In Search of Game Changers for Ukraine

There is no single silver bullet for winning the war against Russia. However, there are numerous game changers capable of restoring peace in Europe and preventing the full-scale outbreak of World War III, if they are deployed simultaneously. The Ukrainian military offensive in the Kursk region is also considered by many experts as a game changer. But why is that? Additionally, why is there so much scepticism about the use of F-16 multirole fighters? What is Ukraine lacking? Soldiers? Money? Weapons? Sanctions against Russia and its allies? In reality, Ukraine is short of almost everything. This is because, up to now, Ukraine has received both weapons and funds, as well as sanctions against the Russian Federation, too late and in insufficient quantities. Another question arises – why is all this being done too late and in such small amounts?

The most striking example of the "too little, too late" sentiment is the case of the American-guided Excalibur shells. According to Pentagon data, since May 2022, Ukrainian forces have received 7,000 high-precision Excalibur shells for 155 mm howitzers. However, in May 2024, it became known that as early as autumn 2023, the United States decided to cease supplying these munitions to Ukraine because their effectiveness had significantly declined.

Too Little and Too Late

Between January and August 2023, the success rate of confirmed strikes using Excalibur shells dropped from a high of 55% to a low of 7% in July and 6% in August. During this period, Ukraine attempted a summer counteroffensive that ultimately proved unsuccessful. This decline occurred because the supply of Excalibur shells was too slow and insufficient. This was against the backdrop of the United States delivering more than 200 units of 155-mm howitzers and over 3,000,000 units of 155-mm artillery shells to Ukrainian forces over two and a half years, with the bulk of these supplies starting in May 2022. While this may seem like a colossal amount, it was not.

From these figures, it can be calculated that each howitzer received approximately 35 guided Excalibur shells and 15,000 conventional shells, but over a period of roughly 780 days of active use. This means that each howitzer could only fire one guided shell every three weeks and an average of 20 conventional shells per day. Moreover, the number of howitzers was far too small—on average, roughly one unit per 5 km of the front line. Naturally, a single gun is not used in one location at a time because that would be ineffective with conventional shells. This means that when used in groups, at least half of the contact line was left without proper artillery cover by Ukrainian forces.

In addition to American howitzers, Ukrainian forces also used former Soviet guns, domestically produced howitzers, as well as German, French, Swedish, Czech, Slovak, and other models. However, this did not fundamentally resolve the problem of Russia's numerical advantage in artillery. If a quantitative advantage was not possible, could qualitative superiority be achieved through high-precision Excalibur shells? As we can see, there was a catastrophic shortage of precision weapons needed to achieve qualitative superiority. Ukrainian artillerymen did not have enough shells to destroy Russian guns and ammunition depots at distances of 20-30 km. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces almost always had the necessary UAVs to support such strikes, thanks to domestically produced equipment.

Could the supply of these shells have been increased by mid-2023, when the shortage of precision shells was glaring amidst a difficult offensive? As noted, by spring 2023, the situation for using Excalibur shells had already become unacceptable. Russian forces had studied the use of these shells and developed effective electronic warfare measures, making Excalibur shells largely ineffective by the summer of 2023. This, incidentally, was one of the many reasons for the less-than-successful Ukrainian offensive in the southeast a year ago.

If American, German, and other 155-mm howitzers and precision shells had been delivered to Ukraine in sufficient quantities by early summer 2022, Russian forces would have suffered catastrophic equipment losses at that time. It is highly likely that this would have tipped the scales of the war decisively in Ukraine's favour.

The diagnosis is simple: "Too little and too late." Due to the insufficient pace of delivering effective weapons to Ukrainian forces, the Russian army has often had time to adapt.

Photo: Ukrainian Air Defence Forces use upgraded Soviet-era S-125 surface-to-air missile systems, which are nearly twice as old as the officers operating them. Source: Air Force Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Timely and Sufficient?

It seems that the goal should be the rapid and sufficient supply of modern, or at least upgraded, weapons systems. Otherwise, due to the slow pace of sanctions pressure and support from China, Russia will have the time to modernise its countermeasures.

For instance, in the summer of 2022, the HIMARS rocket systems, along with Excalibur shells, appeared to be genuine game changers. However, by spring 2023, their effectiveness had similarly declined due to active electronic warfare by Russian forces. This indicates that these systems were also supplied to Ukraine in insufficient quantities and not in the most modern versions.

Photo: The US Army received Hawk missile systems in 1959, and they have undergone multiple upgrades since. Ukrainian forces are now using this weaponry to shoot down Russian drones and cruise missiles. Source: Air Force Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Recently, reports have surfaced about the successful use of HIMARS during Ukraine's offensive in the Kursk region of Russia, which borders Ukraine's Sumy region. It is possible that this success is due to the supply of upgraded or more modern ammunition for these systems. Alternatively, Ukrainian forces may have taken advantage of the temporary absence of a well-established Russian electronic warfare system in the region. The coming days will reveal whether the successful strikes by Ukrainian forces on Russian military columns in the Kursk region and southern Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region were due to upgraded weapons or other factors.

In early August, Ukraine officially announced the commencement of combat use of F-16 multirole fighters, which it received from European partners. The first mentions of possible deliveries of these aircraft were back in 2022, but the process of acquiring and preparing them for effective use stretched over more than a year and a half.

