict. Ukraine is interested in free access to the EU market, and Romania is the first barrier to this. Delays in infrastructure projects, sabotage of transit permits, political games around certifications are tools that Bucharest does not hesitate to use in its own interests. In times of war, this is more than political pettiness. It is a threat to security.
Energy is another area where Romania plays a critical role. Within ENTSO-E, the countries have already partially synchronized their power grids. After the explosion of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant and the strikes on the Ukrainian power grid, electricity supplies from Romania became not just a commercial service, but an element of survival. In addition, Romania is actively developing LNG infrastructure, which can be used to diversify energy supplies in the region. Joint investments in renewable energy-hydro, wind, and solar-open up additional opportunities for partnership, although there is still a lack of political will in this area.
Key Elements of Ukraine-Romania Cooperation
But the main thing is the war. Romania has become NATO's rear for Ukraine. A huge portion of military logistics, from ammunition to heavy equipment, passes through its territory. The opening of warehouses, repair bases, and training centers is already underway. Romania is the key to the operational rear in the southwestern direction.
And at the same time, it is a weak link. The rise of pro-Russian narratives, the rhetoric of Simion and Șoșoaca's parties, the issues of Moldova and Transnistria - all this creates a complex political picture that the Kremlin is actively trying to exploit. Russia's attempts to destabilize the Danube region through hybrid operations, bribery of local elites, and disinformation campaigns have been documented many times.
In this context, Romania needs not just political attention from Ukraine – it needs a systemic presence. Not declarative diplomacy, but a solid political strategy. The embassy should be strengthened. Ukraine should actively promote bilateral formats of cooperation: from the creation of a joint economic committee to defense cooperation at the level of the General Staffs. Particular attention should be paid to the border areas of Chernivtsi, Suceava, Izmail, and Tulcea. It is here that the regional backbone of logistics and humanitarian exchange is formed.
It is equally important to strengthen the information presence. The struggle for Romanian public opinion is another front line. Romanian media need to see and hear Ukraine. Experts, journalists, and bloggers need to receive arguments, facts, and materials. And preferably, before they are flooded with Russian propaganda.
Romania today is not just a neighbor. It is a strategic fulcrum, a channel of survival, and a risk zone at the same time. Without controlling the southwestern direction, Ukraine loses not only exports and logistics, but also the depth of its defense. That is why any political processes in Bucharest, from the victory of radicals to the appointment of the Minister of Transport, should be analyzed in Kyiv no less than changes in Warsaw or Berlin. After all, it is there, on the border with Romania, that Ukraine's next line of defense is now.
Bohdan Popov, Head of Digital at the United Ukraine Think Tank, communications specialist and public figure