The Plan for Victory with Open Dates
The key aspect of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the United States is the presentation of his victory plan to senators, congressmen, President Joe Biden, and Vice President Kamala Harris, who is running in the US presidential elections, as well as her rival, former President Donald Trump. While many expected a brief and complete approach regarding this plan of action, it seems to be emerging as a starting point towards compelling the Kremlin to sit down for negotiations without preconditions.
As of 14:00 on 27 September Central European Time, detailed information on Zelensky’s victory plan, as the document is being called, was still unknown. Sparse leaks offered little insight into the content of the proposals. It was known that this plan includes five blocks of different directions—namely military, economic, sanctions, diplomatic, and foreign policy.
What is Known About the Plan
It was known for certain that the plan proposes to significantly expedite Ukraine’s accession to NATO as a guarantee of the inviolability of its borders should the war be frozen. Kyiv remains highly sceptical about the idea of stopping the forces of both sides “somewhere in the middle.”
Ukrainians rightly believe that freezing the conflict would only give Putin an opportunity to restart his economy, gather resources, and move forward again. “There’s no certainty that he (Putin) sees a boundary even along the Dnipro; it seems he wants to reach the Carpathians,” one of Kyiv’s private analysts told the author. There are objective grounds for such fears: after 2014, when Putin annexed Crimea and installed his puppets in Luhansk and Donetsk, he accumulated resources and trained the army for almost eight years. Putin conducted colossal military exercises for three consecutive years to, in 2022, on third try openly invade Ukraine.
There are also older grounds for demanding solid guarantees of territorial integrity through NATO membership: in the 1990s, Ukraine agreed to relinquish the Soviet nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet army. In return, Kyiv received very weak, almost worthless legal guarantees of sovereignty, which Putin crushed in 2014.
The military component of the plan, according to fragmented reports, involves significantly increasing the supply of weapons—both in quantity and quality—and mandatory permission for missile and other strikes on Russian territory. From a legal standpoint, even Ukrainian strikes on occupied Ukrainian regions are seen as strikes on Russian territory by Russia, as Putin passed amendments through the Russian parliament in 2014 declaring Ukrainian Crimea a Russian region. He did the same in 2022 concerning Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions.
However, Ukrainian strikes using American, British, and French missiles on these occupied territories did not lead to any consequences. Likewise, the offensive operation by Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region did not result in repercussions.
The question of allowing strikes on military targets within Russian territory using imported weapons is critically important for Kyiv, as such strikes could potentially destroy the infrastructure needed for Russian air and missile attacks on Ukraine, as well as logistics supporting Russian military operations.
Ukraine also urgently needs stronger economic sanctions against Russia to dismantle the income streams from raw materials, oil, and gas exports. Kyiv continues to plead for truly devastating economic sanctions against Russia that would halt the supply of critically important materials, components, and equipment essential for the functioning of Russia’s military-industrial complex. These sanctions should likely include decisions to seize Russian financial assets and other property abroad, as these resources are actively used by Russia to finance the war against Ukraine.
The next tier of the victory plan likely includes larger and more stable external financing during the war, along with a detailed timeline for post-war recovery—with sources of funding identified, of course.
Implementing the Plan? With Obstacles
The biggest obstacle was Putin’s announcement of changing the parameters for decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons. Essentially, this week Putin declared that he has no restrictions on spontaneously deciding on a tactical nuclear strike. The wording of his new nuclear doctrine allows him to make such a decision even if he perceives any indirect involvement of third countries in supporting Ukraine’s strikes deep into Russia.
However, there is one important detail—Ukraine regularly carries out precision strikes on military targets within Russian territory using long-range drones of its own design. And no significant responses to these strikes have occurred.
Some experts in NATO countries view Putin’s actions as mere bluff. Others believe that there is still some probability of Russia deciding to use tactical nuclear weapons. However, in any case, Putin’s move is perceived as a preventive quasi-diplomatic demarche aimed at disrupting Zelensky’s visit to the US and, at most, halting partner support for Kyiv.
Yet, only a day passed after Putin’s de facto ultimatum when Joe Biden ordered the US Department of Defense, as part of a multi-billion-dollar aid package, to expedite the provision of weapons to Ukraine, primarily offensive ones. This is unlikely to be seen as a direct verbal reaction to the nuclear demarche from the Kremlin, but actions speak louder here.
Next, it seems, will be the development and implementation of individual points of Zelensky’s victory plan—most likely not all of them and not in their original form. The situation is complicated by the fact that the US is currently nearing the end of its electoral process, limiting Joe Biden’s potential actions. Nonetheless, on 12 October, he will participate alongside other NATO leaders in a meeting of the “Ramstein Group,” which collectively shapes policy on supporting Ukraine in repelling Russian aggression.