During this time, Ukrainians did not idle: they integrated NATO missile systems into outdated Soviet aircraft, mastered operational communication and intelligence systems. In late May 2024, Sweden transferred two ASC 890 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft to Ukraine. These aircraft were provided as part of Sweden’s military support package for Ukraine, valued at 13.3 billion Swedish kronor ($1,3 billion), presented on 29 May.

Photo: The relatively modern German Iris-T surface-to-air missile system gained significant popularity following its use in Ukraine. It was developed quite recently, in the early 2000s. Source: Air Force Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

During the presentation of the ASC 890 aircraft, Swedish Defence Minister Pål Jonson predicted that these systems would have "the greatest impact on Ukrainian air defence" as they were planned to be used in conjunction with the then-promised F-16 fighters. This meant that these fighters were to be integrated into NATO’s Link 16 system, which allows the exchange of operational information with both ground military systems and Alliance combat aircraft.

It seems that the joint use of ASC 890 with F-16 fighters is already underway, as there have been increased reports of Russian air targets being struck since the beginning of August.

However, judging by the lack of reports about strikes on ground targets by Ukrainian aviation missiles, F-16s are not yet being used actively for such purposes. This indirectly suggests that the number of these aircraft at Ukraine's disposal is still too small. This aircraft is not a "silver bullet" on the battlefield, as the Russians possess long-range S-400 air defence systems and fighters equipped with rather long-range air-to-air missiles. Ukrainian F-16s, nevertheless, are capable of playing a decisive role, but only if their use is accompanied by successful strikes on Russian airfields and missile positions.

Photo: The most coveted system by Ukrainian air defence is the American Patriot missile system. In May 2023, it became the first in the world to intercept a group of Russian hypersonic missiles in combat conditions while defending Kyiv. Source: Air Force Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Currently, Ukraine is targeting Russian airfields with domestically produced long-range UAVs. Recent successful missions include strikes on airfields near Morozovsk (in the southern part of European Russia) and Lipetsk (in the central region of European Russia). However, the power of such strikes is still insufficient, though they do play a role.

"The best air defence is missile strikes on the enemy’s airfields," joke Ukrainian soldiers. They are utterly baffled as to why they are not being provided with missile systems capable of destroying Russian military targets at a distance of up to 1,500-2,000 kilometres. After all, the three main Russian strategic aviation airfields, from which bombers launch attacks on Ukrainian cities and power stations, are located at such distances.

Of course, Ukrainians are deeply grateful for the Patriot, NASAMS, and other air defence missile systems provided to them, with which they have even managed to shoot down ballistic missiles. But they would also prefer strike systems to attack Russian airfields and missile sites.

Photo: Hunting down Russian drones occurs every night. Ukrainian forces use not only aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles but also vehicles equipped with heavy machine guns mounted in the back, reminiscent of scenes from the film Mad Max. This particular vehicle was assembled in a field workshop from parts of at least five different car models. Source: 108th Separate Brigade of the Territorial Defence Forces of Ukraine

Asymmetry as a Silver Bullet

Of course, success requires not only modern weaponry but also its effective use, including sound strategic and operational decisions. Rather than launching frontal assaults on the Russian forces that re-invaded the Kharkiv region in May 2024, Kyiv struck the border area of Russia’s Kursk region on 6 August. This region had been used by Russians to constantly shell the Sumy region and launch drones and missiles into central Ukraine. This strike is a flanking manoeuvre against the Russian troops attacking Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city by population.

As of 11 August, Russia was still engaged in intense fighting against a significant Ukrainian force in the Kursk region, approximately 20 kilometres from the border.

One theory regarding the objective of the attack on the Kursk region is that Ukraine is trying to secure a strong position for possible ceasefire negotiations, which might commence after the US elections. Ukrainian forces currently control the border town of Sudzha in the Kursk region, near a gas hub that facilitates the export of Russian gas to Western Europe.

In response to these events, Alexander Bortnikov, Director of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), imposed an anti-terrorist regime in the Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod regions, an area covering over 90,000 square kilometres. This will, of course, allow the Russians to restrict the freedoms of local residents and conduct counter-sabotage measures, but it is not capable of halting the advance. The Ukrainian offensive is still unfolding, with reports suggesting that it could reach the Kursk nuclear power plant, the primary source of electricity for these three Russian regions.

Photo: The offensive in Russia’s Kursk region – an asymmetrical response to the challenges of 2024 and a lever for geopolitical balance. Ukrainian tank crew pose in front of a captured Russian tank. Ukrainian soldiers currently active on the frontline usually do not reveal their faces. Source: FB O.Sh

It is worth recalling that in 2022, Russian forces managed to capture the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine, which is the largest nuclear power station in Europe, housing six nuclear reactors. In the summer of 2023, the Ukrainian offensive advanced several dozen kilometres east of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Had the operation succeeded, the Russians would have been forced to abandon the station as they faced the threat of encirclement.

Amidst a severe shortage of modern weapons systems, Ukrainian forces are attempting to act asymmetrically, employing unconventional methods and utilising drones seemingly crafted in makeshift workshops. In doing so, they demonstrate that supplying weapons and financial support to Ukraine, which is resisting an aggressive Russia, is a quality investment in global security.